BAAG
BRITISH AGENCIES AFGHANISTAN GROUP
Afghanistan:
MONTHLY REVIEW
October 2001
The US-led
military intervention
There are arguably a number of factors that led the
USA, with UK military support, to opt for military action against targets in
Afghanistan from October 7th onwards. Certainly, military action had
been threatened over the previous weeks since the terrorist attacks of
September 11th but it appeared that diplomatic options were being
actively pursued right up to the 7th October and nothing had
happened to suggest that these were likely to fail. Thus, both the USA and the
UK governments were engaged in face-to-face discussions with a number of
Islamic states and appeared to be taking on board their concerns that military
intervention in Afghanistan might fuel support for Osama bin Laden at the
street level within their own states and potentially undermine some regimes,
notably that of Saudi Arabia. The
US and UK governments also appeared to be taking seriously the view expressed
by the various Islamic states that the Palestinian issue had to be effectively
addressed if the terrorist threat was to be reduced. In relation to
Afghanistan, the US government was also exploring options geared to the
possible emergence of a more broad-based government in Afghanistan with a
particular focus on an initiative taken by the former King, Zahir Shah. There
was speculation that Pushtun tribal leaders could play a role in encouraging
elements within the Taliban to cooperate with this initiative, to which the
Northern Alliance had already lent its support.
It is possible that the timing of the military
intervention was the outcome of debates within the US administration, with
those favouring military action countering those who were urging caution
because of the risk that this could increase the terrorist threat. Many anticipated that it would generate
large numbers of volunteers in the Islamic world eager to martyr themselves in
the cause of a jihad against the USA.
The US government was clearly under enormous public pressure to be seen
to be doing something in response to the horrific terrorist attacks of
September 11th. It also had legitimate concerns about the presence
of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and the potential of his network to
orchestrate terrorist activity against Western targets. Osama bin Laden had
already been presented as a key element in US defence strategy early in the
year in the context of proposals to increase the defence budget.
Internal debates within the US administration would
also appear to have influenced the nature of the military intervention. The
attacks on terrorist training camps and on military installations and hardware
held by the Taliban may be regarded as being primarily geared to addressing the
need to be seen by the US public to be doing something in response to the
events of September 11th.
Reports suggest that the terrorist training camps had been vacated
before they were bombed and many of the planes destroyed had been sitting
rusting on the tarmac for some years. Similarly, the decision to airdrop food
packages from US planes was taken outside the framework of the UN-led
humanitarian response and may be perceived as having, above all, a public
relations function. Military interventions subsequent to these attacks may
reflect conflicting views within the US government as to whether it should be
seeking to capture Osama bin Laden, target volunteers from other parts of the
Islamic world fighting for the Taliban, bring down the Taliban government,
strengthen the Northern Alliance and help it to take territory or help bring
about a broad-based government which could include moderate elements from
within the Taliban.
Positions within the US administration have shifted in
response to changing expectations as to likely outcomes. It appeared that many
expected the Taliban to fall very quickly as a result of the early
bombardments, with one of the underlying assumptions being that the Pushtun
tribal leaders would abandon them. However, the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the former Mujahidin leader, Abdul Haq, by the Taliban on 26th
October would suggest that the Pushtun tribes have lined up very firmly behind
the Taliban in response to the US military intervention. There have also been
reports that the Pushtun tribes on the Pakistan side of the border are also
lending support. If, as some sources were suggesting, the Pushtun tribes were
wavering in their support for the Taliban prior to the US air strikes, this
would indicate a pronounced reversal of that process.
The implications of this for the efforts of the UN
to bring the parties to the
conflict together to agree on the composition of a broad-based government are
significant. If, as appears to be the case, the Pushtun tribes could be
expected to be suspicious of any government that was orchestrated by the USA,
they would be unlikely to be willing to cooperate, in any power-sharing
arrangement, with the elements that currently compose the Northern Alliance as
these are clearly seen to be working in conjunction with the USA. Some in the
US government, notably Colin Powell, are aware of this risk and, following
discussions with Pakistan’s President, General Musharraf, Mr Powell has
advocated that any future government of Afghanistan should include moderate
elements from within the Taliban. The USA also seems to have held back in
lending sufficient military support to the Northern Alliance to allow them to
capture territory. It is understandably nervous that, if it succeeds in
removing the Taliban from power in any particular area, this will create a
power vacuum that could lead to anarchy. There are already indications that
this is happening, with law and order breaking down in Kandahar, in particular,
and with volunteers from other parts of the Islamic world fighting with the
Taliban taking the law increasingly into their own hands. It is not clear to
what extent this breakdown in law and order and an increased climate of threat
has been a factor in the exodus of up to three quarters of the populations of
some cities to surrounding villages and to Pakistan. The growing civilian
casualties arising from the US-led military action has evidently been
significant in encouraging flight but the decline in law and order may also be
important. The prospects for a diplomatic solution to the use of Afghanistan as
a base for terrorism would therefore appear to be much less now than was the
case prior to the US-led military intervention.
We may expect, therefore, that any political outcome
will be a consequence of military action. A key consideration is that the
Taliban, although weakened by the loss of some aircraft, have been potentially
strengthened by the large number of volunteers flying in from the various parts
of the Islamic world and crossing the border from the madrasahs in Pakistan.
Any ground troops sent by the USA, or its allies, could also anticipate fierce
opposition from the Pushtun tribes and, possibly, Afghans from the minority
ethnic groups who would feel that any external invader needed to be resisted.
The task of Lakhdar Brahimi, mandated by Kofi Annan to oversee both the peace
process in Afghanistan and the humanitarian response, is therefore a
particularly difficult one.
There is now a serious risk that the US will see its
wavering support amongst governments within the Islamic world progressively
evaporate as television pictures of civilian casualties continue to be filmed
on a daily basis. The USA is in a vulnerable position having failed to convince
many of these governments that it had sufficient evidence to implicate Osama
bin Laden in the terrorist attacks of September 11th. Thus, while
evidence was said to have been shared, in confidence, amongst certain western
leaders, it was not made available to the wider world. This has inevitably led
to a questioning of the legitimacy of the US-led military intervention and to
concerns that the USA had not pursued the legal channels open to it to have
Osama bin Laden made the subject of criminal proceedings.
While determined efforts have been made by the UK to address
the concerns of governments such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, Iran
and Egypt though prime ministerial and ministerial visits to the region, such
governments are having to take increasing account of the objections of both
moderates and radicals, within their populations, to the escalating military
action.
The humanitarian
situation
a) Introduction
The ongoing military action by the US-led coalition is
having a number of specific impacts. First, it is creating a security
environment in which it is very much more difficult for humanitarian agencies
to deliver food to various points within the country, to protect it and to
distribute it to those who are identified as most vulnerable. Second, in
addition to causing direct casualties it is creating panic, with the result
that up to three- quarters of the population of some cities have fled. Of
concern is that a majority of these would appear to have gone to villages where
they had relatives, many of which were already suffering from severe food
shortages due to the drought. However, a joint assessment by UNHCR and the
Pakistan Authorities estimates that 100-110,000 refugees have crossed the
Pakistan border and face severe hardship as humanitarian agencies struggle to
establish camps in areas designated by the Pakistan Government. The camps present enormous constraints
from the point of view of water supply and the security of aid staff, in
particular. Reports that very many
of those seeking to cross the border are having to pay agents are particularly
worrying, not least because of information that suggests that some of those
unable to make the payments are being indentured to work in, for example, coal
mines or carpet workshops.
Also of concern are indications that forcible
recruitment by both the Northern Alliance and the Taliban is growing in scale
and that men of fighting age are being taken from their families as they seek
to flee the country.
(b) The scale of the crisis
The UN estimates that 7.5 to 8 million people are nutritionally highly vulnerable at the present time, either because of the continuing effects of the drought or because of their recent displacement. The UN also estimates that there are 1,160,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan overall and 4,150,000 people who are internally stranded.
(c) Refugees
Although the numbers seeking to flee to Pakistan and other neighbouring countries have been very much less than the planning figure of 1.5 million drawn up by the UN, the 100-110,000 who have already made the journey to Pakistan nonetheless represent a very significant number. Despite appeals by the United Nations Secretary General to the Government of Pakistan to ‘welcome those unfortunate Afghan civilians who would be seeking safety’, the border with Pakistan remains resolutely closed as do those of other neighbouring countries.
The numbers crossing into Iran have been extremely small and none of the Central Asian Republics have permitted any influx. The border at Chaman, between Kandahar and Quetta, has been periodically opened for short periods and others have managed to cross through the use of agents or by other means. UNHCR are monitoring movements of refugees at 7 border crossing points and noted, for example, that 1,200 Afghans crossed on Friday 27th October - only 13 of them legally - and reported 1,600 people crossing the day before.
Mr. Kenzo Oshima, the UN’s
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief
Coordinator, had delivered the request to open the border to President Pervez
Musharraf in Islamabad at the beginning of the month. During the same visit he also met with the Taliban
Ambassador and insisted on guarantees from the Taliban Authorities on the
safety and security of humanitarian workers, full restoration of communications
and facilities, and the safe movement of relief goods within areas under
Taliban control.
The Taliban have set up a camp for refugees near the
border at Spinboldak, but it appears unable to cope with the thousands of
people who have made their way there according to people who have managed to
cross into Pakistan. One man
reported seeing many injured people, mostly women and children and that medical
supplies had been brought in to treat them in a medical unit that has been set
up for the purpose. UNHCR say they
fear that the camp could be used as a recruitment ground for the Taliban.
Human Rights Watch also have serious concerns about
camps being set up in the Tribal Areas in the Khyber Agency. They say that people’s safety
cannot be guaranteed, as the area is known to be insecure, inaccessible and in
addition has inadequate supplies of water.
At Chaman, Killi Faizo staging camp, and two
longer-term camps near to the Chaman border, well drilling is taking place as
well as other preparations ready to receive refugees. Killi Faizo has more than 150 tents with more being erected
and UNHCR say that the camp could accommodate up to 10,000 people although they
want to limit the number of tents to 600.
A water tank has been installed and latrines dug. The Baluchistan
authorities are assisting the aid effort.
In Quetta UNHCR has over 13,300 tents and 18,000
tarpaulins stored in warehouses in addition to tens of thousands of other
essential supplies awaiting the go-ahead for distribution.
(d) The delivery of assistance
The World Food Programme (WFP) is currently delivering
500 metric tonnes of food into Afghanistan daily. This is sufficient to feed 60,000 people for a month but is
far short of requirements as WFP estimates that 52,000 tonnes of cereals are
required each month to meet the need.
In a Submission to the Parliamentary International Development Select
Committee Enquiry into the Humanitarian Crisis in Afghanistan by Christian Aid
and Islamic Relief, the two organisations stressed that NGOs with strong links
to local communities are ‘deeply concerned by the absence of effective
delivery and distribution networks as an essential component of a comprehensive
humanitarian strategy’. In
addition, it was brought to the Committee’s attention that estimates for
food aid required were based on figures drawn up before the 7 October bombing
and plans were made to feed 5 million people. Since this time the number of people requiring aid have
risen to an estimated 8 million and access to many of these has become
increasingly difficult or impossible.
The capacity of agencies to respond to the emergency
varies from region to region depending on the level of conflict. Some, have ceased altogether whilst
others are continuing up to 85% of their planned work. People in many rural and isolated
regions, for example, the Central Highlands, are cut off from medical, food and
other supplies as in the present situation distribution is almost impossible
and they are stranded. Some
medical supplies, however, are reportedly getting through to Faizabad and 11
emergency kits have been delivered to Kabul for distribution. A kit can treat 10,000 people for 3
months for common ailments and injuries.
In Badakshan, supplies continue to be distributed
– warm clothing, plastic sheeting for winter shelter, quilts, soap and
kerosene lamps as well as food.
Similar supplies have been delivered to over 1,400 families in Farkhar,
Warsaj, Kalafghan, Keshem and Rustaq.
A delivery of 30,000 blankets is due to arrive soon from Tajikistan.
The WFP has identified 9 priority districts in NE
Afghanistan and NGOs are working on roads and canals to facilitate delivery of
food to both rural communities and IDPs.
Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan
Mr. Oshima met with the President and Foreign Minister
of Tajikistan at the end of the month and reported that the Tajik Government
fully supports the delivery of aid across the Tajikistan border with
Afghanistan. The Government appears willing to assist the effort by easing administrative
procedures and practical constraints in order to facilitate deliveries of aid
by air and by river. This has
encouraged humanitarian agencies to increase their work in the region in the
hope they can deliver sufficient supplies before winter sets in. Approximately 100,000 IDPs are reported
by the UN to be in the area and for some of them this will be the second winter
away from their villages.
Mr Oshima also met with the Government of Turkmenistan
and as a result of his negotiations, the President gave direct instructions for
the facilitation of delivery of aid and to make improvements to the approval of
visas for aid workers.
UNICEF has established a temporary office in Ashgabad,
Turkeministan after being relocated from North Afghanistan. Mahboob Shareef, the head of the UNICEF
office reported that national UNICEF workers are doing all they can to keep
programmes going and that cross-border operations started at the beginning of
October with a convoy of emergency supplies being sent to Andkhoy in North
Afghanistan.
The
UN say aid will not start moving into Afghanistan from Uzbekistan until the
first or second week in November. Stockpiles are on the Termez docks waiting to
be loaded on to barges for shipment down the Amu Darya River into Northern
Afghanistan. The barges can each
carry up to 1,000 metric tonnes of food.
Mr Oshima discussed the subject of aid operations by air with the
Uzbekistan Government but at present the use of Termez airport is not
acceptable to them.
Meanwhile
the Afghan winter is drawing closer bringing with it the threat that millions
of people will be cut off from vital supplies. Thousands of IDPs are at the
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan borders in poor physical shape and showing signs of
malnutrition. However,
UNICEF say they have managed to gain access to the ‘no-man’s land
between the borders of Tajikistan and Afghanistan and are immunizing children
and bringing relief supplies. An
estimated 6,000 children have been in the area since October.
Iran
There is still a dearth of information on what is happening on the Iranian border.
However, UNHCR have continued negotiations with the Iranian authorities to gain better access to the border area and reiterated their concerns about the security of displaced people. Fears are still being expressed about forcible recruitment by the Taliban forces and lack of water is still a major practical problem to be resolved. UNHCR are also requesting their assistance to facilitate the setting up of communications systems.
Some NGOs who have had access to the Taliban controlled Makaki camp inside Afghanistan report that facilities are inadequate. There are sufficient tents that can accommodate 3,000 people but about 40 families are without shelter and are left exposed to the elements.
UNHCR are building up stockpiles of emergency relief supplies in Mashad and Zahedan. They have made available 3,000 tents, 18,700 plastic sheets, blankets and other non-food emergency supplies in addition to the relief provided by the International Red Crescent Society (ICRS).
e) Health
Apart from injuries sustained as a result of bombing
raids the general health of refugees and IDPs in rapidly deteriorating
conditions is of increasing concern.
The World Health Organisation (WHO) are investigating cases of
falciparum malaria, one of the most dangerous forms, after reports were
received of cases in Nangarhar Province near Jalalabad. Last month 269 children were
hospitalised in the area with various serious illnesses including cerebral
malaria although malnutrition and lack of food, though, remain the greatest
threats to health. As more and
more people move away from the major towns medical services in the rural areas
are stretched way beyond their capacity.
Around Jalalabad for example there has been a 60% increase in demand
during the last half of October and in Kabul there is a desperate need for
mother and child health supplies.
Conditions are rapidly deteriorating due to military strikes leading to further displacement of communities and disruption of services and access to basic amenities. The UN predicts that the consequences for people’s health are dire and are expecting outbreaks of dysentery and cholera where there is no sanitation. Epidemics of measles that can be deadly for children already weak and malnourished are expected as immunisation programmes have been disrupted. Women delivered of babies in primitive, unsafe conditions are likely to produce an increase in fatalities of both mothers and their babies. The statistics for mortality in childbirth in Afghanistan are already among the highest in the world. It may also be expected that the severe emotional and mental trauma that were already common before September 11 will have been enormously heightened by recent events.
Three more suspected cases of Crimean Congo
Haemorrhagic Fever have been reported from Sanjani, Quetta and Chaman. The patients have been hospitalised and
are all responding to treatment.
The fear of an epidemic has prompted the WHO to monitor the situation closely. It still has 8 sub-offices in operation
in Afghanistan but say that communication is becoming increasingly difficult.
f)
Conclusions
The humanitarian crisis is catascrophic in scale and
shows every sign of a further deterioration. Humanitarian agencies will continue to do their best to get
aid to the areas most affected with varying levels of success dependent on the
local security environment, climatic and road conditions and the availability
of food and other emergency supplies.
This report is published by the British
Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) Project,based at the Refugee Council,
London. The Project is funded from
a number of sources, including the UK Government’s Department for
International Development and individual British NGOs operating in
Afghanistan. However, the views
expressed are those of the BAAG Project and do not represent any official view
of its funders.
For more information, please contact:
The Secretariat, BAAG at Refugee Council, 3
Bondway, London SW8 1SJ
Telephone: 00 44 20 7820 3098/7840 4400
Fax:
00 44 20 7820 3107
Email: baag@refugeecouncil.org.uk