1. Court's Judgements
Lagerblom v. Sweden (Appl. No. 26891/95, Judgement of 12 January 2003)
The applicant is a Finnish national who settled in Sweden in the 1980s. In February 1993, he was charged with a criminal offence. He was convicted in May 1994. The sentence was confirmed in appeal in June 1995. During the whole procedure, the applicant, for whom a lawyer was appointed, spoke in Finnish and submitted documents in Finnish. He also wanted to be represented by a different lawyer, one who understood Finnish. Before the Court he complained on the basis of Art. 6 § 3 of the ECHR, that he was not allowed to be defended by a lawyer of his choice. As a consequence his appointed lawyer, who did not or understand speak Finnish, could not carry out his duties properly. The Court started by saying that the right to chose one's lawyer was not absolute, notably when free legal aid is concerned. In appointing lawyers domestic courts should have regard to the wishes of the accused but these can be overridden when necessary for the interests of justice. In this case, the Court noted that the applicant's command of Swedish was sufficient to communicate with his lawyer and that in any case interpretation was provided during the hearings and when submitting documents in Finnish. For all these reasons, the Court decided that there was no breach of Art. 6 § 3 of the ECHR.
Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic v. Turkey (Appl. No. 46827/99 & 46951/99, Judgement of 6 February 2003)
Both applicants are nationals of Uzbekistan who fled to Turkey in 1998-1999 because of their involvement in anti-governmental activities and crimes. Once in Turkey, they were arrested and detained with a view to being extradited to Uzbekistan. All the domestic remedies failed because the Turkish courts considered that the applicants' criminal activities in Uzbekistan were of a non-political nature. They applied to the Court in March 1999 claiming that their extradition would constitute a violation of i) Art. 2 and Art. 3, since political opponents are seriously ill-treated in Uzbekistan, ii) Art. 6, because of the unfairness of both the Turkish extradition procedure and the criminal trial in Uzbekistan and, iii) Art. 34 (right to individual application before the Court), insofar as their extradition, in violation of the interim measure, prevented them from properly presenting and defending their case before the Court. Indeed, on 18 March 1999, the Court indicated an interim measure whereby it requested Turkey not to extradite the applicants, pending the examination of their claim. However, the Turkish authorities disregarded the interim measure and extradited the applicants to Uzbekistan on 27 March 1999. With regard to the part of the claim based on Art. 3 of the ECHR, the Court considered that while there were reports indicating that political opponents faced serious human rights violations in Uzbekistan, it was not demonstrated that the applicants themselves faced a real risk of being subjected to ill-treatment. Moreover, medical reports from the Uzbek medical authorities did not show that the applicants were mis-treated while in detention in Uzbekistan. Also, the Uzbek authorities had given assurances to Turkey that the applicants would not be sentenced to death and would be treated correctly. Based on these elements the Court concluded that the risk of ill-treatment was not sufficiently established. As for an eventual violation of Art. 6 by Turkey during the extradition procedure, the Court reiterated its jurisprudence on the inapplicability of that provision to extradition procedures, which as such do not involve a civil right or a criminal charge. On the other aspect of the Art. 6 complaint, the Court found that it did not have enough evidence to determine whether or not the judicial proceedings in Uzbekistan where conducted in violation of Art. 6 of the ECHR. Therefore on both these grounds, the Court unanimously said that there was no violation of the ECHR. With regard to Art. 34, the Court noted that the applicant's extradition prevented them from communicating properly with their lawyers and from providing evidence of violations of Art. 3 of the ECHR. The Court considered that in the context of Art. 3 the non-respect of an interim measure could have irreparable consequences, thus rendering the protection of the ECHR ineffective. The Court then made reference to other international jurisdictions (International Court of Justice, Interamerican Court of Human Rights) and treaty bodies (UN Committee of Human Rights, UN Torture Committee) which decided in some recent decisions and judgements that interim measures were somehow binding insofar as their aim is to preserve the rights of the parties and prevent eventual violations of the concerned international obligations. Based on this developing jurisprudence, the Court noted that if the applicants were not able to provide sufficient evidence to establish eventual violations of Art. 3 of the ECHR, that was because Turkey extradited them to Uzbekistan, from where they could not communicate properly with the Turkish lawyer in charge of their case in Strasbourg. Consequently, six judges out of seven (the Turkish judge dissented on this point) concluded that the disregard of the interim measure constituted an indirect violation of Art. 34 of the ECHR. It must be noted that in accordance with Art. 43 of the ECHR, this judgement has been referred to the Grand Chamber. The Grand Chamber has the power to review a judgement when the case raises serious questions affecting the interpretation or application of the ECHR or a serious issue of general importance. Therefore, this judgement is not final.
Jakupovic v. Austria (Appl. No. 36757/97, Judgement of 6 February 2003)
The applicant is a national of Bosnia Herzegovina who went to Austria in 1991 to join his mother who was already living and working there. Following several criminal offences (burglary, possession of arms) he was issued with a 10 year residence prohibition in 1995. This decision was confirmed in successive appeals and the applicant was deported to Bosnia Herzegovina in 1997. Before the Court, the applicant complained that the residence prohibition constituted an interference with his right to family life and consequently a violation of Art. 8 § 1 of the ECHR. The Court indicated that its task in such cases was to determine whether a fair balance was struck between the States' interests (prevention of crime) and the applicant's rights. In this case, the Court noted that the applicant was 16 when he was expelled. Moreover, Bosnia had just been through a conflict and the applicant's father has been reported missing since the end of the conflict. There was no evidence that he still had relatives living there. Turning to the criminal offences, the Court considered that while the applicant was convicted twice for burglary, he was only given conditional sentences of imprisonment. Moreover, there were no indications that he made use of the arms for which he received a prohibition of possession. Based on all these elements, the Court decided the Austrian authorities did not strike a fair balance between the interests at stake. Consequently there was a violation of Art. 8 of the ECHR.
Ocalan v. Turkey (Appl. No. 46221/99, Judgement of 12 March 2003)
On 9 October 1998, the applicant was expelled from Syria, where he was living for many years. He ultimately went to Kenya, from where, on the evening of 15 February 1999, he was taken on board of an aircraft at Nairobi airport and arrested by Turkish officials. He was then flown to Turkey. On arrival in Turkey he was questioned by the security forces from 16 to 23 February 1999. He received no legal assistance during that period and made several self-incriminating statements which contributed to his conviction. His lawyer in Turkey was prevented from travelling to visit him by members of the security forces. On 23 February 1999, the applicant appeared before an Ankara State Security Court judge, who ordered him to be placed in pre-trial detention. The first visit from his lawyers was restricted to 20 minutes and took place with members of the security forces and a judge present in the same room. Subsequent meetings took place in the same conditions. After the first two visits from his lawyers, the applicant’s contact with them was restricted to two one-hour visits a week. The prison authorities did not authorise the applicant’s lawyers to provide him with a copy of the documents in the case file, other than the indictment. It was not until the hearing on 2 June 1999 that the State Security Court gave the applicant permission to consult the case file under the supervision of two registrars and his lawyers permission to provide him with a copy of certain documents. He was indicted on 24 April 1999 for carrying out actions calculated to bring about the separation of a part of Turkish territory and of forming and leading an armed gang to achieve that end. The Public Prosecutor asked the court to sentence the applicant to death. On 29 June 1999 the applicant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to death. The Court of Cassation upheld the judgement. On 30 November 1999 the European Court of Human Rights, applying Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (interim measures), requested the Turkish authorities not to carry out the sentence so as to enable the Court to proceed effectively with the examination of the admissibility and merits of the applicant’s complaints under the ECHR. In October 2001, Article 38 of the Turkish Constitution was amended, abolishing the death penalty except in time of war or of imminent threat of war or for acts of terrorism. On 3 October 2002, the Ankara State Security Court commuted the applicant’s death sentence to life imprisonment. The Court made the following finding with regard to the various aspects of the complaint;
The Court held, unanimously, that there had been:
· no violation of Article 5 § 1 (no unlawful deprivation of liberty) of the ECHR in that the applicant’s arrest and detention had not been unlawful;
· a violation of Article 5 § 3 (right to be brought promptly before a judge) given the failure to bring the applicant before a judge promptly after his arrest;
· a violation of Article 5 § 4 (right to have lawfulness of detention decided speedily by a court) given the lack of a remedy by which the applicant could have the lawfulness of his detention in police custody decided.
The Court held:
· by six votes to one, that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 in that the applicant was not tried by an independent and impartial tribunal;
· and unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial), taken together with Article 6 § 3 (b) (right to adequate time and facilities for preparation of defence) and (c) (right to legal assistance), in that the applicant did not have a fair trial.
The Court held:
· unanimously, that there had been no violation of Article 2 (right to life);
· unanimously, that there had been no violation of Article 3 (prohibition of ill-treatment) of the ECHR, concerning the implementation of the death penalty;
· and, by six votes to one, that there had been a violation of Article 3 concerning the imposition of the death penalty following an unfair trial.
Treatment and conditions
The Court held, unanimously, that there had been:
· no violation of Article 3 of the Convention, concerning the conditions in which the applicant was transferred from Kenya to Turkey and the conditions of his detention on the island of İmralı.
The Court also held, unanimously, that there had been:
· no violation of Article 14 of the Convention (prohibition of discrimination), taken together with Article 2 as regards the implementation of the death penalty;
· no violation of Article 34 of the Convention (right of individual application).
Finally the Court held, unanimously, that no separate examination was necessary of the applicant’s remaining complaints under Articles 7 (no punishment without law), 8 (right to respect for private and family life), 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), 10 (freedom of expression), 13 (right to an effective remedy), 14 and 18 (limitation on use of restrictions on rights).
Yilmaz v. Germany (Appl. No. 52853/99, Judgement of 17 April 2003)
The applicant is a Turkish national who was born in Germany in 1976. In 1992, he was granted an indefinite residence permit. However, between 1995 and 1996 he committed a number of criminal offences (robbery, assault, sexual assault) for which he was sentenced to prison. In 1998, he was informed that in view of his criminal record he was requested to leave Germany or face expulsion. Even though the applicant had a German girlfriend, with whom he had a child, all the appeals against this administrative decision failed and the applicant had to leave Germany in 2000. Before the Court, the applicant claimed that his expulsion to Turkey and the indefinite ban from German territory constituted an interference with his family life and therefore a violation of Art. 8 § 1 of the ECHR. The Court first confirmed that the decision to expel the applicant was prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim, i.e. the prevention of disorder or crime. It then determined whether such a measure was proportionate and necessary in a democratic society. The Court noted that the applicant was a second generation immigrant. He studied in Germany, he had an indefinite residence permit and he had a German partner and a young child. Also, his parents and his two sisters live in Germany. With regard to this last point, the Court recalled the protection of Art. 8 applies to adults if it is demonstrated that there is a dependency link, other than the usual affective bonds. Finally, the Court found that the applicant was relatively young when he committed the criminal offences, for which he was sentenced to three years imprisonment in total. In light of all these elements, the Court concluded that while the expulsion of the applicant was not as such a disproportionate measure, the fact that the authorities decided to issue an indefinite ban from the territory, made it go beyond what is necessary in a democratic society. Therefore, the Court decided that there had been a violation of Art. 8 of the ECHR.
2. Court's Decisions
A. Cases Declared Admissible
Krstina Blecic v. Croatia (Appl. No. 59532/00, Decision of 30 January 2003)
The applicant is a Croatian citizen of Serb descent. In 1953, she and her husband were granted a specially protected tenancy on a flat in the town of Zadar. Following his death in 1989, she became the sole tenant. In July 1991, she travelled to visit her daughter in Rome. Shortly afterwards armed conflict broke out in Dalmatia and Zadar was subjected to heavy shelling. In October 1991, the Croatian authorities terminated the applicant’s pension and medical insurance, as she was not, at that time, a Croatian citizen. In view of her age and poor health, the applicant decided to remain in Rome. In November 1991, a family occupied the applicant’s flat. In February 1992, the municipal authorities took proceedings against the applicant to terminate her tenancy right on the basis that she had been absent for more than six months without justification. The applicant relied on her lack of means and poor health as reasons for staying with her daughter. The Municipal Court found these reasons insufficient to justify her absence and terminated her tenancy. After successive appeals including to the Constitutional Court, the applicant's tenancy right was ultimately terminated. Before the Court the applicant claims that the judicial termination of her tenancy right constitutes a violation of Art. 8 (right to respect for her home) and Art. 1 Protocol 1, since she was deprived of a possibility to buy the flat under favourable conditions. The Court first looked at whether it was competent ratione temporis to consider this complaint, since the facts and part of the domestic proceedings took place before the entry into force of the ECHR in respect of Croatia (5 November 1997). To make that determination, the Court observed that the last domestic judicial decision, the Constitutional Court's decision of November 1999, was in fact directly decisive for the applicant’s Convention rights. Therefore, the Court considered the application compatible ratione temporis. The Court finally considered the application admissible on both grounds.
Moldovan & 13 Others and Rostas & 9 Others v. Romania (Appl. No. 41138/98 and Appl. No. 64320/01, Decision of 3 June 2003)
Following a deadly bar fight involving two Romas from the village of Hădăreni in September 1993, the non-Roma population of the village decided to take revenge on all the Romas living there. As a result, some 13 houses belonging to Romas were burnt and other properties destroyed. The two Romas involved in the bar fight were beaten to death. The police did nothing to protect the applicants and even assisted the mob during the riot. While the criminal proceedings concerning the eventual involvement of police officers into these incidents were unsuccessful, those concerning the non-Roma villagers lead to the conviction of twelve of them. Some were convicted of extremely serious murder and others of destruction, offences against morality and disturbance of public order. The Court of Appeal and later the Supreme Court increased the prison sentence for some of them and decreased it for others. Those convicted of extremely serious murder were ultimately pardoned by Presidential decisions and released. The Romanian government also allocated some funds for the rehabilitation of the destroyed houses. Before the Court, the applicants claim that since the destruction of their houses they have been living in very poor conditions, amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Art. 3 of the ECHR. They also complain under Art. 6 about the length of criminal proceedings and about the fact that in the absence of proceedings against the police officers involved in the riots, it is impossible to determine to what extent the civil responsibility of the State could be established. They further claim under Art. 8 that due to the partial or superficial rehabilitation of their houses, they cannot resume a normal family life. They invoke Art. 14 (discrimination) in conjunction with all the a/m articles. The Court declared the application admissible on all grounds.
B. Cases Declared Inadmissible
Mogos and Krifka v. Germany (Appl. No. 78084/01, Decision of 27 March 2003)
The applicants, a couple and their five children, are stateless persons of Romanian origin. In 1990, they left Romania for Germany where they sought asylum claiming that being Romas they faced persecution. In 1993, they renounced their Romanian nationality. Their application for asylum, as well as their attempts to obtain residence permits in Germany were rejected at all stages of the procedure. On 7 March 2002, the applicants (with the exception of the first two children, who were married to German nationals) were expelled to Romania, notably pursuant to an agreement concluded between the two States in 1998, whereby Romania declared that it was prepared to accept its former national who had become stateless persons. They have been staying since then in the transit centre of Bucharest Airport, refusing to enter Romania but wishing to return to Germany. Before the Court, the applicants complained that the implementation of the agreement signed between Germany and Romania violated Art. 6 § 1 of the ECHR. Moreover, their expulsion as such violated Art. 3 and Art. 8 of the ECHR. The Court declared the case inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, since the applicant's lawyer did not deem necessary to go before the Federal Constitutional Court. Indeed, in the opinion of the applicants’ representative, this constitutional action had no prospect of success.
Roslina Chandra and Others v. the Netherlands (Appl. No. 53102/99, Decision of 13 May 2003)
The principle applicant is a Dutch national of Indonesian origin. She left Indonesia in 1992 while she was still in the process of divorcing from her husband. The four children remained in Indonesia in their father’s care. In the Netherlands, she met and settled with a Dutch national and she was granted a residence permit for the purpose of living with him. She obtained Dutch citizenship in 1996. In the meantime, she was granted custody of the children and she therefore wanted them to join her. They arrived in the Netherlands in 1997 with a short stay visa of 90 days. Their request for a residence permit was rejected by the Dutch authorities which considered that the close ties between the mother and her children were severed by the separation back in 1992 and that in any case she did not have the means to support them. Moreover, for the Dutch authorities, there were no obstacles to the family living together in Indonesia. The successive appeals against this decision were unsuccessful. Before the Court, the applicant claimed that the refusal to deliver a residence permit constituted an interference with the family life and therefore a violation of Art. 8 of the ECHR. The Court considered first that the children lived all their lives in Indonesia and had therefore strong links with that country. Moreover, two of them attained the age of majority and given the age of the others, 15 and 13 years old, they were not as much in need of care as younger children. The Court further found that the children could live in Indonesia with other relatives or even with their mother, who could develop a family life in that country. For all these reasons, the Court concluded that by refusing the requested residence permit, the Netherlands did in fact strike a fair balance between the applicant's interests and its own interest in controlling immigration. The case was therefore declared inadmissible.
C. Cases Adjourned
D. Cases Struck out of the List
E. Friendly Settlements
F. Applications Communicated to Governments
Mogos v. Romania (Appl. No. 20420/02)
The applicants, a couple and their five major children, are stateless persons of Romanian origin. In 1990, they left Romania for Germany where they sought asylum claiming that being Romas they faced persecution. In 1993, they renounced their Romanian nationality. Their application for asylum, as well as their attempts to obtain residence permits in Germany were rejected at all stages of the procedure. On 7 March 2002, the applicants (with the exception of the first two children, who were married to German nationals) were expelled to Romania, notably pursuant to an agreement concluded between the two States in 1998, whereby Romania declared that it was prepared to accept its former national who had become stateless persons. Since 7 March 2002 the deported applicants, including the three children, have remained in the transit centre of Bucharest Airport, refusing to enter Romania but wishing to return to Germany. The case has been communicated to the Romanian government under Art. 3 (ill-treatment), Art. 5 § 1 (detention), Art. 2 Protocol No. 4 (freedom of movement), and Art. 14 (discrimination) in conjunction with Art. 3 and Art. 2 of Protocol No. 4.
Basnet v. United Kingdom (Appl. No. 43136/02)
The applicant is a national of Nepal, who sought asylum in the UK in October 2000. She claimed that she suffered ill-treatment on account of her husband’s political activities. He was arrested in April 2000 as was their son six weeks later. Neither had been seen since. Her asylum application was rejected on the basis that she was not facing persecution, her claims did not amount to a sustained pattern or campaign of persecution and she could have attempted to seek redress through the proper Nepalese authorities. There were also significant discrepancies in her account. The applicant appealed to the Special Adjudicator. Although she was legally represented, she prepared the written submissions herself. Her appeal was rejected on the ground that her account was unreliable, inconsistent and that there was no reasonable likelihood of her being targeted, detained, tortured, ill-treated or killed in Nepal. The applicant prepared written submissions for the Immigration Appeals Tribunal (IAT), repeating her claims and explaining that the inconsistencies noted by the Special Adjudicator were due to poor translations. While IAT hearing was scheduled for April 2001, the applicant submitted a medical certificate indicating her inability to attend on the appointed date. Her solicitors withdrew just before the hearing, which went ahead nonetheless. The IAT decided to disregard the applicant’s further documentary evidence since it had not been filed in triplicate and the applicant had not explained why she had not made these arguments earlier. The IAT upheld the Special Adjudicator’s decision. The applicant sought leave to appeal, arguing that her failure to supply documents in triplicate was due to her lack of professional help, as she had not been able to pay her solicitors. She further submitted that the inconsistencies detected in her statements were due to factors such as trauma-induced memory loss and language difficulties, since the interpreters assigned to her were not proficient in her language. Following the refusal of leave to appeal, the applicant applied to the Court of Appeal, which rejected her application in November 2002. The applicant’s expulsion was scheduled for 10 December 2002 but on the basis of Rule 39 the Court asked the UK not to carry it out. The case was then communicated to the Government under Art. 2, Art. 3, Art. 5 and Art. 6 of the ECHR.
Ovihangy v. Sweden (Appl. No. 44421/02)
The applicant is an Iranian national of Kurdish descent who sought asylum in Sweden in April 1999. He claimed that he became a political activist in 1990 and that he was arrested, detained and tortured in 1994, after which he avoided political activity. However, in February 1999, following the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, he participated in a public demonstration, handing out posters and leaflets. The military intervened and the applicant went into hiding. He learned of the arrest of his father and brother and secretly left the country for Turkey, from where he travelled to Sweden. His asylum application was rejected both in first and second instance. The Swedish asylum authorities considered that, apart from those who worked actively for Kurdish political goals, the members of this ethnic minority were normally left in peace. As the applicant ceased political activity in 1994, his fears were exaggerated. The applicant made two successive new asylum applications, producing a medical opinion showing a risk of suicide should he be deported and providing further information about the risks he would face in Iran and a medical diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. They were again rejected. In October 2002, he was put on a plane to Istanbul, escorted by two police officers. However, attempts to make him board a plane to Teheran from Istanbul failed and he was therefore taken back to Sweden where he was kept in detention until 23 December. A further psychiatric assessment concluded that because of the long-lasting strains to which the applicant had been exposed (torture, political persecution), his mental health would be significantly prejudiced should he be forcibly expelled and that there was a high risk of suicide. On 2 January 2003, the expulsion order was stayed. In addition to arguing that his expulsion would be contrary to Art. 3, the applicant contends that his detention was illegal, since it exceeded the period of two months permitted in Swedish law. The complaint has been communicated to the Government under Art. 3 and Art. 5 § 1(f) of the ECHR.
Ndangoya v. Sweden (Appl. No. 17868/03)
The applicant is a Tanzanian national currently serving a seven-year sentence in Sweden for aggravated assault. He was married to a Swedish national, whom he accompanied to Sweden in 1991. Both spouses were already infected with HIV. They had two daughters in 1991 and 1996. The applicant received a residence permit in July 1996. He divorced his wife in 1997 and in 1999 he was convicted of aggravated assault. In addition to the term of imprisonment, the court of appeal ordered that he should be banned for life from Sweden. The applicant claims that he has a close relationship with his daughters and has produced letters in support of his claim. His place of detention is far from their home, creating psychological difficulties for his former spouse and his daughters. According to a medical expert, the applicant would have little chance of continuing his treatment for HIV if sent back to Tanzania. This would entail the development of Aids, leading to death in 3-4 years. The application was communicated to the government under Art. 2, Art. 3 and Art. 8 of the ECHR.
Melnychenko v. Ukraine (Appl. No. 17707/02)
The applicant is a Ukrainian national holding refugee status in the USA. He was previously an officer in the State Security Service of Ukraine, assigned to the President’s office. During the course of his work, he made audio recordings of phone calls between the President and other persons regarding the possible involvement of the President in the disappearance of a journalist. The applicant left the country two days before the tapes were made public in Parliament in November 2000. He was granted refugee status by the USA in April 2001. In January 2002, the Socialist Party of Ukraine nominated the applicant to stand for the upcoming parliamentary elections. However, his candidature was rejected on the basis that he was not permanently resident in the country and that he had provided inaccurate information about his actual place of residence and his residence during the previous five years. The applicant maintains that he still has a permanent address in Kiev. The complaint has been communicated to the Government under Art. 3 of the Protocol No. 1 (right to free election) and Art. 14 (discrimination) of the ECHR.
G. Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court - Interim Measures
3. Supervision of Execution of Judgements by the Committee of Ministers
KKC v. the Netherlands, ResDH(2003)38 adopted on 24 February 2003
In this decision the Committee of Ministers satisfied itself that in accordance with the judgement of 21 December 2001 the Dutch government did issue to the applicant a residence permit without restrictions and paid to him the sum of 1,400 Euros in respect of costs and expenses.
4. Other News
On 15 January 2003, Malta signed and ratified Protocol 7 of the ECHR.
On 29 January 2003, Francisco Javier Borrego Borrego (Spain) was elected as judge at the European Court of Human Rights.
In March 2003, four judges of the Court went to Moldova to take evidence from witnesses in the case of Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and the Russian Federation. Interviews with the witnesses took place in Chisinau and in Tiraspol. This case has been declared admissible on 4 July 2001 and is currently pending before a Grand Chamber of the Court.
Protocol 12 of the ECHR (prohibition of discrimination) has been further ratified by Croatia and San Marino. Having also been ratified by Cyprus and Georgia, it needs another 6 ratifications in order to enter into force. It has been signed by 28 member states of the Council of Europe.
On 3 April 2003, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro signed the ECHR, as well as Protocol 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13.
Protocol 13 of the ECHR (abolition of the death penalty in times of war) entered into force on 1 July 2003. It has been signed and ratified by 15 member states of the Council of Europe.
UNHCR LO Strasbourg,
22 July 2003
 See Judgement of the Court in the case of Maaouia v. France, 5 October 2000, Appl. No. 39652/98. Update No. 15, August 2000 - December 2000.
 For the part of the complaint concerning Romania, see under Applications Communicated to Governments, Mogos v. Romania, Appl. No. 20420/02
 For the part of the complaint concerning Germany, see under Cases Declared Inadmissible, Mogos and Krifka v. Germany, Appl. No. 78084/01
 See Update No. 17, July - December 2001.
 See Update No. 16, January - July 2001.
 Andorra, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Georgia, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Romania, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine.