Croatian democracy’s ‘litmus test’:

Based on field and desk research November - January 2000

Published by:

The ECRE Focus Group on South-Eastern Europe

European Council on Refugees and Exiles ICVA

Stapleton House, Obala Kulina Bana 4,

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Website: www.ecre.org

Report structure:

1.2 November 2000 saw the summit of the European Union (EU) take place in Zagreb with an agenda of pluralism and democratic development in Southeast Europe. The summit’s final declaration noted that "the year 2000 began with democratic change in Croatia...opening the way for regional reconciliation and co-operation." Political leaders of the EU noted that "the recent historic changes [in the region]...give new impetus to a policy of good neighbourliness based on...a lasting solution for the problem of refugees and displaced persons and respect for States’ international borders."

1.3 The return of refugees and displaced persons has reached a critical point in Croatia, as the country embarks on an ambitious process of integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions in the next few years. As a candidate for membership of the EU, Croatia is acquiring rights and obligations towards the EU; it has had responsibilities to the Council of Europe since becoming a member in November 1996. The political and economic opportunities are clear. Demands on Croatia to approximate its human rights and social policies to the standards of its new European partners in terms not only of the rhetoric of ‘reform’ but of concrete implementation are central to this process. As the EU summit declaration states, the resolution of the problems of refugees and displaced people is one of the most important tests of Croatia’s new commitments.

1.4 The central government in Zagreb has committed itself in clear public statements to the principles of the Dayton Agreement and to the implementation of its own legal provisions to facilitate the return and reintegration of its citizens of any ethnicity who were displaced by the conflicts of the 1990s. High-level government representatives informed this Mission that they intend to resolve all the outstanding problems relating to return within the next three years.

1.5 However, the entire basis of the returns policies is currently subject to constitutional challenge and after extensive consultations in Zagreb and in the east and south of the country, this Mission has grave reservations whether the government can achieve its objectives either in the time-scale envisaged, or indeed at all. The reasons for this reluctant conclusion are as follows:

The Mission did note positive elements in the situation:

1.6 It nevertheless remains the case that many people forcibly displaced by the conflict of the 1990s have not returned and are deterred from doing so by a range of unresolved problems in Croatia. There is an evident lack of political will on behalf of many public officials at local level to implement the political commitments of the government. Those who have returned are often elderly, as younger family members are not prepared to return or have already emigrated elsewhere. To its dismay, the Mission heard from many of those it consulted on the ground the view that in effect "the returns issue was finished"; that Croatian democracy would develop without many of its former citizens playing a role; and that de facto there has been a radical and probably permanent reduction in the ethnic diversity of Croatia. The institutionalised intolerance that this implies is directly contrary to both the spirit and the law of the European Human Rights Convention and is at odds with the basic democratic standards that the European Union insists upon when considering the application of a new candidate Member State. The responsibility of the Croatian government to resolve the outstanding issues of refugee return and the wider international political aspirations of the government and the people of Croatia are thus inextricably linked.

2.2 Until the end of 1999, return for Serb minority refugees and displaced persons was obstructed and discouraged through discriminatory laws and practices under the government of President Tudjman. A new, more moderate coalition government and Head of State (heded by Premier Racan and President Stipe Mesic) was elected in 2000. The new government has committed itself to democratic reforms in its eagerness to integrate into the European institutions in the next few years.

2.3 Of chief relevance to this report is: how genuine is the government’s commitment to remove the obstacles to return for its displaced citizens? OSCE reports that the government has started a process of attempting to amend discriminatory measures from existing legislation relating to return, such as legislation on repossession and reconstruction of housing. However, so far these central government statements of good intent have not been translated into practical or procedural improvements at the local government level to facilitate safe and sustainable return. The legal regime of repossession of property and other property issues remains a significant obstacle to the return of Croatian Serbs and other ethnic minorities.

2.5 The focus of the Mission and this report is to provide some clarity on the present situation and future prospects for return to Croatia through:

2.6 This report draws from evidence collected by the Focus Group team that visited Croatia between the 18 and 24 of November 2000. The team consisted of: Philip Rudge (independent consultant), Nick Scott-Flynn (independent consultant), Ann Pesic (Country Director of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies — ICVA -in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia); Bojan Munjin (Coordinator of the Civil Society Department in the Croatian Helsinki Committee), Marina Skuric-Prodanovic (independent consultant), Allan Leas (Head of Membership & Development at the European Council for Refugees and Exiles — ECRE); Katie Hope (independent consultant); Vesna Vukmanic (Regional Support Officer for the Focus Group, based at ICVA Sarajevo). The Mission gratefully acknowledges the practical support provided by IRC, CRS, UNHCR and the Croatian Helsinki Committee in carrying out the field mission, and would like to thank everybody who gave time to discuss the issues involved.

2.7 The Mission team undertook field visits in three areas of Croatia: Zagreb; the south of the country around Karlovac, Knin, Benkovac and Gracac; and the east of the country around Sisak, Pakrac, Djulovac, Osijek and Vukovar. The full list of staff and organisations/bodies interviewed during the Mission is given in the appendix. This field research has been augmented by information provided by a wide range of NGO, IGO and media sources (where direct quotations are used in the report, the source is acknowledged).

2.7 The resulting conclusions and recommendations are given in section 5 below, and in the Executive Summary above.

3.1.1 Croatia’s new government is facing considerable socio-economic problems, coupled with a poorly functioning legal system and the prospect of a political backlash by supporters of its predecessors in local elections in April 2001. This uncertain political situation is a strong deterrent to the return of the country’s displaced persons.

3.1.2 The ethnic composition of Croatia has changed greatly since its independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1991. This is particularly true of the areas outside Zagreb visited by the Mission. Precisely how far it has changed will be clarified by a Government census planned for March 2001.

3.1.3 The Krajina had been a region with a Serbian ethnic majority until a Croatian government military offensive in 1995 swept up to 200,000 Serbs from the area. Since the Dayton Accords in December 1995, about 140,000 ethnic Croat refugees from Bosnia and Yugoslavia who obtained Croatian citizenship have been "de-registered" — ie, they are no longer refugees. However, according to the US Committee for Refugees, human rights observers have charged that Croatian authorities de-registered many ethnic Croat refugees after settling some 18,500 of them into the abandoned homes and farming land of ethnic Serbs, in a deliberate effort to alter the ethnic composition of the Krajina region.

3.1.4 Following the outbreak of hostilities in 1991, some 85,000 ethnic Croats were displaced from Eastern Slavonia (also known as the Croatian Danube region). The pre-1991 Serb population in Eastern Slavonia had been 70,000, before peaking at 127,000 after the massive displacement of Serbs in 1995 from the Krajina region. A UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) was deployed in 1996. In January 1998, eastern Slavonia reverted to Croatian control. Since then, some 44,000 Serbs left the area to return home, and some 67,000 Croats have returned to Eastern Slavonia.

3.1.5 The successful return of large numbers of people will ultimately depend not only on wide ranging political democratisation, legal and procedural reform, but also on the revitalisation of the country’s fragile economy, the rebuilding of the country’s infrastructure and damaged houses and de-mining. With regard to building destruction, the reliability of the official statistic is again problematic. The government estimates that there are about 35,000 damaged and has applications for some 7,000 occupied housing units in the country. However, the repossession scheme is not available to refugees who cannot provide the government with the extensive identity documentation required for filing an application to repossess their property. Therefore the number of occupied housing units is likely to be far higher. The number damaged is also questionable - the US Committee for Refugees estimated that there were 170,000 damaged or destroyed houses at the beginning of the year.

3.1.6 The legacy of protracted mismanagement of the economy; damage to the country’s infrastructure and buildings during the armed conflict; population displacement; and the disruption of economic ties all contribute to a grave economic situation, made worse by the recession since 1998. The government has made sweeping budget cuts in the year 2000. These cuts, however, have hit the country’s welfare system particularly hard, which bodes ill for potential returnees who have little else to survive on.

3.1.7 The Ministry of Public Works, Reconstruction and Construction’s Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees (ODPR) is responsible for the welfare of returnees. Returnees receive a six-month social welfare package. This is formally administered through the country’s 78 social welfare centres that are funded from the budget of another ministry - the Ministry for Social Affairs. Both ministries are currently addressing this administrative anomaly. However, severe restrictions on resources, and bureaucratic inadequacies at a local level, have resulted in not all returnees receiving their entitlements.

3.1.7 Unemployment stands at an average of 21% nationally, but reaches 85% in some villages (particularly in war-affected areas). Reports indicate that there will be further unemployment owing to bankruptcies. Unemployment assistance is reportedly insufficient to protect the unemployed. Meanwhile, some 150,000 to 200,000 persons are working without regular payment of wages. Croatia’s 1.65 million labour force has consistently reduced over the last seven years, and the country’s industrial production rate fell two per cent in 1999 as against 1998.

3.1.8 The international community plays a vital role in bolstering government efforts to revitalise the economy and repair the country’s infrastructure. The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, after a slow start, has recently approved over US $63 million for refugee return and reintegration projects implemented through the international humanitarian sector. In September 2000, the Council of Europe Development Bank approved a loan for 30 million EURO, which the government of Croatia will match. UNHCR has assumed a co-ordinating role for the Stability Pact funding under Table One, " Voluntary Repatriation and Sustainable Reintegration of Croatian Refugees". This is a crucial element for all funding to ensure that gaps in the distribution of resources are filled and that there is no resource overlap. The international community’s role in South-Eastern Europe and Croatia is crucial; any quick, un-phased withdrawal of that involvement would have serious ramifications at such a crucial period in Croatia’s rebuilding process. The serious humanitarian needs in the country are profound and long-term, and require an ongoing international commitment.

3.1.9 Relative to other areas of the former Yugoslavia, Croatia does have some positive socio-economic indicators. It has a high life expectancy (73 years); a low infant mortality rate (8 per 1,000 live births); and a low illiteracy rate (only 2 per cent of the population over the age of 15 cannot read and write). The level of service provision in the health sector has steadily deteriorated over the last 10 years for Croatian citizens, however. The education system also suffers from a lack of resources, low levels of retention of teachers, frequent strikes of educational workers and low levels of motivation due to low salaries.

3.1.10 The country’s legal system as a whole is in need of reform and a major investment of human resources. This applies particularly to entrenched discriminatory provision relating to Croatian citizenship and to repossession of property. According to the Norwegian Refugee Council, numerous Serb legal officials or private lawyers who after the conflict applied for readmission to the Croatian Bar Association were denied, essentially on the basis of participating in rebellion against the state. While there has been a criminal amnesty, the civil effects of being seen as a sympathiser or participant in the armed rebellion also deserve attention. There are huge backlogs in the courts. Croatia is particularly in need of a greater number of judges and other legal officials with more experience. There are 1,400 judges in Croatia, 65 per cent of whom are younger than 30 and have less than five years experience. Even the capital, Zagreb, has only 100 judges. The government indicates that it often cannot afford to pay greater numbers than those who are already employed, but there is a also a lack of qualified people to fill these posts. Unsurprisingly, reports indicate that there has been a drain towards the private sector — most qualified lawyers choose to open their own practices for economic reasons.

3.1.11 There are between 2,300 and 2,500 missing persons in the country, including those who went missing in military operations ‘Flash’ and ‘Storm’ in 1995. This is key factor in the peace and reconciliation process in Croatia and remains a pressing human rights concern. According to the OSCE and UN reports, the Government Commission for Missing and Detained Persons, blaming lack of funding, continues to neglect the fate of Serb missing persons.

3.1.12 While the six-party coalition government elected in February 2000 hold power at a central government level, the former ruling party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) holds the majority of seats in both the Chamber of Municipalities and Chamber of Representatives, representing regional municipalities. Despite the political optimism created by the election for the general population, national political activities appear very remote, particularly to those 400,000 unemployed and one million pensioners for whom daily survival is an overwhelming preoccupation. The elections in April 2001 at the Chamber of Municipalities level will be a powerful indicator of the strength of opposition against the central government.

3.2.1 UNHCR statistics for the start of 2000 indicate almost 300,000 Croatian Serb refugees in Yugoslavia, and 30,000 - 40,000 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. An additional 47,000 persons remain internally displaced on Croatian territory, 42,000 being ethnic Croats from the Danube region and 5,000 ethnic Serbs.

3.2.2 At the beginning of 2000, the proportion of ethnic Serbs in Croatia’s population of 4.8 million stood at about 4%, compared to 12% in 1991.

3.2.3 To date, UNHCR in conjunction with the government’s Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees (ODPR) estimate that some 318,000 people of all ethnicities have returned to their place of domicile in Croatia. This figure includes 109,000 refugee returns and 210,000 IDP returns, of which, nearly 26,000 refugees returned during until end of September 2000 — more than double the 10,500 who returned in 1999. Returns of internally displaced Croatians slowed in 2000, however, with 12,500 people returning compared with some 30,000 in 1999. More than 10,000 people had returned to the Eastern Slavonia region (also known as the Croatian Danube region) to November 2000.

3.2.4 Of these returns, ODPR records 12,500 organised minority ethnic Serb returns during 2000, of which 10,700 are from FRY, 1,300 from BiH and some 500 are from the Eastern Slavonia region. ODPR estimates that an additional 20,000 Serbs refugees returned spontaneously.

3.2.5 Two issues taint the accuracy of these statistics. Firstly, many refugees return only temporarily to Croatia to attend to their affairs (for example to sell property, or claim their pensions) while continuing to live in BiH or FRY. Secondly, it is not easy to be precise about the number of spontaneous returns — many returnees chose not to wait for the months or even years it takes to clear the official applications process, and are not therefore accurately counted. Some 14,000 applications for return, mostly from ethnic Serbs, were pending at the end of October 2000. UNHCR and the government are doing an assessment of the number of spontaneous returns, and the government has promised to speed up the applications process for return to one month.

3.2.6 The vast majority of returnees are elderly — over 50% of the total are aged over 60 years, and the average age of returnees in the past six years is 57. Returnees of school age represent only 4% of the total.

3.2.7 Croatia also hosts about 23,000 refugees from BiH (about 16,000 Bosnian Croats and some 7,000 Bosnian Muslims, according to USCR); about 1,000 refugees from FRY; and more than 140,000 Bosnian Croat ‘settlers’ who have acquired Croatian citizenship and the right to vote and have therefore been de-registered as refugees.

3.2.8 About 60,000 ethnic Croat refugees have returned to BiH so far, mostly to Federation areas where they are in the majority. However, according to the government, very few have returned to Republika Srpska — an estimated 1,000 people to November 2000.

4.2 Most Serb refugees from Croatia and BiH have in the past expressed a wish to return, although the last census is nearly five years old. Since it is highly desirable in any return programme that the intentions of returnees and conditions to which they would return are clearly established, the Mission welcomes a new census planned by Serbia and UNHCR in 2001. It is also essential to understand to what extent refugees are contemplating solutions other than return for their long-term prospects. However, this should not delay further the already delayed return process. The involvement of UNHCR with its protection mandate should be a guarantee against any institutional pressure to artificially lower the number of refugees or prematurely conclude that individual problems have been solved when they have not.

4.3 The mission heard that younger refugees with families were reluctant to return home, not only because of the occupation of their property by others and the bureaucracy they face concerning its reconstruction, but also because of the lack of infrastructure (schools, medical centres) and the economic development necessary for rebuilding their lives.

4.4 Refugee return can be seen as a litmus test of the Croatian government’s commitment to its own domestic legal standards and to the key European human rights norms. The return of significant numbers of Serb refugees to Croatia would contribute greatly to the easing of pressure within Serbia and to the chances for regional stability. But for speedier implementation of the government’s present rhetoric to happen, the international community — both inter-governmental and non-governmental sectors - need to forcefully restate the legal requirements of international law in providing practical and operational guidelines to facilitate return. However, ultimately, the responsibility lies with the Croatian government.

4.5 The findings of the Mission as they relate to the return of refugees and displaced persons to Croatia are set out below in five sections:

4.6.1 November 2000 saw the unprecedented summit of the European Union (EU) taking place in Zagreb with an agenda of pluralism and democratic development in Southeast Europe. The summit’s final declaration noted that "the year 2000 began with democratic change in Croatia...opening the way for regional reconciliation and co-operation." Political leaders of the EU noted that "the recent historic changes [in the region]...give new impetus to a policy of good neighbourliness based on...a lasting solution for the problem of refugees and displaced persons and respect for States’ international borders." Paradoxically, outside the summit rooms, Croatians demonstrated against the EU presence illustrating that the situation in Croatia remains turbulent and far from settled.

4.6.2 The election of a more moderate government in Croatia and recent political changes in Serbia have contributed to the most positive regional picture for many years, in terms of outstanding inter-state issues including that of the refugees and returnees. Since the elections, Croatia has signed a declaration with Republika Srpska agreeing to facilitate the return of some 2,000 refugees each way; and at a meeting of the Joint co-ordination Council with BiH, agreed that the two countries would extend social security benefits to each other’s nationals. Possibilities for dialogue with FRY regarding refugee return have also greatly increased since the assumption of power by President Kostunica.

4.6.3 While these new bilateral contacts are a positive development, it is important that refugee return is not perceived in terms of inter-state negotiation, but rather as a fundamental obligation of a state to its citizens. The Croatian government has committed itself in clear public statements to the principles of the Dayton Agreement and to the implementation of its own legal provisions in order to facilitate the return and reintegration of its citizens of any ethnicity who were displaced by the conflict of the 1990s. A high-level government representative told the Mission, "We want each displaced person to be able to return to their home or place they are happy to live." He also said they hoped to be able to "remove the refugee issue from our agenda" in three years.

4.6.4 The government has opened dialogue with representatives of the Serb community and Croatian settlers. In a joint statement, the Serb National Council, Serb Democratic Forum and Community of Immigrants and Settlers of Croatia in June 2000 said they welcomed being included into the work of government bodies dealing with areas of special state concern. It has also publicly recognised the steps needed in order to facilitate sustainable return.

4.6.5 However, a high-level representative told the Mission that the government wants to de-politicise the issue of returnees, that in 2001 it plans to no longer record their ethnicity or nationality, and is asking the international community to do the same. The Mission and the international community found this a worrying development, as the issue of discrimination against Serbs has not, in many human rights groups’ views, been adequately addressed at either the legal, socio-economic or political level. Although the present government has voiced its commitment to creating an environment conducive to multi-ethnicity, it will take time (as outlined earlier in the report) for this to be translated into practice. As evidence shows, discrimination along ethnic lines still exists and needs to be monitored. Recording data without ethnicity/nationality would not be conducive to challenging discriminatory practices.

4.6.6 The same representative of the government, while recognising the work ahead in preparing for return also told the Mission, "I don’t predict large-scale returns in the future. The majority of people who wanted to return have already done so. Republika Sprska is now reasonably safe; 80,000 to 100,000 people received citizenship in FRY, so the majority has probably decided to stay."

4.6.7 The Mission viewed this analysis with grave concern, implying as it does that effectively, the return issue is over before people have had a realistic change of exercising their right to return. The Mission welcomed the fact that FRY has addressed the basic immediate status problems of the Croatian Serbs displaced from the Krajina region. Nevertheless, Croatia is still responsible for it refugees. It would be wrong to conclude that people cease to be of concern to the government of Croatia simply because they have made a pragmatic decision to improve their rights in exile. Some of the refugees have been unable to attain Croatian citizenship even though they were born in Croatia or lived there for many years prior to the conflict. However, the key issue is that they are refugees from Croatia and should have the right to return and exercise all other rights associated with this status.

4.6.8 In many of the regions the Mission visited, local officials displayed a complete lack of either the political will or the capacity and leadership in taking responsibility to realise the government's objectives. The majority of them relate more to the policies of the previous central administration than that of the new, and representatives of the vestiges of political extremism and intolerance of minorities have often simply been given new jobs in the same municipality. In several mayors’ offices the Mission visited, the portrait of President Tudjman was still hung ceremoniously on the wall. This symbolised, to the Mission, a failure to accept politics of change and modernisation.

4.6.9 In terms of community relations, some local authorities had made efforts to co-operate with local and international NGO return projects, but others refused to even meet with them. It should be noted, however, that in an encouraging number of cases, NGOs did see an improvement in the openness of their local municipalities.

4.6.10 The local elections in April 2001 could mark the opportunity for improved co-operation with both national government and local voluntary initiatives or the possibility of continuing opposition and stalemate. However, the Mission was struck by the number of representatives from the NGO community who said that little was being risked at the local level regarding minority return before the elections so as not to further provoke reactions among groups whose status, privileges or power were already threatened. There are legal provisions for minority representation in local government in Croatia. The census in March 2001 takes place close to the election date, the result of which will be a clear demonstration of whether this representation right is real or rhetorical.

4.6.11 Judgement has to be reserved as to whether this local inertia is a failure of political leadership or a calculated position to move slowly. The present situation where people feel that even a modest return programme could provoke a political backlash at the upcoming elections illustrates the fragility of the situation in Croatia. Nevertheless, in order to meet its own proclaimed objectives, the Government of Croatia will need to remove the multiple legal problems and administrative obstacles relating to return.

4.7.1 The Mission was frequently told that the inconsistency of approach to returns issues in different arts of the country and the total inadequacy of the present complicated and contradictory legal system relating to returnees’ property rights, reconstruction assistance and citizenship was one of the main obstacles to return. Some organisations go as far as to say that there are serious illegalities in the system under international and domestic norms and cite in evidence the absence of the right to a fair trial, the elimination of the right to remedy for civil rights, and the violation of the right to possessions. Further they assert that the laws continue to be applied in a discriminatory way.

4.7.2 Three different regulations presently relate to repossession of property — The Returns Programme (administered through the Housing Commissions); the Act on Alterations and Amendments to the Law of Areas of Particular State Concern; and court proceedings based on provisions of the Property Act and other property laws. The amended Reconstruction Law together with contradictory guidelines in the Returns Programme relate to returnees’ reconstruction rights. A new ‘rule book’ listing four priorities for reconstruction support was issued in July. Serb returnees were not even mentioned as a priority, except as category four, ‘other beneficiaries with the right to reconstruct.’

4.7.3 The Mission heard of problems with the content, administration and implementation of each of these laws. The Returns Programme has been challenged as unconstitutional and the Housing Commissions, made up of unpaid local authority staff, have lacked both the capacity and will to implement their unclear mandates. The Mission heard that the criteria guiding the appointment of Housing Commission officials was unclear, and that many official have reportedly often been susceptible to pressure from local communities. Amendments to the laws serve to further complicate administrative guidelines rather than simplify them. Also, the courts interpret their role differently depending on which municipality they sit in - with some actively implementing eviction orders, while others do not.

4.7.4 Overall, legal confusion, inefficiency and a lack of capacity or will by local authorities to implement them result in major obstacles to the property owner’s ability to reclaim possession. Rather, the occupiers de facto have carte blanche to stay where they are, often occupying multiple properties, and vandalising with impunity those they are forced to leave. In addition to the thousands of homes the previous government invited Bosnian Croats and other ethnic Croats to settle in, the Mission heard that many houses were occupied or damaged by war profiteers. In some cases, even between eviction of an occupying family and return of the property to its owner, another illegal occupier often squats in the property. The Mission heard that cases are being reported to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Zagreb regarding the phenomenon of "cross-border multiple occupancies" where Croats from BiH occupy Serb houses in Croatia and their own houses in BiH.

4.7.5 Indeed, even in cases of successful repossession, the Mission heard that furniture and fittings were often impossible to reclaim, as there was no inventory taken of house contents by the previous administration before giving possession to new occupiers. The cases of repossession that were positive were often agreed between the occupier and owner, who would privately pay for the return of his/her property. The net effect of the current state of legislation has the effect of bolstering the rights of occupiers rather than the original rightful owners.

4.7.6 The government announced in October 2000 that it would abolish provisions in the Return Programme on procedures for repossession of property and allocation of alternative accommodation to occupants. In its place, the government promised to adopt new legislation implemented through a central government body. This step is evidence that the government recognises the ineffectiveness of the original procedures. However, it will only be effective if the government lays out clear administrative and procedural guidelines for the new legislation and imposes stricter monitoring of the progress made in implementing it.

4.7.7 In terms of reconstruction assistance, Croatian law deems that houses destroyed by ‘terrorism’ — i.e. houses blown up after the conflict and not part of the war action - are not entitled to government reconstruction assistance. The reconstruction application process is also essentially not available to refugees unless they can travel on their own to Croatia to apply.

4.7.8 For those theoretically eligible for reconstruction assistance, the Mission heard of long delays in receiving a response to applications for reconstruction. There is also the problem that the original damage was categorised several years before the work of reconstruction started. In many cases, structural wear and tear from ageing as well as vandalism meant that the repair work needed was much greater than was originally assessed. The Mission heard, however, that the original body responsible for assessing categorisation of the damage had long been disbanded, and no reassessment seemed possible. An additional problem the Mission heard was that people with badly damaged housing are not eligible for repairs due to the scale of damage. The international community generally only repairs lower grade damage to increase the impact of their investment, while Croatian funds are blocked by the procedural inadequacies mentioned above. Therefore, the most vulnerable — those with the least chance of re-inhabiting their homes — receive the least help.

4.7.9 In the Guidelines issued by UNHCR on the voluntary repatriation of refugees, one of the key indicators of safety is the existence of amnesty laws. In the case of Croatia, several amnesty laws have been passed: the first in 1992, the last in 1996. Croatia’s 1996 Amnesty Law, intended for ethnic Serbs who took up arms during the war, remains ambiguous and fails to encourage Serb return. Many of the 13,575 individuals mentioned in court decisions issued in 1998 were not clearly identified in terms of their personal information. However, there is a negative aspect to this amnesty process. The Norwegian Refugee Council reports that, in some cases, individuals are amnestied for crimes of which they were convicted in absentia, and may not have been convicted for if there was a real trial. The civil consequences of having such a criminal record, albeit amnestied, means that these people cannot serve as elected officials, legal professionals or police. They are forever labelled and have likely lost their ability to work in their profession.

4.7.10 Without taking a position on the merits of individual cases, the Mission was concerned that the highly contentious issue of suspected war criminals among returnees is not handled with regard to national and international standards of due process by the responsible local authorities. The Mission head reports of lists of alleged war criminals being publicly posted by local communities in returnee towns leading to a direct risk of vigilante action. During a field visit to Serbia in May, another ECRE mission interviewed Serb refugees who expressed fear about return to Croatia for men aged mid-20s to mid-60s because of arrest for alleged war crimes. Their expectation was that arrest would be arbitrary. Indeed, the OHCR claims that many prosecutions are based on group indictments that fail to specify individual criminal acts and often, individuals belonging to groups are tried in absentia.

4.7.11 The Mission heard that in October, 13 Croatian Serbs were arrested on the basis of a warrant that was issued in 1995 for alleged war crimes. OSCE was monitoring the validity of these arrests against the 1997 government agreement with UNTAES, which states that no new arrests for war crimes would take place unless there was new, substantiated evidence.

4.7.12 Another major obstacle to return is the uneven implementation of the 1997 "convalidation" law. The law had sought to legitimise administrative and judicial documents issued by Krajina Serb authorities during the region’s secession from Croatian. Most Serb refugees in Yugoslavia and Bosnia were not able to apply for welfare benefits within the limited period allotted by the law. Consequently, they risked not receiving their pensions or disability insurance proceeds–a major disincentive to return, given the bleak employment prospects for elderly Serbs.

4.8.1 The Mission heard from all representatives it interviewed of the prevalence of highly economically-deprived areas characterised by mass unemployment, widespread poverty and minimal industrial production to generate the wealth and reinforce social stability for the existing population and to create an environment conducive to return. One returnee woman, who had sons in Serbia and Canada, told the Mission, "I hope the economy will get better, that businesses will open and that my children will be able to come back and get jobs."

4.8.2 Returnees, both those who return spontaneously and those who come as part of the UNHCR-organised return, are entitled to a six-month return welfare package. This includes health care, and monthly cash assistance of either 150 kuna (about £12.50) for those with other income, or 250 kuna (about £22) for those without alternative income. After the six months, returnees can apply for social welfare, but local NGOs told the Mission of the problem of needing eight forms of identification in order to access this welfare.

4.8.3 Another impediment to return, particularly for agricultural workers is lack of access to pensions. The Serb Democratic Forum (SDF) reports that ‘establishing the right to family and disability pensions for Croatian Serbs is a distressing process’ as local municipalities require them to submit documents that are not required by law. SDF also reports that local office of the Croatian Pension and Disability Fund have different procedures for issuing pensions, and do not take instruction from the central office in Zagreb. The "convalidation" law discussed above meant that most Serb refugees in Yugoslavia and Bosnia were not able to apply for welfare benefits within the 30 days after return allotted by the law. Consequently, they risked not receiving their pensions or disability insurance proceeds. Also those who served in the RSK army are denied pension rights.

4.8.4 The Croatian government announced that it would conduct a population census in March 2001. It is unclear to the Mission whether refugees in Bosnia and FRY currently not in possession of Croatian documents will be able to be included in the census. It is unclear whether all persons who were citizens of Croatia in 1991 will be included in the census; if the nationality of children of refugees born after 1991 would be problematic; or how these people will be identified and reached as the census will expectedly be held on the territory of Croatia. Failure to include refugees in the census would merely consolidate the effects of the conflict displacement and is therefore unacceptable.

4.8.5 While Zagreb is reasonably economically stable, unemployment rates in the municipalities the Mission visited were between 75% and 85%. In many industrial war-affected areas, none of the pre-war factories had re-opened and those returning to rural areas often found their land either occupied by illegal or government-invited settlers or made unworkable by the presence of land-mines (discussed below in section 4.9.1). In the worst affected areas, people were continuing to leave in search of better opportunities. International NGO micro-credit schemes, such as CRS’ livestock programme, were working on a small-scale in war-affected areas to help returnees re-start their agricultural production. Other NGO projects working to help returnees survive in the dire economic situation are discussed in section 4.10 below. The view was frequently heard by the Mission that discrimination against Serbs in employment continues to be a major problem, but is hard to prove given its covert application and the overall high unemployment rates experienced by all in the community.

4.8.7 In terms of using the education system to facilitate better inter-ethnic relations, the Mission found a lack of government-led initiatives. In one Serb returnee family, the Mission met a 16-year old girl who was too scared to go back to her old school, as she was in the minority. However, OSCE reports that the Minister of Education soon plans to remove ‘non-reconciliatory messages’ from school history textbooks.

4.8.8 Some international NGOs told the Mission that the Bosnian and Kosovan Croat refugees in Croatia, encouraged by the previous government to occupy Serb refugees’ homes, have been left with little financial support. It remains to be seen if the agreement between BiH and Croatia mentioned in section__ actually delivers social security benefits to Bosnian refugees at a time of severe social security cutbacks.

4.9 Other issues relating to the return of refugees and displaced persons

4.9.1 The presence of some one million land mines in Croatia represents a lethal barrier to return areas. While the government has made efforts to clear mines in some urban areas, the cost of clearance is prohibitively high, so it has opted in many areas for education programmes instead. There continue to be regular fatalities and injuries from land mines, particularly in rural areas posing a deterrent to returnees, particularly those working in agriculture.

4.9.2 Compared to previous years, most government and NGO representatives felt that personal security incidents were much less widespread in Croatia. However, several areas are still reported to be ‘tense’ and even minor incidents, such as verbal abuse or vandalism to property represent a general lack of progress in fostering inter-ethnic tolerance. As such, they constitute a strong deterrent to return. In one area visited by the Mission, where there was no international presence, the Mission heard that vandalism of newly-reconstructed Serb properties by known offenders was not investigated by local police. Even worse, the same area reportedly had incidents where booby traps were put in returnees’ gardens to deter them from returning. While such incidents were not prevalent, OSCE’s police monitors anticipate that incidents relating to property issues will increase in the war-affected areas as the government’s commitment to the return of refugees and repossession of property is translated into action at the local level.

4.9.3 The local police role, therefore, is crucial in allaying returnees’ security fears. OSCE’s Police Monitoring Group report that while in many respects, police performance was "satisfactory", the police were unfortunately reluctant to record the ethnic nature of incidents. The Mission heard mixed reports about the effectiveness of police reactions to incidents, but most NGOs reported an overall improvement in their performance.

4.9.4 There is also appears to be increased tension amongst the local population in relation to Bosnian Croats and Croats from Kosovo. Roma in Croatia experience racial intolerance in general; Roma refugees are in an especially difficult situation. The Mission heard reports of Croatian embassies abroad refusing to issue citizenship documentation to Croatian Roma, or even refusing them entry to the premises.

4.10.1 The international and local NGO sector have developed some excellent grass-roots projects to encourage sustainable return. International projects include the International Rescue Committee’s holistic Community Revitilization Project, Catholic Relief Service’s Parent-School Partnership, micro-credit loans and community repayment scheme; UNHCR’s income generation and community infrastructure project. While local NGO work includes the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights and the Serb Democratic Forum’s excellent monitoring, legal and information work; and the Dalmatian Consortium of Solidarity’s legal advice and community revitalisation work.

4.10.2 Often, international projects were being implemented in partnership with the small local NGO sector, which seemed beneficial to both parties -- resource-strapped local NGOs and the international staff who could benefit from local people’s contacts with and knowledge of the community. However, while energetically continuing to fight against administrative bureaucracy and even public hostility, the Mission noted a sense of isolation and exhaustion in the civil sector of Croatian society. The Mission heard the view that relative to other areas in South-East Europe, Croatia has not been prioritised by the international community.

4.10.3 The Mission heard from both government and non-government representatives that a situation has arisen whereby reconstruction assistance is given along discriminatory ethnic lines. The government pays for the reconstruction of ethnic Croat houses, while the international community is perceived as only rebuilding Serb houses. The Mission was concerned about the ramifications that this perceived bias would have on inter-ethnic relations and potential reconciliation.

4.10.4 In a joint statement which the Mission felt was a welcome demonstration of inter-ethnic co-operation around a common need, the Serb National Council, Serb Democratic Forum and Community of Immigrants and Settlers of Croatia in June 2000, touched on the importance of this issue. The statement called on, "the international community and its organisations as well as the Government of Croatian to equally treat every human being in despair and need regardless of their ethnicity or religion, and to assist with the implementation of the return so that the Serb returnees would gain right to use their property, and immigrant and settled Croats a possibility of permanent accommodation, and all of them the right to reconstruction, as well as the right to work and live in dignity."

4.10.5 The Stability Pact grant of $63.1 million is a major support to the government and international community’s effort to facilitate return to Croatia. But the Mission heard recommendation on the ground that all the organisations in the Stability Pact and its key partners must also help unblock the bureaucratic procedures and legal impediments to return by linking cash grants to the government with implementation of reform.

4.10.6 To increase the level of return to Croatia, the Mission heard the view that there also needs to be a higher level of regional co-ordination for both national and local government, and international agencies, notably UNHCR, OSCE and OHR. Many NGOs such as SDF and NRC are active across borders. The principle aim of improved co-ordination across frontiers for all agencies involved should be to open the process for refugees to use themselves.

4.10.7 All the parties the Mission met were alarmed at unsubstantiated rumours that UNHCR had planned budget cuts to its South-East Europe operations. UNHCR plays a vital role in ensuring protection, safety and dignity for refugees and returnees in Croatia. The OSCE plays a useful monitoring and advisory role, and the UN High Commission of Human Rights is also active. The low level of governmental support for the work of the Public Ombudsman is also very concerning. The Ombudsman’s office clearly falls to the bottom of the priority list and such lack of interest is contradictory to the government’s commitment to improve its human rights record if it wishes to join the EU. The Mission head with concern that NGO representatives are excluded from UNHCR’s ‘legal experts group’ which is limited to representatives of governments and international agencies. In such a complex and contentious issue as return policy to Croatia, the Mission would support all those who call for more transparency and openness as a key element in confidence building.

5.2 Listed below are a number of practical recommendations intended to help build sustainable return to Croatia. The ECRE Focus Group on South-Eastern Europe offers these recommendations as timely advice to the inter-governmental, governmental, international and local NGO communities involved with all aspects of the return process.

5.3.1 The Government of Croatia says that it wishes to resolve the returns issue within three years. As a first step, the Croatian authorities should act with greater conviction to remove the multiple barriers to return. The test of a successful refugee return programme is less a matter of arbitrary deadlines than a matter of solving outstanding injustice and barriers inhibiting return. The authorities in Croatia need to demonstrate a strategic coherent set of objectives and activities that would achieve their proclaimed aim. The principles of such a strategy are the assertion of fundamental human rights and humanitarian law principles; the requisition by all refugees and displaced persons of state protection and their full civil rights; and the positive contribution to regional peace, stability and development.

5.3.2 Part of this strategy should include a complete overhaul of the administrative and legal procedures relating to property. New, non-discriminatory, clear legislation is needed to ease the returnees’ process of repossessing their property, with clear guidelines and accountability for local authorities. The following seven specific recommendations relate to this:

5.3.3 Croatia should ratify the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness as well as the European Convention on nationality.

5.3.4 The 2001 census must take account of the refugee population. Many refugees continue to have residence in Croatia but will not be physically present at the time of the census count. The census will have important political and financial consequences for minority areas.

5.3.5 Related to the above recommendation, minority representation in government must be implemented in the April 2001 local elections. The right to vote and elect representatives is fundamental to the protection of all other legal rights. Croatia’s constitutional law on human rights and freedoms and the rights of national and ethnic minorities in the Republic of Croatia provides that minorities are entitled to representation. However, this right is suspended until completion of the 2001 census.

5.3.6 Central and local authorities should comply with document requests from refugees directly — refugees should not be required to go through foreign and international intermediaries to deal with their own government.

5.3.7 Local authorities should abide by bilateral agreements on legal aid between Croatia and FRY. This requires local authorities to recognise FRY legal stamps and documents.

5.3.8 Serb legal professionals who after the conflict applied for readmission to the Croatian Bar Association and were denied, essentially on the basis of participating in rebellion against the state, should be allowed to rejoin the bar.

5.3.9 The Croatian consulates in FRY and BiH should abide by the law and issue citizenship documentation and allow refugees to acquire citizenship by naturalisation.

5.3.10 To strengthen Croatia’s commitment to broad legal reform, the international community could play an important role in reinforcing the independence of the judiciary, for example by training new judges and lawyers who would play a crucial role in making comprehensive legal change. As a matter of priority, extra resources need to be put into clearing the huge court backlog of cases and in speedily assessing current cases.

5.3.11 When courts deliver decision that ensure the requisition of property rights by returning refugees, law enforcement authorities should ensure that these orders are executed, including evictions in cases where they need to be implemented.

5.3.12 Local and international NGOs in Croatia play a crucial role in providing legal advice to returnees. International donors should help increase their capacity and government should ensure they are given training on new legislative procedures.

5.3.13 International and local NGO grass-roots micro-credit schemes need to be increased to empower returnees’ self-sufficiency.

5.3.14 Reconstruction assistance needs to be given to all beneficiaries by both the government and the international community along non-discriminatory lines. International aid should not be seen to favour one ethnic group. Furthermore, in the interests of promoting long-term integration and social cohesion, the government should not be absolved of their responsibility to their ethnic minorities in providing this tool to the basic human right of shelter.

5.3.15 Stability Pact funding promoting return should be clearly linked to the government’s overall legal and administrative reform of which the full exercise of civil rights by returning refugees is an important element. The international community, particularly the Council of Europe, European Union, and OSCE, should send a strong message to the central government about the consequences of not reforming and speeding up the processes to facilitate return. The Stability Pact should also improve its interaction with NGOs. Funding to international NGOs should include directives about how local NGOs are involved and given capacity-building support.

5.3.16 International donors should look to the great need for human rights education and civil society development in Croatia as one of the most effective means of promoting long-term stability. The local NGO sector must be supported in building its capacity, both through supporting its access to donors and by international NGO mentoring and partnership.

5.3.17 There needs to be a collaborative economic strategy between the government and international donors to turn the economy around and encourage commercial development in the country.

5.3.18 The imminent survey of attitudes towards return of Croatian Serb refugees in FRY should ensure that individuals are made aware of the continuing existence of impediments to their return. The survey will enable UNHCR to take action to resolve the outstanding protection issues as part of its mandate to ensure the durable solution of safe, sustainable and dignified return.

5.3.19 The returnees’ views and the evidence gathered by local NGOs in Croatia needs to be incorporated into international NGO work, so that it reflects community needs. International and local NGOs should increase their collaboration and inform each others’ work, particularly in the planning stage. Local and national government should both consult with local NGOs and offer open access to them.

5.3.20 The Mission urges IGOs and NGOs to increase capacity for cross-border planning and operations. Municipalities in Serbia and FRY which host high numbers of refugees should be supported and encouraged by international organisations and NGOs operating in the region to make direct links with ‘return’ municipalities in Croatia which are required by law to respond to the individual requests of citizens to return.

5.3.21 The government should vigorously promote non-discriminatory employment policies to ensure that Croatian Serbs have a fair chance in the public employment sector. They also need to ensure judicial review of earlier dismissals on discriminatory practice.

5.3.22 Croatia’s amnesty laws should be implemented fairly. Croatian authorities at all levels should ensure that the amnesty law is not undermined or circumvented by the spurious charging of returnees with crimes not covered by the amnesty.

5.3.23 War criminals from both sides need to be brought to justice in line with international law guidelines. However, the government should put an end to irresponsible community involvement in exposing alleged war criminals where the inaccuracy of the information is leading to vigilante action.

5.3.24 The Croatian authorities should quickly address the issue of missing persons to bring resolution to the families and friends of those missing. This is an important step in realising post-war reconciliation.

5.3.25 Croatian government and international community resources need to be increased to clear landmines from the country, particularly in potential returnee areas.

Appendix A: full list of organisations and individuals consulted for this report