EN
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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES |
Brussels, 05.12.2001
COM(2001) 743 final
COMMISSION WORKING DOCUMENT
The relationship between
safeguarding internal security
and complying with international protection obligations and instruments
This Working Document is the Commission response to
Conclusion 29 of the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting of
20 September 2001, in which: “The Council invites the Commission to
examine urgently the relationship between safeguarding internal security and
complying with international protection obligations and instruments”.
INDEX
Introduction
Chapter 1: Mechanisms for excluding those not deserving
protection from Refugee Convention status and other forms of international
protection
1.1. Application
of exclusion clauses
1.1.1 Terrorism
in relation to the grounds for exclusion from Refugee Convention
1.1.2 Definition
of terrorism
1.1.3 Membership
of a terrorist group
1.2 Cancellation
of Refugee Convention status
1.2.1 Re-examination
of refugee status granted
1.3. Crimes
committed on the territory of the country of refuge
1.4 Asylum
procedure
1.4.1 Access
to the asylum procedure
1.4.2. The processing of asylum requests in extradition cases
1.4.2.1 Suspension
of the examination of an asylum claim
1.4.2.2 Inadmissible
asylum claims
1.4.3 Treatment
within asylum procedures
1.4.3.1 Assessment
of the asylum claim in a regular asylum procedure
1.4.3.2 Assessment
of the asylum claim in an accelerated asylum procedure
1.4.4 Standard
of proof
1.4.5 Right
to appeal the exclusion decision
1.5 Administrative
treatment of potential article 1(F) cases
1.5.1 Special
units in the asylum system for dealing with exclusion clauses
1.5.2 Guidelines
on the use of the exclusion clauses
1.5.3 Information
exchange mechanisms
1.6 Treatment
of security risk cases
1.7 Exclusion
from other forms of international protection
Chapter 2: Legal follow up to the exclusion
of persons from Refugee Convention status or other forms of international
protection
2.1 Prosecution
or extradition
2.2 Prosecution
2.2.1 Universal
jurisdiction
2.2.2 Future
International Criminal Court
2.3 Extradition
2.3.1 Legal
obstacles to extradition or removal
2.3.2 Legal
guarantees in extradition cases
2.4 The
legal position of persons excluded from protection regimes but who are
non-removable
2.4.1 Harmonisation
of basic rights granted to persons excluded from protection regimes but who are non-removable
2.4.2 Detention and alternatives to detention of of persons excluded from protection
regimes but who are non-removable
Chapter 3: Approximation of relevant legislation,
regulation and administrative practices against the background of the Common
European Asylum System
3.1 General
framework
3.2 Legislative
harmonisation, accompanying measures, administrative co-operation and the Open Co-ordination Method
Chapter 4: Analysis of “internal
security”-related provisions in EC legislation and (future) Commission
Proposals for EC legislation in the immigration and
asylum field
4.1 General
analysis
4.2 EC
legislation in the field of asylum
4.2.1 Temporary
Protection
4.2.2 Eurodac
4.3 Proposals
for EC legislation in the field of asylum
4.3.1 Asylum
procedures
4.3.2 Reception
conditions
4.3.3 State
determination
4.3.4 Qualification
for international protection
4.4 Proposals
for EC legislation in the field of immigration
4.4.1 Economic
migration
4.4.2 Family
reunification
4.4.3 Long
term residency status
4.5 Future
Proposals for EC legislation in the field of immigration
4.5.1
Students
and other third country nationals
4.5.2 Victims
of trafficking
INTRODUCTION
At the
Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting of 20 September 2001,
flowing from the tragic events of the 11th of September in the USA,
Conclusion 29 invited “the Commission to examine urgently the
relationship between safeguarding internal security and complying with
international protection obligations and instruments”. This specific subject has been and will
remain a permanent concern to the Commission, and may result in the mid to long
term to Proposals for (amended) legislation. In answering to the above
invitation this Working Paper however aims at providing for both a rapid
reaction as well as a comprehensive review of the issue.
The European
Council has in the aftermath of and in response to the 11th
September events decided to develop an “Action Plan on the fight
against terrorism”.
This Plan covers several policy areas, including external, economic/financial,
transportation and Justice and Home Affairs policy. With regard to the latter
strand, Justice and Home Affairs, a separate plan of action has been developed,
covering more particularly the policy areas of: judicial co-operation,
co-operation between police and intelligence services, financing of terrorism,
measures at the border and other measures. In the “measures at the
border” Chapter of
the Conclusions of the extraordinary JAI Council of 20 September 2001, in which
Conclusion 29 is framed, other specific Conclusions relate to border control,
issuing of identity documents, residence permits and visa, and the functioning
of the Schengen Information System (SIS).
These specific Conclusions
are very relevant in the fight against terrorism, and more generally they
provide tools for States to strengthen national security. In particular pre-entry screening,
including strict visa policy and the possible use of biometric data, as well as
measures to enhance co-operation between border guards, intelligence services,
immigration and asylum authorities of the State concerned, could offer real
possibilities for identifying those suspected of terrorist involvement at an
early stage. The functioning of Europol, Eurodac and the SIS can also
substantially assist in the identification of terrorist suspects. However,
these specific Conclusions are subject of separate actions and follow up to be
taken at European and Member States level, and therefore fall outside the scope
of this Paper. With this Paper , the Commission focuses on the mandate
formulated in Conclusion 29.
This Document
takes a fourfold approach. Firstly, the Paper will
analyse the existing legal mechanisms for excluding those persons from
international protection who do not deserve such protection, focusing in
particular on those suspected of terrorist acts. Subsequently, the Paper will
consider which legal steps can possibly be taken by governments who are
confronted with a person who is excluded from international protection
regimes. The Paper will then
elaborate in more detail on what actions can be initiated and taken at European
level regarding the issue at stake, in the short as well as in the mid to long
term. Finally, the Paper will assess the adequacy of the internal security related provisions in EC
legislation and (future) Commission Proposals for Directives in the asylum
and immigration field
The two main
premises on which this Document is built are, firstly, that bona fide refugees
and asylum seekers should not become victims of the recent events, and secondly
that there should be no avenue for those supporting or committing terrorist
acts to secure access to the territory of the Member States of the European
Union. It is therefore legitimate
and fully understandable that Member States are now looking at reinforced
security safeguards to prevent terrorists from gaining admission to their
territory through different channels. These could include asylum channels,
though in practice terrorists are not likely to use the asylum channel much, as
other, illegal, channels are more discreet and more suitable for their criminal
practices. Any security safeguard therefore needs to strike a proper balance
with the refugee protection principles at stake. In this context the Commission
fully endorses the line taken and expressed by UNHCR that, rather than through
major changes to the refugee protection regime, a scrupulous application of the
exceptions to refugee protection available under current law, is the
appropriate approach.
Chapter 1: Mechanisms for excluding those not deserving
protection from the Refugee Convention status and others forms of international
protection
1.1 Application
of the exclusion clauses
After the 11th September events,
UNHCR has publicly called on States to “scrupulously and
rigorously” apply the exclusion clauses, as contained in Article 1(F) of
the Refugee Convention, as that
Convention was never intended to be a “safe haven” for criminals,
nor was it designed to protect them from criminal prosecution, but quite the
opposite: to protect the persecuted and not the persecutors.
Article 1(F) of
the Refugee Convention states that refugee status can not be granted to any
person with respect to whom “ there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime
against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make
provision in respect of such crimes;
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the
country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations”
This Paper is not
the appropriate framework for analysing in full detail the application of the
three grounds listed in Article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention. In addition to
guidelines issued by Member States, UNHCR has issued special guidelines on the
application of this particular article. The Commission also likes to refer to
other relevant documents issued by UNHCR, including background papers and notes
for the UNHCR Standing Committee and within the context of UNHCR’s Global
Consultations process.
1.1.1 Terrorism
in relation to the three grounds for exclusion from Refugee Convention
In line with
several United Nations General Assembly-
and Security Council Resolutions, most recently Resolution 1373 of 28
September 2001, and following international refugee law jurisprudence,
exclusion of persons involved in terrorist acts from refugee status may be
based on either of the three grounds listed in the exclusion clause under
Article 1(F), depending on the circumstances of the case.
·
Art 1F
(a): as it has been recognised
that terrorist acts may constitute “war crimes” if committed in a
war context
·
Art.1F (b):
in so far as particular cruel actions, even if committed with an allegedly
political objective, can be classified as serious non-political crimes, and
fall within the realm of extraditable offences.
·
Art. 1F (c)
following UN General Assembly Resolutions “Relating to measures combating
terrorism”, which declare that "acts, methods and practices of
terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations" and that "knowingly financing, planning and inciting
terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations".
1.1.2 Definition
of terrorism
Rather than
attempting to adopt a general definition of what constitutes terrorism, States
have, until now, preferred to declare certain specific acts as terrorist
crimes. They have identified a number of crimes within this category, such as
those related to hijacking, hostage-taking and bomb attacks. Though within the
United Nations context work is accelerated with regard to the preparations for
an international instrument on terrorism, there is no internationally agreed
definition of terrorism as yet.
In this particular
context it is even more relevant that the European Commission has recently
adopted the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism[1] (which includes the establishment of
minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts) and the Proposal
for a Council Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the
surrender procedures between the Member States.[2]
In particular an EU common definition of what constitutes terrorists offences,
if incorporated in EU extradition treaties, may be a basis for relying on
Article 1(F)(b). EU standards will also be a helpful way of illuminating UN
standards of eg “terrorist acts”, and hence serve as an
interpretative aid to application of Article 1 (F) (a) or 1(F) (c).
1.1.3 Membership
of a terrorist group
Mere, voluntary,
membership of a terrorist group may, in some cases, amount to personal and
knowing participation, or acquiescence amounting to complicity, in the crimes
in question, and hence to exclusion from refugee status. In this assessment the purpose of the
group, the status and level of the person involved, and factors such as
duress and self-defence against superior orders, as well as the availability of
a moral choice should be taken into consideration. If it has been determined
that the person
is still an actual, active, present and willing member, the fact of mere
membership may be difficult to dissociate from the commission of terrorist
crimes.
1.2 Cancellation
of Refugee Convention status
Refugee
Convention’s status can be withdrawn, for instance if it is discovered
that the person had committed serious crimes, including terrorist acts, before
having been recognised as a refugee. In such cases refugee status may be cancelled,
following the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status.
1.2.1 Re-examination
of refugee statuses granted
Active re-examination of “closed
files” of persons granted a refugee status could be considered by Member
States. However, such a re-examination should only be undertaken if there is a
clear inducement for doing so, for instance based upon intelligence services
information, identifying security risks. A review of cases based solely on the
grounds of nationality, religion or political opinion is not considered
appropriate. If this re-examination would lead to the conclusion that someone
indeed has committed crimes falling under the scope of the exclusion clauses,
his/her refugee status could be cancelled.
1.3. Crimes
committed on the territory of the country of refuge
In cases where a
refugee has committed a serious crime, including terrorist acts, on the
territory of the country of refuge, protection against expulsion can be
withdrawn, in conformity with Article 32 (1), “The Contracting States
shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of
national security or public order”, and Article 33 (2) (on prohibition of expulsion
or return -“refoulement”): of the Refugee Convention. The
purpose of this latter article is to safeguard the receiving country from persons
who present a danger to the public safety or the security of the country, and
states that: “The benefit of the present provision may
not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for
regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who,
having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime,
constitutes a danger to the community of that country”.
Article 33(2) therefore provides an exception
to the principle of non-refoulement, laid
down in Article 33(1). This means in essence that refugees can exceptionally be
returned in case of threat to the national security of the host country, and in
case their proven criminal nature and record constitute a danger to the
community. The various elements of these extreme and exceptional circumstances
need, however, to be interpreted restrictively and require a high standard of
proof. However, any person within the terms of Art. 33(2) may lawfully be
expelled, even if the only option is to return him or her to the country in
which persecution is feared, without prejudice to other international legal
obligations of States, in particular Article 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights.
1.4 Asylum
Procedure
1.4.1 Access
to the asylum procedure
In order to implement in good faith, and
“full and inclusively”, the 1951 Refugee Convention it is
indispensable to determine who fulfils the requirements of the Convention.
Therefore all persons requesting for asylum in the Member State responsible for
assessing the claim, should be granted access to a procedure, enabling such
assessment. Automatic bars to accessing an asylum procedure, even of suspected
criminals, for instance by rejection at the border, without providing such
persons access to an asylum procedure, could result in
“refoulement”. In addition this would not be in conformity with
article 4 of the Proposal for a Council Directive on
minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing
refugee status[3].
Channelling all
asylum seekers through an asylum procedure with a view to granting or denying refugee status
is also necessary from a practical security perspective. It effectively
provides the opportunity to identify possible suspects of crimes. Asylum seekers will be known and identified, their
background thoroughly investigated in one or more interviews, and checked
against all available information on countries, groups and events. In addition
they will be easily “tracked” during the procedure, even if they
are not detained.
1.4.2 The
handling of asylum request in extradition cases
1.4.2.1 Suspension
of the examination of an asylum claim
After access to the asylum procedure has been granted, it could however
be considered to allow for the immediate suspension, the “freezing”
of the actual examination of the asylum request in the following two
situations. Firstly, in cases
in which an international criminal tribunal has indicted the individual who has
claimed asylum. In such cases, the appropriate response would be to hand over
the individual concerned to that tribunal for prosecution. The second possible
ground for a suspension of the examination of the asylum request would be where an extradition
request from a country other than the country of origin of the asylum seeker,
relating to serious crimes, is
pending. In both cases the criminal proceedings would take priority over the
actual conducting of the asylum procedure. Following the criminal prosecution
of these cases, and following the serving of an eventual punishment, the old
situation of the asylum request would be “unfrozen”. This would effectively
mean that the asylum seeker would be transferred back to the country where he
had an asylum request pending. If opted for this approach the Proposal
for a Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for
granting and withdrawing refugee status[4] would need to be
changed to allow for such an approach.
1.4.2.2 Inadmissible
asylum claims
An alternative legislative approach for
dealing with asylum claims in cases where an extradition request or an
indictment by an International Criminal Court has been made, could consist in
the
dismissal of an asylum claim as being “inadmissible”. In this
option it would be necessary to add to article 18 of the Proposal for a Council Directive on
minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing
refugee status[5], dealing with the
inadmissibility of certain claims for asylum, two new grounds for
inadmissibility: namely in cases where an extradition
request has been made by a country, other than the country of origin of the
asylum seeker, or in cases of an indictment by an International Criminal Court.
In the case of extradition request, and if following criminal prosecution the
asylum seeker wants to re-apply for asylum, the revised article 18 should
include a rule to the effect that the merits of such a renewed asylum claim is
to be assessed by the Member State to whom the person has been extradited.
The advantage of both such approaches would be
that the possibilities for criminal prosecution of alleged criminals would not
be hindered by the mere fact of the filing of an asylum request. It would also
be an appropriate response to the
several UN General Assembly Resolutions on “Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism” which provide that, before considering to grant refugee status, States
should take appropriate measures to ensure that the asylum-seeker has not
participated in terrorist acts, taking into due account any relevant
information as to whether the asylum-seeker is subject to investigation for, is
charged with, or has been convicted of offences connected with terrorism.
1.4.3 Treatment
within asylum procedure
The procedure
assessing the claim for refugee status, based on the Refugee Convention, also
includes the examination of the applicability of the exclusion clauses,
contained in article 1(F) of that Convention. The rationale underlying
these exclusion provisions is that certain acts are so grave as to render their
perpetrators undeserving of protection as refugees. However, because exclusion
from refugee status may have potentially life-threatening consequences, such
decisions should be made within the asylum procedure, by the authority with
expertise and training in refugee law and status determination, in the context
of a comprehensive consideration of the refugee claim.
1.4.3.1 Assessment
of the asylum claim in a regular asylum procedure
The standard rule for assessing claims for asylum should be that this is being done in a comprehensive, holistic and integral manner.
This means that there should be a comprehensive examination of all
relevant facts underlying a claim for asylum. However, the possible
applicability of the exclusion
clauses should not be explored in all cases, as a matter of routine. It should
only be explored in cases where there are specific reasons to believe that the
person may fall under one of these clauses. Indeed facts justifying an
examination of the applicant’s excludability will normally emerge in the
course of the “inclusion phase” of the refugee status determination
process, checking the reasons for recognising someone as a refugee, and may
then be referred to during the “exclusion phase” of the case.
1.4.3.2 Assessment
of the asylum claim in an accelerated asylum procedure
There may however
be cases in which it has been prima facie established that someone falls under the scope of the
exclusion clauses. In such situations States should be entitled to channel such
claims through an accelerated procedure. In such an procedure States are
entitled to start with and, if found applicable, limit themselves to the particular examination of
the applicability of the exclusion clauses, as a preliminary matter at the
commencement of a hearing, without having the need to examine the
“inclusion clauses” of the Refugee Convention. “Translated”
legally, such cases could be considered to allow for a dismissal of the asylum
claim as being “manifestly unfounded”, as to be then provided for
in a revision of the Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards
on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status[6]. If this option
would be pursued, the issue of whether or not an appeal against a dismissal of
such a claim as manifestly unfounded should automatically have suspensive
effect, needs to be further examined.
1.4.4 Standard
of proof
In determining the applicable standard of
proof in exclusion procedures, it has to be acknowledged that exclusion proceedings do not amount to a full
criminal trial. The term “serious reasons for
considering”, used in the chapeau to article 1 (F), should be interpreted as
meaning that the rules on the admissibility of evidence and the high standard
of proof required in criminal proceedings do not need to apply in this respect.
There is therefore no need to prove that the person has committed the act,
which may justify the exclusion from refugee status. It is sufficient to
establish that there are serious reasons for considering that the person has
committed those acts. The basis for such a conclusion must be clearly
established. Thus, an investigation should be undertaken, checking the
claimant’s potential links with or involvement with violent acts. In
order to consider the possibility of exclusion of refugee status as a result of
individual liability for terrorist acts, the measure of personal involvement
required must be assessed carefully. A person whose actions contribute to the
crime, through orders, incitement or significant assistance, may be excluded
from refugee status.
1.4.5 Right
to appeal the exclusion decision
The application of
any exclusion clause must be individually assessed. The grounds for exclusion
should be based solely on the personal and knowing conduct of the person
concerned, and on available evidence and conform to legal standards of fairness
and justice. The person concerned should be entitled to lodge a legal challenge
in the Member State concerned, as also provided for and according to the
standards laid down in the Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee
status.[7]
1.5 Administrative
treatment of potential article 1(F) cases
1.5.1 Special
units in the asylum system for dealing with exclusion cases
Without prejudice
to paragraph 1.4.5, and the right to appeal a denial of refugee status in front
of an independent Court, Member States may have different logistical
arrangements for dealing with claims of suspected war criminals or terrorists.
In some Member States special Units have been set up to which all security risk
cases and cases of suspected involvement in serious violent acts or violations
of human rights are forwarded. Other Member States are considering introducing
standard “front-security checks”, by which all claims for asylum
would be checked upon potential security risks, running the personal data
through the available and relevant databases. Such logistical measures are
fully compatible with the legal international obligations impending upon Member
States and could potentially prove useful.
Given the
complexities involved, Member States that have no specialised
“Exclusion/Security Unit” within their asylum system could consider
introducing it. Referral to such a Unit could either be called for where there
are immediate suspicions of involvement in war or other serious crimes, such as
terrorist involvement (for instance, where an asylum-seeker is alleged to be a
member of en extremist group practising violence), or where these suspicions
emerge during the course of assessment under the normal asylum procedure.
Although it is likely that only a relatively small number of cases would be
involved, the specialised “Exclusion Unit” could pursue
examination. In order to function properly and effectively such a unit should
possess expertise in both refugee as well as criminal law and have an in-depth
knowledge of terrorist organisations. Equally important for such a Unit would
be its access to all regularly available country of origin, and if necessary,
classified information, and efficient working links with intelligence and
criminal prosecution and enforcement bodies.
A specialised Unit
would be able to undertake priority, expedited processing of cases with a
potential exclusion element. Its resources and expertise would enable it to
undertake a more thorough assessment of any asylum claim made by someone
suspected of involvement in terrorist acts. The Unit could subsequently refer
such cases to the office of the public prosecutor for criminal prosecution as
the appropriate avenue for bringing suspected terrorists to justice. Its increased
specialist expertise and clearly focused resources would enable prompt and
quality decision-making.
1.5.2 Guidelines
on the use of the exclusion clauses
Some Member States have issued special internal guidelines on the
application of the exclusion clauses of the Refugee Convention. These could
assist in an identification of cases with a potential exclusion element as
early in the process as possible. It could be considered to establish such
guidelines at a European level, making use of the best practises at national
level.
1.5.3 Information
exchange mechanisms
It could also be
considered to set up information exchange mechanisms to help those Member
States which do not have sufficient resources to benefit from the already
existing expertise on these issues in some other Member States, in order to get
information and support once they have a potential case. Such information exchange
mechanisms could involve the setting up of contact lists and explore the
usefulness of creating Intranet sites.
It could also serve to inform each other of
the presence of an exclusion case, in order to avoid the person trying to get
protection in another Member State. Within this context the establishment of a
European list of “Refugee Convention-excluded persons” could also
be considered. In the framework of information sharing it needs to be stressed
that the normal rules with regard to the confidentiality of personal data, in
particular as regards possible communication between a Member State and the
country of origin of the person need to be respected.
1.6 Treatment
of security risk cases
Member States have
at their disposal a range of measures to ensure asylum-seekers on their
territory do not abscond during the procedure. These include holding
asylum-seekers in reception centres, reporting requirements, regulations on
informing the authorities about any change of address, and detention. Which
measures are appropriate will depend on individual circumstances, although
where there is evidence to show that an individual asylum-seeker has criminal
affiliations likely to pose a risk to public order or national security,
detention would be an appropriate tool. It must however be acknowledged that in
most systems there are limits to the detention of asylum applicants; also the
legality and necessity of detention is subject to judicial review.
1.7 Exclusion
from other forms of international protection
The findings of
this Chapter 1 should be considered equally relevant in cases where someone has
requested, respectively has been granted another form of international
protection, such as subsidiary protection.
Chapter 2: Legal
follow up to the exclusion of persons from Refugee Convention status or other
forms of international protection
2.1. Prosecution
or extradition
Following a
denial of an appeal against the decision to exclude a person from refugee or
subsidiary protection status, and according to the international law principle
known as aut dedere aut judicare, the State is obliged to either surrender or prosecute
the person excluded from protection regimes. The above principle provides for a solution of the inherent
contradiction between the State's need, and indeed obligation, to combat
criminal acts such as terrorism, and the individual's entitlement to protection
against refoulement. This principle is formulated inter alia in Article 7 of
the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.
2.2 Prosecution
2.2.1 Universal
jurisdiction
On the
implementation of the above principle, the situation differs from one Member
State to the other. Some Member States attempt to actively try such a person, if they have
specific criteria to have jurisdiction on the case, or if their national
criminal law provides for an universal competence. In such a legal system
the State can actively prosecute and punish persons suspected of crimes of
universal jurisdiction, without having regard to the territoriality of the crime committed or
the nationality of the person suspected. However, it has to be
acknowledged that it is often, de facto, not possible to prosecute the person
for a criminal offence, given the strict rules on the admissibility of evidence
and the high standard of proof required in the criminal justice systems of the
Member States of the European Union. These standards are much higher than for
refugee exclusion and or expulsion proceedings. In particularly the
availability of (reliable) witnesses has proved in practice to be a very
serious obstacle for Member States in pursuing successful criminal prosecution
of those persons excluded from the Refugee Convention.
2.2.2 Future
International Criminal Court
The future International Criminal Court (ICC)
could play an important role in the context of prosecution of persons covered
by the exclusion clauses of the Refugee Convention. However, the current
mandate of the Court, laid down in its Statute, does not cover terrorism as
such, except if it is associated with the other serious crimes (of concern to the international
community) regarding which the Court does have
jurisdiction. These crimes are also of direct relevance to the
interpretation and application of Article 1 (F) of the 1951 Convention. The
future ICC could also help address problems where national refugee status
determination procedures may lack access to relevant intelligence information
and/or resources and tools, such as are available to a judge or prosecutor
investigating such crimes. It is also envisaged that co-operation between the ICC and UN agencies,
such as UNHCR, will be established. It could therefore be useful to
consider establishing formal and confidential co-operation agreements between
Member States and the ICC in potential Article 1F cases.
2.3 Extradition
If there is no possibility to bring the person
to trial in the country of refuge, nor to have the person indicted by the
International Criminal Court, then in principle such a person needs to be extradited; that is if
extradition is legally and practically possible to either the country of
origin, another Member State or another third country. In connection with
extradition requests made against persons accused of having committed terrorist
crimes, both the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
provide that States Parties are not obliged to accede to the extradition, if
they have substantial grounds for believing that such request has been made for
the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person on account of his/her race,
religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion or that compliance
with the request would cause prejudice to that person's position for any of
these reasons.
2.3.1 Legal
obstacles to extradition or removal
Extradition may however be impossible because of legal obstacles. The
protection against refoulement as a consequence of the prohibition of certain
treatments or punishments, provided for in human rights instruments such as the
United Nations Convention against Torture, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is
namely absolute in nature, that is to say, admits no exceptions. The European
Court of Human Rights has repeatedly affirmed that the European Convention on
Human Rights, even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight
against terrorism and organised crime, prohibits, in absolute terms, torture
and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The European Court of Human
Rights has emphasised that, unlike most of the substantive clauses of that
particular Convention, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no
derogation from it is permissible even in the event of a public emergency
threatening the life of the nation.
Following the 11th September events, the European Court of
Human Rights may in the future again have to rule on questions relating to the
interpretation of Article 3, in particular on the question in how far there can
be a “balancing act” between the protection needs of the
individual, set off against the security interests of a state.
2.3.2 Legal
guarantees in extradition cases
Extradition must be considered legal when it is possible to obtain legal
guarantees from the State that is going to trial the person, addressing the
concerns connected to the potential violations of the European Convention of
Human Rights. Such “guarantees” by third States could for instance relate to the
non-application of capital punishment in that particular case, though the law
of that State allows for such punishment.
2.4 The
legal position of persons excluded from protection regimes but who are
non-removable
The question that
remains unresolved -and which falls outside the scope of refugee /international
protection law- relates to the status that must be accorded to persons who
disqualify for refugee status or other forms of international protection, who
cannot be successfully prosecuted, and yet who cannot be expelled because of
the absolute nature of the prohibition of refoulement as laid down in some
international and regional human rights instruments. There are no international
legal instruments, which regulate the status and rights of persons who are
excluded from any protection status but cannot be expelled because of legal
obstacles. However, the UN Committee on Human Rights
elaborated on the obligation of State parties to "keep” some aliens
with long links in the country, despite their criminal activities.
The current
situation of Member States having limited policy options for dealing adequately
with excludable but non-removable persons is a very unsatisfactory one. The
issue is therefore urgently in need of further examination, and eventual
resolution at European level. In this context it again has to be stressed that,
despite the serious obstacles referred to earlier on, criminal prosecution by
the international community, both at global level as well as Member States
level, of those persons having committed crimes against humanity, war crimes or
terrorist attacks, and excluded from protection regimes, is an appropriate
response. In addition to their possible criminal prosecution it may also be
necessary to harmonise the basic rights granted to this category of excludable
but non-removable persons, and to assess the different means for dealing with
these persons if they pose a security risk.
2.4.1 Harmonisation
of basic rights granted to persons excluded from protection regimes but who are
non-removable
The 15
Member States of the European Union deal differently with the excludable but
non-removable persons. Some Member States do not grant any rights whatsoever to
these persons except for the right not to be refouled. In other Member States,
persons do get access to basic human rights, such as urgent medical health care
and education for children. In again other Member States these persons are
entitled to even more socio- and economic rights and benefits. This difference
in treatment may call for a harmonised approach at European level in order to
take away potential “pull factors” for persons not deserving international
protection.
2.4.2 Detention
and alternatives to detention of persons excluded from protection regimes but
who are non-removable
Persons, who are excluded from protection regimes, yet who can not be
removed, do not necessarily and automatically pose a risk to the national
security. For instance many of the war criminals, rightly excluded from the
protection regimes by Member States, are not being automatically detained by
these States. Indeed, so far an administrative unlimited detention system is
not made use of in the Member States, and it may also be useful to further
explore alternatives to full detention measures, such as “residence
surveille”.
However there may be cases in which there is a need for the public to be
protected against persons rightly excluded from the protection regimes, such as
terrorists, who do pose a risk to the security of the State. In this context it
is relevant to note legislation recently proposed at Member State level with
regard to the detention of foreign nationals whose presence is believed to
constitute a risk to national security and who are being suspected of being
international terrorists. This legislation has been proposed in anticipation
of situations where Article 3 of the ECHR prevents removal or deportation of
the above cases to a place where there is risk that the person will suffer
treatment contrary to that Article. If no alternative destination is
immediately available then removal may not, for the time being, be possible,
even though the ultimate intention remains that removal, once satisfactory
arrangements have been made. Notwithstanding this continuing intention to
remove a person who is being detained, it is not possible to say that
“action is being taken with a view to deportation” within the meaning
of Article 5 (1) (f) ECHR, interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.
To the extent therefore that the envisaged detention of the above cases may be
inconsistent with the obligations under Article 5(1) ECHR the right of
derogation conferred by Article 15 (1) of the ECHR could be invoked, provided
that the strict conditions laid down in Article 15 (1) are met, and the
envisaged “measures are not inconsistent with (States) other obligations
under international law”.
Chapter 3: Approximation of relevant legislation,
regulation and administrative practices against the background of the Common
European Asylum System
3.1 General
framework
Continuing working
on these issues at the EU level can be done following the method and means
explained in the Commission’s Communication “Towards a common asylum procedure and a uniform
status, valid throughout the Union for persons granted asylum” [8]and
followed up by the recent “Communication on the common asylum policy, introducing an
open co-ordination method-First Report by the Commission on the application of
Communication COM(2000)755 final of 22 November 2000”[9].
The establishment
of the Common European Asylum System will follow a 2-step approach. The
relationship between safeguarding internal security and complying with international
protection obligations must be fed into both steps. Indeed it is necessary to work on more efficient,
well-informed and common procedures, more convergent interpretation and
application of exclusion possibilities and on enhancing prosecution and
detention possibilities, including alternatives to detention. It is also
necessary to ensure that terrorists, against the background of international
protection, face a comparable treatment in all Member States. If a terrorist is
not granted an international protection status in one Member State or if the
status is withdrawn or cancelled, he/she should expect the same treatment of
his/her case in all other Member States.
3.2 Legislative
harmonisation, accompanying measures, administrative co-operation and the Open Co-ordination Method
Quick progress
should be made on the negotiation of the different Commission’s Proposals
for Directives on the Council’s table, and appropriate attention should
be given to the provisions dealing with examination and decision making,
exclusion, cancellation of status and withdrawal of benefits. Appropriate and
quick transposition of the EC legislative instruments at the national level
will also be necessary. The Commission will prepare regular reports on the
implementation of these instruments. The Contact Committees created for monitoring the implementation
will facilitate consultation between Member States and the Commission with a
view to reaching similar interpretations of the relevant provisions and
comparing national rules and practices. In addition caselaw developed by
national and European courts or review bodies will need to be further analysed.
A meeting with representatives of determining authorities and review bodies
could be organised in 2002 in order to study trends and caselaw and discuss
common problems and solutions.
A continuing
investment on enhancing common analysis tools is needed. In this context
National points of contact could be nominated for developing co-operation and
exchange of information. The new programme ARGO, an Action programme for co-operation in the fields
of external borders, visas, asylum and immigration[10], could be used in order to support such
administrative co-operation.
The Commission has
recommended the use of the open co-ordination method. Illustration of such a method specially
designed for the asylum policy can be found in the “Communication on the common asylum
policy, introducing an open co-ordination method”[11] Attention is drawn to the Second
European Guideline proposed on the development of an efficient asylum
system, offering protection for those in need, based on the full and inclusive
application of the Geneva Convention and in particular on points G (“by identifying
principles and techniques for improving the identification of individuals,
covered by the exclusion provisions, who do not deserve international
protection.”)
and J (“by
evaluating…..the use of cessation and exclusion clauses….”). In order to implement this Guideline,
Member States have to identify in their national action plans means and
objectives to meet the European goal and analyse implementation of national and
EC instruments. This will also facilitate comparing and identifying good
practices and analysing real impact and results of choices made. Finally, appropriate
consultation of and co-operation with the UNHCR, relevant international
organisations and third countries will also be required to efficiently and
comprehensively address the issue subject of this Paper.
All the above
instruments will greatly assist in the identification of the necessary
improvements, leading to the
adoption of additional rules within the framework of the second step of the
harmonisation of asylum polices in the European Union.
Chapter 4: Analysis
of “internal security”- related provisions in EC legislation and ( future) Commission Proposals for
EC legislation in the asylum and immigration field
4.1 General
Analysis
The current
EC legislation or Commission Proposals for such legislation in the field of
asylum and immigration all contain, currently, sufficient standard provisions
to allow for the exclusion of any third country national who may be perceived
as a threat to national/public security from the right to international
protection, residency or access to certain benefits. However, in the framework
of current and future discussions and negotiations of the different Proposals,
these relevant provisions will be revisited in the light of the new
circumstances, without prejudice to the relevant international obligations
underlying the Proposals. The relevant provisions in the different Proposals
are shortly analysed below, and, where appropriate, possibilities for
clarifying or enhancing these provisions have been identified.
4.2 EC
legislation in the field of asylum
4.2.1 Temporary
Protection
The formally
adopted Council Directive on minimum standards for giving temporary
protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures
promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such
persons and bearing the consequences thereof[12]
allows Member States in
its Article 28 (1) (b) to exclude a person from temporary protection if,
amongst other grounds, there are reasonable grounds for regarding him or her as
a danger to the security of
the host Member State or, having been convicted by a final judgement of a
particularly serious crime, he or she is a danger to the community of the host Member
State.
4.2.2 EURODAC
The formally adopted Council Regulation concerning
the establishment of "Eurodac" for the comparison of fingerprints for
the effective application of the Dublin Convention[13]
allows for the prompt
taking of the fingerprints of all fingers of every applicant for asylum of at
least 14 years of age. For
the purposes of applying the Dublin Convention, it is necessary to establish
the identity of applicants for asylum and of persons apprehended in connection
with the unlawful crossing of the external borders of the Community. However
this will simultaneously assist Member States in knowing who is entering their
territory, and subsequently enhance their national security.
4.3 Proposals
for EC legislation in the field of asylum
4.3.1 Asylum
procedures
The Proposal
for a Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for
granting and withdrawing refugee status[14]
allows in Article 26 for
“Cancellation of
refugee status” on the grounds that circumstances have come to light that
indicate that this person should never have been recognised as a refugee in the
first place. Article 33 (2) (c)
also allows Member States to derogate from the rule of suspensive effect for
appeals in cases where there are grounds of national security or public order.
As also
referred to in paragraph 1.4.2.1, within the context of the forthcoming
revision of this particular Proposal it could be considered to include rules
allowing for a suspension of
the asylum procedure in situations where an extradition request, relating to a
serious crime, for an asylum seeker has been made by a State, other than the
country of origin, or in cases of an indictment by an International Criminal
Court. Alternatively, as explained earlier in paragraph 1.4.2.2, Article 18 of the Proposal, on the inadmissibility of
certain claims for asylum,
could be amended to the effect that it would allow in the above cases for the
dismissal of an asylum claim as being inadmissible.
As elaborated upon
in paragraph 1.4.3.2, the Commission is also considering, deleting article 28
(2) (b) of the Proposal, which states that cases where there are serious
reasons for considering that the grounds of article 1 (F) of the Refugee
Convention apply can not be considered to constitute grounds for the dismissal
of applications for asylum as manifestly unfounded. Following this possible deletion an
additional ground would then need to be added to article 28 (1) allowing for
the dismissal of asylum claims as manifestly unfounded in those cases where it
has been prima facie established that the
exclusion clauses of the Refugee Convention apply.
4.3.2 Reception
conditions
Following Article 22(1)(d) of the Proposal for a Council Directive
laying down minimum standards on the reception of applicants for asylum in
Member States[15], Member States may reduce or withdraw
reception facilities if an applicant is regarded as a threat to national
security or there are serious grounds for believing that the applicant has
committed a war crime or a crime against humanity or if, during the examination
of the asylum application, there are serious and manifest reasons for considering
that the grounds of Article 1 (F) of the Geneva Convention may apply with
respect to the applicant.
It could be considered to add a new paragraph (4)(a) in Article 22,
regarding the reduction or withdrawal of reception conditions, to the following
extent: “Should
the applicant’s involvement in terrorist activities be established,
either by his having taken an active part therein or by his having aided and
abetted or provided financial support to terrorist organisations as defined by
the European Union, before or after the application for asylum has been lodged,
Member States must withdraw the routine reception conditions in respect of the
applicant and enforce the legal protection measures provided for in their
respective legislation.”
It is also relevant to mention in the context of this Paper that the
current text of Article 7 of the Proposal allows, where appropriate, for a
limitation of the freedom of movement of asylum seekers to a specific area of
the national territory of the Member States.
4.3.3 State
determination
In the Proposal for a Council regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third‑country national[16] there are no specific provisions relating to national security. However, such articles are not necessary given that the Proposal contains no provisions relating to the granting / refusing of rights or status.
4.3.4 Qualification
for international protection
In Article 14
of the recent Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards for the
qualification and status of third country nationals and stateless persons as
refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection[17]
Member States have to ensure
that an applicant who comes within the terms of the exclusion clauses of the
Refugee Convention is excluded from refugee status. This Proposal equally
obliges in Article 17 Member States to ensure that an applicant who comes
within the terms of those exclusion clauses is also excluded from subsidiary
protection status.
In
the framework of the future discussion on this particular Proposal an
additional paragraph (2) to article 19, relating to “Protection from
refoulement and expulsion” could be considered. This additional
paragraph, in accordance with article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, holds
that the benefit of that provision (the non-refoulement obligation), “may
not be claimed by a persons enjoying international protection whom there are reasonable
grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the Member State in which
he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that Member
State”.
The provisions in the above mentioned articles 14, 17
and the possibly to be proposed new provision to Article 19, are all without
prejudice to Member States other international obligations, in particular those
deriving from article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.
4.4 Proposals
for EC legislation in the field of immigration
In the field of legal immigration, all three
Commission Proposals for Council Directives submitted so far on the right to
family reunification, the status of third‑country nationals who are long‑term
residents, and the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals
for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities
already contain “public order” clauses. These clauses allow Member
States to refuse admission of third country nationals for reasons of public
policy or domestic security. It appears that a scrupulous application of these
clauses is a more appropriate way of enhancing security than to substantially
change the different Proposals at stake.
Invocation of these grounds must be based exclusively
on the personal conduct of the third country national concerned. In practice
this means that current or past membership to a certain – terrorist
– association might be interpreted to be linked to the “personal
conduct” of a person and might therefore justify the use of this
“public order” clause. Within the scope of the Directives, any
discrimination based on race, ethnic origin, religion or beliefs, political opinions
or membership of a national minority is explicitly excluded. The mere ethnic
origin or nationality of a person could never justify use of the “public
order” clause, also, as this would be contrary to the principle of
non-discrimination enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union.
4.4.1 Economic
migration
Following Article
27 of the Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and
residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and
self-employed economic activities[18]: “Member States may refuse to grant
or to renew or revoke permits in accordance with this Directive on grounds of
public policy, public security or public health. The grounds of public policy
or public security must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the
third country national concerned.”
This provision
gives Member States a large degree of discretion. The current drafting of
Article 27 of the Proposal can therefore be considered as sufficient and it is
not deemed necessary to envisage a modification.
4.4.2 Family
reunification
The Proposal
for a Council directive on the right of family reunification[19] contains in its article 8 a
provision on public order allowing Member States to refuse: “the entry and residence of family members on grounds of public policy, domestic security or public
health. The grounds of public policy or domestic security must be based
exclusively on the personal conduct of the family member concerned.”
The same logic as
set out in 4.4.1 applies equally in the context of this particular Proposal,
and amendment of the text is therefore not considered necessary.
4.4.3 Long
term residency status
The Proposal
for a Council Directive concerning the status of third country nationals who
are long term resident[20] contains several national security related
provisions. The Commission is considering amending these provisions in the
following manner:
Following Article
7 on Public policy and domestic security Member States may refuse to grant long‑term
resident status where the personal conduct of the person concerned constitutes
an actual threat to public order or domestic security. It is considered to delete in paragraph 1
the word actual. It is
also proposed to delete in paragraph 2 of Article 7 the reference to the fact
that “Criminal
convictions shall not in themselves automatically warrant the refusal referred
to in paragraph 1”. The
same applies to Article 19, regarding the right to settle in another Member
State.
With regard to Article 13 Protection against expulsion the Commission is considering deleting
paragraph 7 in which
emergency expulsion procedures are prohibited against long term residents. This
provision applies once the third country national has obtained the long-term
resident status, he/she should therefore benefit from a higher level of
protection. Nevertheless, emergency expulsion procedures can be justified in
case of a terrorism threat.
Finally, in Article 25 on the Withdrawal of
residence permit it is stated that: (1) “During a five‑year transitional period, the
second Member State may take a decision to expel a long‑term resident
and/or family members: on grounds of public policy or domestic security as
defined in Article 19; (2) Expulsion decisions may not be accompanied by a
permanent ban on residence”. In
such cases, the second Member State shall expel the long-term resident only to the Member State that
has granted him/her the status. In cases of serious threat, as defined in art.
13 (1), the second Member State should expel the long-term resident directly to
his/her country of origin or to another country outside the European Union. The
Commission is considering adding an article 2 bis: “In case of an actual and sufficiently
serious threat the procedure of article 13 may apply”.
4.5 Future
Proposals for EC legislation in the field of immigration
4.5.1 Students and other third-country nationals
The objectives of the
future Proposal for a Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of
third-country nationals for the purpose of study and self-employed economic
activities are considered to be best achieved by guaranteeing simultaneously
the possibility for Member States to cater for their domestic security
concerns. The Proposal will therefore include a clause allowing Member States to
refuse admission of a third-country national, the renewal of a residence permit
or to revoke such a permit on grounds of public policy, public security or
public health based exclusively on the personal conduct of the third-country
national concerned. This drafting seems sufficiently large to give Member
States the necessary margin of maneuver to refuse admission or put an end to
the stay of a third-country national if objectively needed. Same provisions
will be included in the Proposal for a Directive on the conditions of entry and
residence of third-country nationals for other purposes.
4.5.2 Victims of trafficking
The Commission
services are currently preparing a Proposal for a Directive on short-term
permit to stay for the victims of trafficking. There is no right to this permit
to stay as such, its issuing is subject to a set of conditions being met. One
of the conditions for the delivery is that “ no considerations
regarding public order or national security oppose this delivery”. The same applies to the renewal and
consequently the withdrawal of the permit. This wording seems wide enough to
enable Member States to protect their public order and national security.
[1] Brussels, 19.9.2001 COM (2001) 521 final
[2] Brussels, 19.9.2001 COM (2001) 522 final
[3] Brussels, 20.09.2000 COM(2000) 578 final
[4] Id at 3
[5] Id at 3
[6] Id at 3
[7] Id at 3
[8] Brussels, 22.11.2000 COM (2000) 755 final
[9] Brussels, 28.11.2001 COM (2001) 710 final
[10] Brussels, 16.10.2001 COM (2001) 567 final
[11] Id at 9
[12]Directive (2001/55/EC) 20.07.2001
[13] Regulation (2725/2000/EC) 11.12.2000
[14] Id at 3
[15] Brussels, 3.4.2001 COM (2001) 181 final
[16] Brussels, 26 .7.2001 COM(2001) 447 final
[17] Brussels, 12.9.2001 COM (2001) 510 final
[18] Brussels, 11.7.2001 COM (2001) 386 final
[19] Brussels, 10.10.2000 COM (2000) 624 final
[20] Brussels, 13.3.2001 COM (2001) 127 final