UNHCR’s Observations
on
the European Commission’s proposal for a
Council Directive on
Minimum standards on procedures for granting and
withdrawing refugee status
_____________________________________________________________________
Introduction
1. On 20 September 2000, the European Commission issued a proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status (Document COM(2000) 578 final). The adoption of this Directive is one of the measures envisaged by the Conclusions of the Presidency at the Tampere European Council and by the Vienna Plan of Action, for the purpose of establishing an area of freedom, security and justice in the Union, as mandated by Article 63 of the Amsterdam Treaty.
2. Consistent
with the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, all asylum-seekers must be
granted access to fair and effective procedures for determining their
protection needs.[1] In this
connection, UNHCR is bound to recall that it has in the past raised serious
objections regarding the possibility that access to asylum procedures may be
denied on grounds of nationality, as allowed under the Protocol on Asylum for
Nationals of Member States of the European Union. UNHCR hopes that Member
States will continue to examine any application for asylum that may be
submitted to them by any person who is not a national of the Member State
concerned.
3. UNHCR
has repeatedly emphasized the importance of States adopting appropriate
procedures for the determination of refugee status, as the enjoyment by
refugees of all the rights to which they are entitled under international law,
and specifically under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, is dependent
upon their status as refugees having been formally recognized. In addition,
both UNHCR and States have an interest in the early identification of those not
in need of international protection, as this is critical for the credibility of
the institution of asylum.
4. UNHCR
has further emphasized that refugee status determination and asylum procedures
must be both fair and efficient, and has insisted that efficiency should not be
achieved at the expense of fairness. UNHCR has also recalled that, while
efficiency can be obtained by streamlining procedures, it is also indispensable
that adequate resources be allocated to the processing of asylum requests and
that those involved in this process be appropriately trained.
5. Member
States of the European Union have had in place procedures for determining
refugee status for several decades. Though significant differences persist and
the level of guarantees is far from uniform, it must be acknowledged that
European practice has, over the years, contributed positively towards setting
international standards in this area. Recent developments in the law and
practice of Member States have, however, not always advanced the international
refugee protection regime. UNHCR has noted, with concern, a gradual shift of
emphasis away from the identification of persons in need of protection towards
the deterrence of real or perceived abuse, if not sheer deterrence of arrivals
of asylum-seekers. Concern about growing backlogs and the difficulty of
agreeing on burden-sharing formulas have resulted in policies of deflection,
with less attention paid to key issues of responsibility and international
solidarity. Accelerated procedures, while acceptable in principle, have been
expanded to become, in some jurisdictions, the rule rather than the exception.
Perhaps most worrying of all is the climate of mistrust and suspicion within
which asylum procedures, more often than not, operate. This adversarial
environment must be transformed by the restoration of mutual confidence in the
system for the determination of asylum claims, if this system is to function
fairly and effectively. The Community instrument on procedural standards has
the potential to assist in achieving this.
6. Against
this backdrop, UNHCR must commend the policy
vision embodied in the Communication on a common asylum procedure and a uniform
status for persons granted asylum, issued by the European Commission on 22
November 2000. Likewise, UNHCR appreciates the comprehensiveness of the present
proposal and supports its central objectives to:
(i) provide for measures designed at ensuring the efficiency and speediness of asylum procedures, including the introduction of time limits for deciding asylum requests;
(ii) establish minimum safeguards to ensure the fairness of the decision-making process;
(iii) lay down specific procedural
safeguards for persons with special needs;
(iv) establish a common approach as regards
both the definition and the application of the notions of
“inadmissible” and of “manifestly unfounded” claims;
and
(v) lay down minimum requirements
for ensuring a good standard of decision making.
7. The
Commission’s proposal constitutes a serious and valuable attempt to
strike the right balance between the imperatives of fairness and those of
efficiency. As such, it provides a sound basis for discussion. UNHCR welcomes a
number of provisions contained in the proposal, particularly those related to
the basic principles and guarantees and the regular procedure, which generally
reflect the international standards laid down in, inter alia, the
resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Conclusions
of the Executive Committee of UNHCR. The following observations therefore focus
on those areas which require clarification or amendment in order to ensure full
conformity with those international standards, as well as the realisation of
those objectives which the Commission has set for its own work.
8. UNHCR’s
comments are presented in the order of the proposal’s chapters and
sections.
Scope and definitions (Chapter I of
the proposal)
9. UNHCR
notes that the proposal relates only to procedures for determination and withdrawal of refugee
status under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. The text envisages that
Member States may apply the provisions of this Directive to procedures for
deciding on applications for protection not falling under the scope of the
above refugee instruments[2],
but does not go farther. UNHCR believes that, by thus leaving at the level of a
mere possibility a comprehensive treatment of all applications for protection,
an important opportunity is being missed.
10. It
is in the interest of Member States, as well as of asylum-seekers, that the
same minimum guarantees apply to all procedures leading to the grant of any
form of international protection. As the Commission intends to table its
proposal on minimum standards on the qualification of persons as refugees and
on subsidiary forms of protection in the very near future, it would be most
useful to consider, in parallel to the definition of protection grounds and
criteria, all related procedural aspects.
11. The
Commission’s Communication on a common asylum procedure and a uniform
status explores the adoption of a system whereby all international protection
needs arising from all forms of risks would be considered within a single procedure.
UNHCR strongly favours such an approach, because the circumstances that force
people to flee their country are complex and often of a composite nature. The
identification of protection needs cannot, therefore, be made in a
compartmentalised fashion. Each case must be examined in its totality, and this
can be better achieved if the claim is considered in a single procedure.
Furthermore, UNHCR believes that a single asylum procedure will help to
increase speed and reduce the costs of decision-making in asylum matters.
12. Following
the same logic, UNHCR finds the definition of “asylum” provided in
Article 2 (b) of the proposal unnecessarily restrictive. Asylum, which is the
protection extended by a State to a foreign national or a stateless person in
need of it, is broader than and cannot be equated with the specific protection
afforded to refugees under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. As for
“refugee status”, defined in Article 2(i), UNHCR wishes to point
out that this phrase may, depending on the context, cover two different
notions. Paragraph 28 of the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status reads: “[a] person is a refugee within the
meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he fulfils the criteria contained in
the definition. This would necessarily occur prior to the time at which his
refugee status is formally determined”. In this sense, “refugee
status” means the condition of being a refugee. In contrast, the proposal
uses the phrase “refugee status” to mean the set of rights,
benefits and obligations that flow from the recognition of a person as a
refugee.
13. Finally,
under this Chapter, Article 2 (l) defines “[w]ithdrawal of refugee
status” as the decision by a determining authority to withdraw the refugee
status of a person on the basis of Article 1(C) of the Geneva Convention or
Article 33(2) of the Geneva Convention. This provision merits two
important observations:
(i) Article
1(C) of the 1951 Convention deals with “cessation” of refugee
status, a notion which is different from that of “withdrawal”, even
though, in practice, the latter accompanies the former. As is known, a person
ceases to be a refugee as soon as any of the circumstances envisaged in Article
1(C) become applicable. The decision determining the cessation of refugee
status is, as well as the decision determining its recognition, declaratory in
nature. Given that Article 1 of the Convention cannot be the object of
reservations or amendments of any kind, UNHCR would recommend use of the word
“cessation” to describe a decision based on Article 1(C) of the
said Convention;
(ii) The exception
laid down in the second paragraph of Article 33 of the Convention falls outside
the scope of this proposal, which relates to procedures for granting and
withdrawing refugee status. Article 33(2) of the Convention denies, in very
exceptional cases, the benefit of the non-refoulement rule to persons who are
refugees within the meaning of Article 1(A) of the Convention. Withdrawal of refugee status is not at issue
in the operation of this exceptional provision.
Basic principles
and guarantees (Chapter II of the proposal)
14. For
refugees to be able to benefit from the standards of treatment provided for by
the 1951 Convention, or by other relevant international instruments and/or by
national law, it is essential that they can have physical access to the
territory of the State where they are seeking admission as refugees[3]
and that they can further have access to a procedure where the validity of
their refugee claim can be assessed. These essential pre-conditions of refugee
protection have been repeatedly underlined by the General Assembly of the
United Nations and by the Executive Committee of UNHCR.
15. UNHCR
therefore appreciates:
(i) that
the proposal stipulates that Member States shall ensure that the applicant for
asylum has an effective opportunity to lodge an application as early as
possible;[4]
(ii) that the
Directive is meant to be applied to all persons who make a request for asylum
either at the border or on the territory of a Member State;[5]
and
(iii) that applicants
for asylum shall be allowed to remain at the border or on the territory of the
Member State in which the application for asylum has been made or is being
examined, as long as it has not been decided on.[6]
16. On this
last point, however, UNHCR is of the view that the proposal can be improved in
two ways. Firstly, the text should make it clear that the stay of an
asylum-seeker at the border of a Member State must be for the shortest possible
time, as it is clear that this is not a conducive environment for the
determination of refugee status. Secondly, there should be no ambiguity as to
the meaning of “as long as it has not been decided on” in Article
5. An applicant for asylum must be allowed to remain on the territory of the
State in which his or her application has been lodged or is being examined
until such time as a final decision is reached on this application, and
the wording of Article 5 should reflect this principle with full clarity.
17. UNHCR notes
with concern that it is proposed to restrict the basic guarantees contained in
Articles 8(6) and 9(3) of the proposal to the regular procedure, described in
Articles 24 to 26. The opportunity for an asylum-seeker, not only to hear (as
per Article 8(2)), but also to consult the transcript of his or her personal
interview should be granted in all procedures in which a personal interview is
foreseen. Likewise, UNHCR sees no reason to restrict the presence of legal
advisers or counsellors during such interviews. Their advice may be equally
relevant during the course of admissibility or accelerated procedures as in the
regular procedure. It may, as a matter of fact, be more urgently needed where a
possible outcome of the interview is swift removal to a third country, or where
the interviewer operates under the pressure of tight time constraints and/or
other guidelines.
18. Article 11
of the proposal deals with the detention of asylum-seekers. The re-affirmation
of the general principle that asylum-seekers should not be detained is, in
itself, welcome. However, UNHCR is concerned that a single article in the
proposal cannot do justice to the complex and delicate issues involved in the
application of, and exceptions to, this principle. If it is deemed
indispensable to address the subject within the context of this Directive, then
a clear cross-reference should be made to the future Community instrument
laying down minimum standards for the reception of applicants for asylum in
Member States, and the latter instrument should deal in detail with the full
range of procedural guarantees to which
detained asylum-seekers should be entitled, and with the conditions of
their detention. In doing so, the Commission will find valuable guidance in the
UNHCR Guidelines on applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention
of Asylum Seekers, of February 1999.
19. These UNHCR
Guidelines make
extensive references to alternatives to detention, including (though not
exclusively) for the benefit of minors and other vulnerable persons seeking
asylum. This useful notion must find its way into Community law provisions in
one instrument or another.
20. Turning
to (exceptional) grounds for detention, which are the principal subject matter
of Article 11 of the proposal, UNHCR wishes to recall that its Executive
Committee has affirmed that detention of asylum-seekers should normally be
avoided, and that if necessary, it may be resorted to only on grounds
prescribed by law and only for specifically defined purposes. These purposes
are to verify identity; to determine the elements on which the claim to refugee
status or asylum is based; to deal with cases where refugees or asylum-seekers
have destroyed their travel and/or identity documents or have used fraudulent
documents in order to mislead the authorities of the State in which they intend
to claim asylum; or to protect national security or public order. The Executive
Committee has also recommended that detention measures should be subject to
judicial or administrative review.[7]
21. Though
the wording may differ slightly, the provisions of Article 11(a), (b) and (c)
of the Commission’s proposal are, in UNHCR’s view, compatible with Executive Committee
criteria. The proposal is also
consistent with UNHCR’s recommendations insofar as it makes provision for
the review of detention measures.[8]
22. On
the other hand, UNHCR would like to seek clarification of the import of the
provision, in Article 11(d), that an asylum-seeker may be detained “in
the context of a procedure to decide on his right to enter the
territory”. UNHCR observes that such procedure is neither defined nor
explicitly regulated in the proposal, and is, therefore, concerned that the
provision in question may allow for the detention of an asylum applicant for
the duration of the asylum procedure, in the absence of any ground to believe
that s/he is seeking unlawful entry for any other purpose. This would raise
serious questions regarding the compatibility of Article 11(d) with the
Executive Committee standards referred to above and, importantly, with the
provisions of Article 31 of the 1951 Convention.
23. On a different score, the importance placed in the proposal on decision-makers having access to precise and up-to-date information on countries of origin of asylum-seekers is noted with appreciation. It is, however, of concern that, under Article 13 of the proposal, some of the information on which country-of-origin assessments are made may be withheld from public scrutiny, and even from the scrutiny of reviewing bodies. In UNHCR’s view, this restriction may seriously prejudice the fairness of the asylum procedure.
24. UNHCR is equally pleased to note that the proposal affirms, among the basic principles and guarantees supporting fair and efficient asylum procedures, the need for determining authorities at all levels to be properly and regularly trained. UNHCR queries, however, why references in Article 14 to qualify training as “basic” may be necessary. In UNHCR’s experience, on-going and advanced training may be equally necessary to the successful operation of fair and efficient asylum procedures.
25. Finally
regarding this Chapter, UNHCR would like to suggest that Article 15 of the
proposal be complemented by a provision to the effect that hearings at all
levels should be held in camera – unless the applicant requests otherwise - with a view to
protecting the confidentiality of information regarding the applicant, his
family and/or his predicament. In camera hearings also facilitate the provision of full and
frank testimony. Incidents of
humiliation, torture and shame that often characterise the refugee experience
are less likely to be recounted in the absence of a certain level of privacy for the applicant.
Admissibility
(Chapter III of the proposal)
26. UNHCR is
pleased to note that the proposal introduces a clear distinction between, on
the one hand, admissibility procedures – which do not go into the
substance of an asylum application – and, on the other hand, procedures
that deal with the substantive aspects of the application, whether they are
regular or accelerated. This is a fundamental distinction, disregard for which
has led to confusion and weakened protection in some domestic legislation in
the past. It is the case, in particular, that some States consider as
“inadmissible” those asylum claims that appear to be manifestly
unfounded. This practice is inconsistent not only with the provisions of the
proposal, but indeed with the guidance provided by the Executive Committee of
UNHCR, which (..) recognized the substantive character of a decision that an
application for refugee status is manifestly unfounded or abusive[9].
27. UNHCR notes
with satisfaction the recognition inherent in Article 18 of the proposal that
the allocation among States of responsibility for examining an asylum
application is the essential underlying rationale for decisions on
admissibility. This is particularly welcome as it is clear to UNHCR, as set out
in earlier comments[10],
that State authorities receiving an asylum application must deal with the
substance of this claim in all cases, except where another State assumes
responsibility for doing so.
28. Since the
agreement of another State cannot be presumed, that State’s express
consent to accept responsibility for examining the application must be a key
factor in any decision on admissibility. The relevance of consent also derives
from the principle of international co-operation in addressing refugee
problems. As the preamble to the 1951 Convention and a number of Executive
Committee Conclusions make clear[11],
refugee protection issues are international in scope and satisfactory solutions
cannot be achieved without international co-operation. Perhaps most importantly
for UNHCR, as for refugees, the overriding consideration with respect to the
need for consent is the basic protection concern that, if no State assumes
responsibility for an asylum-seeker, s/he faces at best indefinite
“orbit” between national jurisdictions, and at worst refoulement.
29. In the
light of these basic considerations, UNHCR makes a distinction between two
types of permissible limitations on access to a substantive refugee status
determination procedure.
30. In the
first type of case, access to the substantive procedure may be denied to a
person who has already found
protection in another country – a “first country of
asylum”– provided that such protection continues to be available.[12]
This exception is reflected in the Commission’s proposal, which provides
that Member States may dismiss a particular application for asylum as
inadmissible if the applicant has been admitted to that other country as a
refugee or for other reasons justifying the granting of protection, and can
still avail himself of this protection.[13]
31. The second
type of case is commonly referred to as the “safe third country”
exception, and addresses the situation of a person whose asylum application
has not yet been examined in substance by any State. Commenting on the
“safe third country” notion, UNHCR has made it clear that a country
where the person could have found protection is not a first country of
asylum. Accordingly, the mere circumstance that the applicant has been in a
third country where he could have sought asylum does not provide sufficient
grounds for refusing to consider the application in substance.[14]
However, provided that certain conditions are met, the responsibility for
considering an asylum request may be transferred to a third country. These
conditions are:
(i) That it is a country where
he will be protected against refoulement and will be treated in accordance with
accepted international standards – i.e., that the third country is
“safe” for the applicant;
(ii) That the applicant already has a
connection or close links with the third country, so that it appears fair and
reasonable that he be called upon first to request asylum there; in this
respect, the intentions of the asylum-seeker as regards the country in which he
wishes to request asylum should, as far as possible, be taken into account;
(iii) That the third
country agrees to admit the applicant to its territory and to consider the
asylum claim.[15]
32. As regards
the notion of “safety”, UNHCR has often noted that this cannot be
assessed solely on the basis that such country is or is not a
party to international instruments for the protection of human rights and/or
for the protection of refugees. UNHCR has stressed that what is relevant is the
country’s practice, not just the formal obligations that it may have
acquired.
33. UNHCR has
also repeatedly pointed out that the question of whether a particular third
country is “safe” for the purpose of returning an asylum-seeker is
not a generic question which can be answered for any asylum-seeker in any
circumstances. This is why UNHCR insists that the analysis of whether the
asylum-seeker can be sent to a third country for determination of the claim
must be done on an individualised basis, and strongly advises against the use
of “safe third country” lists. Articles 21 (2) and (3) and the
first sentence of Article 22 of the proposal should, in UNHCR’s view, be
amended accordingly.
34. A
“safe third country” is defined in the proposal as one which
generally observes the standards laid down in international law for the
protection of refugees, and generally observes basic standards laid down in
international human rights law from which there may be no derogation in time of
war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Sections I A,
1 and B, 1 and 2, of Annex I elaborate on these standards, which UNHCR would
generally endorse as useful indicators for deciding whether a country is
“safe” on an individualised basis.
35. On the
other hand, UNHCR cannot, for the reasons stated above, accept a procedure (as
per section II of Annex I) for the purpose of designating a country as
“safe” in general. Furthermore, UNHCR is bound to raise a strong
objection against the designation of a country as a “safe third
country”, even with regard to a particular individual, if that country
has not ratified the 1951 Convention and the applicant whose admissibility is
in question is seeking the protection of that Convention. UNHCR is not only
bound by the terms of its own Statute[16]
to promote accessions to the Convention, but perhaps more importantly, can only
effectively fulfil its mandate of supervising the Convention’s
application in those States where it has been ratified.[17]
36. As noted
above, the country to which an asylum application has been submitted is
primarily responsible for considering it. Accordingly, if that country wants to
transfer that responsibility to a third country, in addition to securing the
agreement of that country to receive and consider the asylum application, it
must establish that such third country is “safe” with respect to
that particular asylum-seeker. The burden of proof does not lie with the
asylum-seeker (to establish that the third country is unsafe), but rather with
the country which wishes to remove the asylum-seeker from its territory (to
establish that the third country is safe). The provision in Article 22 (c) of
the proposal is problematic in this regard, as it unduly places the burden of
the proof on the applicant.
37. UNHCR is
further concerned that, pursuant to Article 22(a) of the proposal, Member
States may seek to transfer to a third country the responsibility for
considering an asylum application, not only in cases where the applicant has a
connection or close links with that third country but, in addition, in cases
where the applicant “has had the opportunity during a previous stay in
that country to avail himself of the protection of its authorities”.
UNHCR considers it inappropriate to derive any responsibility for considering
an asylum application from the fact that the applicant has been merely present
in the territory of another State. Mere presence in a territory is often the
result of fortuitous circumstances, and does not necessarily imply the
existence of any meaningful link or connection. This holds true irrespective of
whether the entry of the person in the territory of a State was regular or not.
Even a person who was regularly admitted to the territory of a State cannot be
assumed to have established a meaningful link with that State if he has only
remained there for a short period of time. Although the Commission’s
comments on this provision seem to suggest that the expression “previous
stay” does not include stays of a short duration, this interpretation
does not necessarily flow from the actual wording of the provision, which may
well be read as allowing the removal of asylum-seekers to countries of mere
transit.
38. Finally,
UNHCR must express a serious reservation vis-à-vis the provision, in
Article 22(b), that Member States may deny an applicant access to the procedure
and remove him to a third country where there are “grounds for
considering that this particular applicant will be re-admitted to [the third
country’s] territory”. Removal following a decision of
inadmissibility may thus take place without the third country having consented
to admit or re-admit the person to its territory and to consider the asylum
application. As explained above, this approach is clearly inappropriate from an
international protection point of view, as it may easily lead to the creation
of “orbit” cases and may even have more serious consequences in
terms of refugee protection – including potential breaches of the
principle of non-refoulement.
Substantive
determination procedures (Chapter IV of the proposal)
Section 1. The
regular procedure
39. Prompt
decisions on asylum applications are clearly in the interest of both States and
asylum-seekers. UNHCR welcomes, therefore, the establishment, in Article 24 of
the proposal, of mandatory time limits for examination of applications for
asylum by the determining authority. To be fully consistent with the wording of
Article 24 (2), and with the general intent of this section, it is recommended
that reference be made to “decisions”, rather than to
“examination”, in Article 24 (1).
40. Derogation
from the provisions of Articles 7 and 8 made possible by Article 26(3), which
deals with procedures for withdrawal, cessation or cancellation of refugee
status, have the potential to lead to significant unfairness unless the
circumstances in which such derogation can be invoked are fully circumscribed
in the proposal. The Explanatory Memorandum makes it clear that this clause is
intended to address situations in which the guarantee to be informed and the
right to a personal interview are impossible to implement because the person in
question has voluntarily re-established himself in his country of origin
– which is, indeed, a motive for cessation of refugee status foreseen in
Article 1 C (4) of the 1951 Convention. UNHCR would like to recommend that this
important clarification be imported into the text of Article 26 itself, so as
to avoid any misunderstanding.
Section 2. The accelerated procedure
42. This said, UNHCR recognises that some applications deserve to be handled with special diligence. Thus, applications from unaccompanied minors and other persons in a particularly vulnerable situation should be examined and decided upon on a priority basis. Prompt decisions should also be made on those applications which, upon a first cursory examination, appear to be manifestly well-founded. It would be unfair, indeed, to subject a refugee to long waiting periods once the determining authority possesses the necessary elements to make a swift, positive determination on his behalf.
43. An asylum procedure can be accelerated in a number of ways, including in particular: by giving priority to the examination of specific categories of applications; by establishing shorter, but reasonable, delays for appealing a negative decision; by reducing the time required for the completion of the appeals process; and by simplifying and/or prioritising appeals and reviews. UNHCR would generally advise against the creation of special, parallel procedures for dealing with certain applications. A parallel “accelerated procedure” that deals with only one aspect of an application – e.g., the “manifestly unfounded” character thereof - may paradoxically result in deferring a decision on the full substance of this application. This situation, which contradicts the very purpose of an accelerated procedure, may well arise, in UNHCR’s view, from the combined application of Articles 34(3) and 36 of the proposal.
44. The Executive Committee of UNHCR has acknowledged that procedures for the determination of refugee status may usefully include special provision for dealing in an expeditious manner with applications which are considered to be so obviously without foundation as not to merit full examination at every level of the procedure[18]. “Manifestly unfounded” or “clearly abusive” applications are defined as those which are clearly fraudulent or not related to the criteria for the granting of refugee status laid down in the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees nor to any other criteria justifying the granting of asylum.
45. In conformity with this guidance from the Executive Committee, UNHCR would like to make a few observations regarding some of the grounds on which, according to the Commission’s proposal, an application may be treated as manifestly unfounded.
46. One
such ground is the circumstance that the applicant has produced no identity or
travel document and has not provided sufficient or sufficiently convincing
information to determine his identity or nationality, and there are serious
reasons for considering that the applicant has in bad faith destroyed or
disposed of an identity or travel document that would help determine his
identity or nationality.[19] With
regard to
this provision, UNHCR must stress that the
asylum-seeker’s lack of documentation or use of forged documents to
escape from persecution or other threats to his or her life or freedom does
not, by itself, render the application fraudulent nor warrant negative
conclusions about the genuineness of the refugee claim. Given the specific
circumstances in which refugees find themselves, they are often unable to
obtain valid travel documents and are compelled to use forged documents in order
to escape persecution or danger. It is, accordingly, recognised in Article 31
of the 1951 Convention that asylum-seekers who enter or remain illegally should
not be penalised on that account.
47. The
proposal also identifies as manifestly unfounded an application that is made at
the last stage of a deportation procedure and could have been made earlier.[20]
UNHCR wishes to stress, in this respect, that the mere fact that an asylum
application has been submitted after an expulsion order was made against the
person is not sufficient reason to treat that application as abusive. In fact,
the need for the person to apply for asylum may, precisely, arise at the time
when he is under threat of being expelled. Although UNHCR realises that the
clause contained in the proposal relates to applications “made at the
last stage of a deportation procedure”, and hence does not necessarily
support the above assumption, it would be useful to further clarify this notion
to avoid any possible misinterpretation.
48. Where
an application does not raise issues that justify protection on the basis of
the Geneva Convention or Article 3 of the 1950 European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, it may also, according to
the proposal, be dismissed as manifestly unfounded.[21]
UNHCR wishes to recall the language of the above mentioned Conclusion No. 30 of
the Executive Committee, which refers to applications “not related to the
criteria for the granting of refugee status laid down in the 1951 United Nations
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees nor to any other criteria
justifying the granting of asylum”. Obviously, the fear of treatment
prohibited by Article 3 of the European Convention would be such an
“other” criterion justifying the granting of asylum. However, this
criterion does not exhaust the range of grounds upon which a form of
protection, complementary to that offered by the 1951 Convention, may be
granted. As the Commission prepares to table a draft Community instrument on
precisely these complementary, or subsidiary, forms of protection, UNHCR is
concerned that the current wording of Article 28.1(d) may pre-emptively, and
unnecessarily, limit the scope of that future instrument.
49. An
application may also be deemed manifestly unfounded if the applicant is from a
“safe country of origin”, as defined by Articles 30 and 31 of the
proposal in accordance with the guiding principles set out in Annex II thereto.[22] UNHCR
acknowledges that applications for asylum may be made by persons coming from
countries in which there is, in general terms, no serious risk of persecution.
UNHCR has not objected, in principle, to the use of this notion as a procedural
tool to assign these applications to accelerated procedures.
50. Article 31
acknowledges, albeit obliquely, that the “safe” character of the
country of origin cannot be established once and for all, but must be assessed
with regard to each individual applicant. This Article raises, however, some
concern in that it places upon the asylum-seeker an evidentiary burden of
almost unbearable weight. In UNHCR’s opinion, once an application has
been channelled into an accelerated procedure because the applicant originates
from a country identified as “safe”, the determining authority must
still examine every aspect of the claim and determine whether, in the
individual case at issue, a well-founded fear of persecution or other valid
ground for asylum exists. The “unsafe” character of the country of
origin for that applicant will be proved when s/he shows that s/he has a
well-founded fear of being persecuted if returned there.
51. UNHCR finds
the criteria for designation of a country of origin as “safe”, as
set out in Annex II to the proposal, generally sound and fair. UNHCR observes
that it is likely that very few countries in the world will be found to meet
all these criteria. The procedure for designation, in section II of Annex II,
lists information from UNHCR as a valuable source in a general assessment of
the observance of human rights standards by countries, which Member States
propose to list as “safe”. UNHCR wishes to point out, however, that
it gathers and disseminates information (notably in the form of eligibility
guidelines) primarily about those less than safe countries that do produce
refugees.
Appeals procedures
(Chapter V of the proposal)
52. UNHCR has
consistently stressed that multi-layered procedures allowing for protracted
review or appeal proceedings unduly hamper the efficient functioning of asylum
systems. It has commented in the recent past [23]
that a streamlining of such systems would be desirable, and that, generally,
two levels of appeal with the necessary safeguards would be adequate. The first
appeal level may involve consideration of fact and law, and the second
(possibly on a “with leave” basis) questions of law only. UNHCR
notes with satisfaction that the proposal’s provisions on appeals
recommend a very similar structure.
53. Reducing
the number of appeals presupposes, of course, high quality in the first
instance decision-making. Furthermore, in the event of a negative decision, the
reasons for the decision and information on the possibility and procedures for
review and/or appeal and the relevant time limits must be given in a language
that the person understands. UNHCR appreciates that these important guarantees
are contained in the proposal.[24]
54. UNHCR’s main concern
regarding this Chapter in the proposal relates to Article 33(2). This Article
allows for derogation from the rule that appeal shall have suspensive effect in
cases where:
(i) the
claim is rejected on “safe third country” grounds[25]
(ii) the
claim is dismissed as manifestly unfounded[26]
(iii) there
are grounds of national security or public order.[27]
55. These
possible derogations are of serious concern to UNHCR. Withholding of
deportation until a final decision is reached on an asylum application is a
fundamental guarantee, given the potentially devastating consequences of an
erroneous determination. This requirement must be seen in the light of the
absolute respect that the principle of non-refoulement commands.
UNHCR strongly insists that the principle of suspensive effect of appeals
against negative decisions on asylum must apply regardless of whether such
decisions are taken in regular or in accelerated procedures.
Conclusion
56. UNHCR
appreciates the resolve of Member States of the European Union, and the
initiative of the Commission, to harmonize their asylum procedures within the
framework of the Amsterdam Treaty. The adoption of a Community instrument on minimum
standards on procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status will,
hopefully, result in fairer and more efficient asylum procedures throughout the
Union. The present Commission proposal represents a serious attempt at striking
the right balance between the imperatives of fairness and those of efficiency
and, as such, it provides a sound framework for the legislative negotiations
ahead.
57. At the same
time, UNHCR has serious concerns about an approach to harmonization whereby
exceptions to fundamental principles of refugee protection may be tailored to
accommodate lower standards found in the domestic legislation and practice of
individual Member States. The risk of downward harmonization will, inevitably,
be higher if the Directive contains significant scope for derogation or wide
margins of discretion. It is UNHCR’s strong hope that best practice, in
full conformity with international standards, will be allowed to prevail.
58. It is with
this concern in mind that UNHCR has offered the foregoing observations. On some
aspects of the proposal, such as the notions of “safe third
country” and “safe country of origin” or accelerated
procedures, UNHCR has warned that procedural devices risk to overshadow the
basic concepts and principles which refugee status determination is supposed to
serve, and it urges Member States to re-focus their attention on the latter.
UNHCR looks forward to a continuing dialogue with the Commission and Member
States on these and other topical issues, including those – such as
detention of asylum-seekers or complementary forms of protection – that
are being addressed by other, closely related Community instruments.
***************
UNHCR
Geneva
July
2001
[1] Cf. General Assembly resolutions 48/116 of 20 December 1993, paragraph 4; 49/169 of 23 December 1994, paragraph 5; 50/152 of 21 December 1995, paragraph 5; and 51/75 of 12 December 1996, paragraph 4; and EXCOM Conclusions Nos. 6 (XXVIII) of 1977; 15 (XXX) of 1979, paragraph (h) (i); 22 (XXXII) of 1981,section II (A); 65 (XLII) of 1991, paragraph (o); 68 (XLIII) of 1992, paragraph (g); 71 (XLIV) of 1993, paragraph (i); 73 (XLIV) of 1993, paragraph (c); 74 (XLV) of 1994, paragraph (i); and 87 (XLX) of 1999, paragraph (j).
[2] Article 3.3.
[3] The granting of physical access to the territory does not necessarily imply the granting of legal access to it, which is done by the issuance of a leave or permit to enter or to land.
[4] Article 4.2.
[5] Article 3.1.
[6] Article 5.
[7] Conclusion No. 44 (XXXVII) of 1986.
[8] Article 11.2.
[9] Conclusion No.30 (XXXIV) of 1983 on The Problem of Manifestly Unfounded or Abusive Applications for Refugee Status or Asylum, para. (e)
[10] See REVISITING THE DUBLIN CONVENTION: Some reflections by UNHCR in response to the Commission staff working paper, January 2001.
[11] See fourth preambular paragraph of the Convention and EXCOM Conclusions from No.11(XXIX)of 1978 up to, and in particular, No.85(XLIX) of 1998 and No.87(L) of 1999.
[12] EXCOM Conclusions No. 15 (XXX) of 1979; and No. 58 (XL) of 1989.
[13] Articles 18(b) and 20.
[14] EXCOM Conclusion No. 15 (XXX) of 1979, paragraph (h)(iv).
[15] Conclusions No. 15 (XXX) of 1979, paragraph (h)(iv); No. 58 (XL) of 1989, paragraph (f);and No. 85 (XLIX) of 1998, paragraph (aa).
[16] See Article 8(a) of UNHCR’s Statute.
[17] See Article 35 of the 1951 Convention.
[18] Conclusion No.30 (XXXIV) of 1983 on The Problem of Manifestly Unfounded or Abusive Applications for Refugee Status or Asylum
[19] Article 28.1(b).
[20] Article 28.1(c).
[21] Article 28.1(d).
[22] Article 28.1(e).
[23] See, e.g., UNHCR’s comments on the Commission’s Working Document “Towards Common Standards on Asylum Procedures”, May 1999.
[24] Article 7 paragraphs (d) and (e).
[25] Article 33.2(a).
[26] Article 33.2(b).
[27] Article 33.2(c).