- Update No. 18 -

Relevant Case-Law of the European Court for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 

(1st January 2002- 30th June 2002)

(Summary of Judgements & Decisions)

 

1. Court's Judgements

 

Čonka vs. Belgium (Appl. No. 51564/99, Judgement of 5 February 2002)

 

The case concerned four rejected Roma asylum seekers from Slovakia. They fled their country of origin because of alleged harassment from skin heads and the refusal of the police to intervene to protect them. They sought asylum in Belgium in November 98, where their requests were rejected both in first instance (March 99) and in second instance (June 99) for lack of credibility. The action before the Conseil d'Etat did not succeed either. In September 99, the applicants were called (by mail), along with other Roma asylum seekers from Slovakia, to the police station in order to 'complete' their asylum requests. Upon arrival at the police station, they were served with an expulsion order and placed in detention. They were sent to Slovakia few days later. Before the Court the applicants argued that the trick consisting in calling them to the police station under a false pretext constituted a violation of Art. 5 § 1 of the ECHR (lawfulness of detention). Also the conditions of detention were in violation of Art. 5 § 2 (information as to the reasons of detention) and Art. 5 § 4 (judicial review). They also claimed that their expulsion along with other nationals of Slovakia of the same origin was a collective expulsion prohibited by Art. 4 Protocol 4, against which they had no effective remedy (Art. 13).

 

The Court agreed with the applicants that the trick of the Belgian authorities contravened the provisions of the ECHR. It said that while such methods could be justified to prevent criminal activities, they were not acceptable in cases involving asylum seekers, even illegally residing in the country. There was therefore a violation of Art. 5 § 1 of the ECHR inasmuch as the trick was used in order to detain the asylum seekers. On Art. 5 § 4, the Court examined in detail the detention conditions in order to determine whether the applicants had the possibility of having the detention decisions reviewed. The Court noted that the information concerning remedies was written in small letters and in a language that they could not understand. Moreover, there was only one interpreter available at the police station and none when they were moved to the airport. Finally, the applicants' lawyer was informed of the detention only 4 days prior to the expulsion and he could not have pleaded their case because the competent jurisdiction held a regular session after the departure date. The Court concluded that there was a violation of Art. 5 § 4 but no violation of Art. 5 § 2. On Art. 4 Protocol 4, the Court reminded its jurisprudence according to which there is collective expulsion when there is no individual and objective examination of each person's situation. In the present case, the Court considered that while there has been an individual examination of the applicants situation during the asylum procedure, the September 99 decisions to detain and expel them was taken without reference to their personal situation. These latter decisions were simply taken on the basis of their irregular stay in Belgium. Noting that all the other expellees were called to the police station on the basis of the same motives, the Court concluded that there was a collective expulsion and hence a violation of Art. 4 Protocol 4. In their dissenting opinions some judges came to another conclusion. They found that the Belgian police authorities did in fact examine the individual situation of those who were called, since they did release a number of them for humanitarian and administrative reasons. They also argued that the September 99 decisions to detain and expel could not be considered in isolation from the previous asylum procedure, which required an analysis of the applicants' claims.

 

Lastly, on Art. 13 in conjunction with Art. 4 Protocol 4, the Court concluded that there was indeed no effective remedy available to prevent the violation of the ECHR, since the procedure before the Conseil d'Etat was not suspensive even in emergency cases.[1]

 

Kutić vs. Croatia (Appl. No. 48778/99, Judgement of 1 March 2002)

 

The applicant, a national of Croatia, initiated two domestic proceedings against the Republic of Croatia, following the destruction of his house and other properties by explosives. His properties, located in Martinec and in Bjelovar, were destroyed respectively in December 1991 and in November 1994. In January 1996, the Parliament passed an amendment to the Civil Obligations Act which provided that all proceedings concerning actions for damage resulting form terrorist acts were to be stayed pending the enactment of a new legislation. The domestic judicial proceedings initiated by the applicant were therefore suspended, but so far no new legislation has been introduced. Before the Court the applicant claimed that he was deprived of his right to access to court and that the domestic proceedings exceeded the reasonable time requirement of Art. 6 § 1 of the ECHR. On the first issue, the Court recalled that the right to a court included the right to institute proceedings, the right to have a final judgement implemented and the right to obtain a determination on a dispute by a court. In the present case the domestic proceedings have been suspended for over six years and no new legislation has been enacted. The Court concluded that given the long period of time involved, there was a violation of Art. 6 § 1 of the ECHR. Concerning the length of proceedings issue, the Court decided that given its findings on the first point it did not have to examine this part of the claim separately.

 

Podkolzina vs. Latvia (Appl. No. 46726/99, Judgement of 9 April 2002)

 

The applicant, a Russian-speaking national of Latvia, was candidate to the October 1998 general elections. She registered with the Electoral Commission, providing the requested language certificate showing that she spoke Latvian appropriately. In August 1998, a governmental inspector came unexpectedly on the applicant's work place to test her orally on her language abilities. The governmental inspector came again the next day to require a written test. The applicant refused to take the test and the inspector reported that she did not master the official language. She was consequently bared from running for the elections. Having been unsuccessful in reversing this decision before the domestic jurisdictions, the applicant lodged a complaint before the Court on the basis of Art. 3 Protocol 1 of the ECHR (right to free elections), in conjunction with Art. 14 (discrimination) and Art. 13 (effective remedy). The Court  indicated that Art. 3 Protocol 1 implied the right to vote and the right to be candidate. However, there are implicit limitations to these rights and States have a margin of appreciation in determining who can vote and who can be candidate. In this respect, the Court considered that the obligation to speak Latvian appropriately in order to be candidate to elections in Latvia was a legitimate requirement. However, the procedure whereby such a requirement is enforced should guarantee that the decisions are taken by an impartial organ, in a non-arbitrary, equitable and objective manner. In the present case, the Court noted that the applicant did submit a language certificate when registering for the elections. She obtained it according to the applicable law. Out of twenty candidates who submitted language certificates, only nine, including the applicant, were subjected to additional tests. Moreover, the legal basis for such additional tests were not clear and in any case the decision was left to the discretion of one governmental inspector. The Court concluded that the procedure was not in accordance with the a/m guarantees. Consequently, the applicant's striking off from the candidate's list was not proportionate to the legitimate aimed pursed by the government, which constituted a violation of Art. 3 Protocol 1. Concerning the alleged violations of Art. 13 and Art. 14, the Court considered that given its findings on Art. 3 Protocol 1, it did not have to examine those parts of the claim.      

 

Al-Nashif vs. Bulgaria (Appl. No. 50963/99, Judgement of 20 June 2002)

 

The applicant is a stateless person of Palestinian origin who resided legally in Bulgaria with his wife and two children, who were born in Bulgaria and had Bulgarian nationality. In April 1999, the Bulgarian authorities revoked the applicant's permanent resident permit for national security reasons, because he was teaching Islam without permission. In June 1999, further decisions were made to detain and to deport him and all these decisions were served on the applicant without explanations on the underlying reasons. He was effectively deported to Syria in July 1999.[2] Since, according to Bulgarian law, orders based on national security grounds are not subject to judicial review and need not be reasoned, the applicant's domestic appeals against the deportation, detention and residence revocation orders failed. Before the Court, the applicant complained that since Bulgarian law did not provide for judicial review against his detention, there was a violation of Art. 5 § 4 of the ECHR. He also argued that the decision to deport him, against which he had not effective remedy (Art. 13), constituted an interference with his right to family life (Art. 8) and did not have a legal basis (Art. 8 § 2). On the issue of detention without judicial review, the Court found that a person detained should have access to a court and should have the opportunity to be heard in person or though some form of representation, even in cases of involving national security or terrorism. The Court mentioned that States invoking such grounds for detention must find a way to accommodated their legitimate security concerns and the guarantees of the ECHR. In the present case the Court concluded that there was a violation of the ECHR insofar as the applicant did not enjoy the elementary safeguards of Art. 5 § 4. Turning to the part of the claim based on Art. 8, the Court first confirmed that there was a family life and that the deportation measure constituted an interference with such a family life. The Court went on to determine whether the interference was in accordance with the law. The Court noted that while the deportation order had a legal basis, the relevant domestic law lacked the accessibility and foreseeability required. Indeed, the decision to deport was taken without disclosing any reasons to the applicant and there was no adversarial procedure or appeal possible to an independent body. In light of this, the Court decided that the legal regime of deportation did not provide the necessary safeguards against arbitrariness and there was consequently a violation of Art. 8 § 2 of the ECHR. The Court also noted that instead of trying to conciliate its security interests with the guarantees of a domestic effective remedy, Bulgaria decided to remove altogether such a remedy in cases involving national security issues. This, for the Court, also constituted in the present case a violation of Art. 13 of the ECHR. 

 

2. Court's Decisions

 

A. Cases Declared Admissible

 

 

 

Sejdovic and Sulejmanovic vs. Italy (Appl. No. 57575/00, Decision of 1 March 2002)

 

The applicants are nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina of Roma origins. They left their country of origin at an unspecified date and went to Italy. They settled in a camp (Casilino 700) in Rome and stayed there illegally until their expulsion. In July 1999, the Italian authorities conducted a census in the camp and found out that a number of individuals, including the applicants, did not have residence permits. The applicants received their expulsion orders separately in November 1996 and in August 1999. Failing to reverse the decision of the Italian authorities to expel them, they were finally returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 2000, along with other persons who lived in the camp. Before the Court the applicants claim inter alia that i) their return constituted a violation of Art. 3 of the ECHR in view of the treatment inflicted to persons of Roma origins in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ii) the manner in which the Italian authorities conducted the expulsion was also a violation of Art. 3, iii) the living conditions in the camp in Rome amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, iv) the expulsion was a collective expulsion prohibited by Art. 4 Protocol 4, v) their expulsion was an interference with their family life because one of the applicants' parents and sister remained in Italy (Art. 8) and vi) they did not have an effective remedy against the expulsion orders (Art. 13). The Court, after examining the arguments of the parties and notably a report from UNHCR Sarajevo concerning the occupation of Roma houses by Bosnian Serb IDPs, declared the application admissible on the basis of Art. 3 with regard to their situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The parts of the claim based on Art. 4 Protocol 4 (collective expulsion) and Art. 13 (effective remedy against the expulsion order) were also declared admissible. The rest of the claim was declared inadmissible.

 

Sulejmanovic and Sultanovic vs. Italy (Appl. No. 57574/00, Decision of 14 March 2002)

 

The facts of this case are similar to those of the a/m one. The applicants, nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina of Roma origins, were expelled from Italy in March 2000. Their claim before the Court is based on the same grounds and arguments. The Court declared the case admissible with regard to; Art. 3, as it relates to their treatment in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Art. 4 Protocol 4 (collective expulsion) since the applicants were expelled along with a number of other individuals; Art. 13 with regard to the eventual absence of effective remedy against the expulsion orders.  The notable difference with the a/m case is that the applicants had a 4 years old child, suffering from Down's syndrome, who was following a treatment after a heart operation in 1997. The applicants claimed that her expulsion, insofar as it stopped the treatment, constituted an inhuman and degrading treatment in view of the consequences on the physical and psychological health of the child. The Court declared this part of the claim admissible as well on the basis of Art. 3 of the ECHR.

 

Nina Shevanova vs. Latvia (Appl. No. 58822/00, Decision of 28 February 2002)

 

The applicant, a Russian-speaking woman, settled in Latvia in 1970 for professional reasons. She had a son in 1973. In 1991, following the break-up of the Soviet Union, she became stateless and she was registered in 1992 as a non-citizen permanent resident. In 1994, she was offered a job in Dagestan and Ingushetia. She was advised to obtain Russian citizenship and residence registration in the Russian Federation, which she did, in order to be recruited. She went to the Russian Federation to work in 1995 and in 1996. In 1998, the Latvian authorities discovered this situation and decided to cancel her residence registration. All her domestic proceedings failed in reversing this decision and in February 2001 she was arrested and sent to the aliens detention center. Before the Court she claims that sending her back to the Russian Federation would be a disproportionate sanction given the nature of the offence and the fact that she has been living in Latvia for 30 years and that she has no family links in the Russian Federation. The Court found that this case raised important issues of facts and law and that it should therefore be examined on the merits. The case was therefore declared admissible on the basis of Art. 8 of the ECHR.

 

Svetlana Sisojeva and Others vs. Latvia (Appl. No. 60654/00, Decision of 28 February 2002)

 

This case concerned the family of a retired Soviet Union army soldier established in Latvia since 1968. After his retirement in 1989 and the independence of Latvia in 1991, the applicants became stateless. After various domestic procedures, the District Tribunal of Aluksne decided to grant to the applicants permanent residents status. However, this decision was quashed by the Supreme Court since it was discovered that three of the applicants had obtained Russian citizenship and residence registration in the Russian Federation. The applicants, failing to reverse this decision of the Supreme Court, argued before the Court that the refusal to legalise their stay in Latvia constituted a violation of Art. 8 of the ECHR (right to private and family life). One of the applicant, who got married to a Latvian national was authorised to apply for a non-citizen permanent residence permit. However, she refused to do so, claiming that she did not have one of the required documents. For this applicant, the Court decided that insofar as she refused to make use of a domestic remedy that might have solved her problem, her claim should be declared manifestly unfounded. Concerning the remaining applicants, the Court found that their case raised important issues of facts and law and that it should therefore be examined on the merits. The case was therefore declared admissible.

 

B. Cases Declared Inadmissible

 

Larioshina vs. the Russian Federation (Appl. No. 56869/00, Decision of 23 April 2002)

 

The applicant, a Russian national receiving an old-age pension and other social benefits, complained before the Court that the amount of the pension was insufficient. She argued on the basis of Art. 1 Protocol 1 that the pension did not allow her to maintain a proper standard of living. While the Court considered the claim manifestly unfounded on this ground, it recalled that in principle a complaint about a wholly insufficient amount of pension may raise an issue under Art. 3 of the ECHR. In the present case, there were not elements indicating that the applicant suffered inhuman or degrading treatment because of inadequate level of social benefits. The case was therefore declared inadmissible.

 

Jose Alejandro Peñafiel Salgado vs. Spain (Appl. No. 65964/01, Decision of 16 April 2002)

 

The applicant was a banker in Ecuador. In August 1998, he moved to Spain when the banks came under scrutiny for their role in the outbreak of the recession affecting Ecuador. Following the issuance of an extradition request by Ecuador, he applied for asylum in Spain. However, he was arrested in Lebanon while on a business trip. Ecuador requested his extradition from Lebanon. Although he had filed an application for asylum with the Spanish Embassy in Beirut and despite the fact that UNHCR had granted him mandate refugee status for a twelve-month period, the Lebanese authorities extradited him. During a stopover in Paris, he took the opportunity to reapply for political asylum in Spain and was transferred to that country to have his application examined. In October 2000 his mandate refugee status was declared invalid by UNHCR and the Spanish authorities rejected his application for asylum. He was subsequently extradited to Ecuador.[3] Before the Court the applicant based  part of his claim on Art. 6 considering that the extradition procedure, the asylum procedure in Spain and the procedures initiated against him in Ecuador were in contradiction with that provision. He also argued that in Ecuador he would be subjected to treatments contrary to Art. 2 and Art. 3 of the ECHR and that there was a violation of Art. 8 of the ECHR since he was married to a Spanish national residing in Spain. On the extradition and asylum procedures, the Court reiterated its jurisprudence according to which such procedures do not involve civil rights or criminal charges and cannot therefore be examined under Art. 6 of the ECHR. Concerning the procedures initiated against the applicant in Ecuador, the Court noted it was incompetent ratione loci to examine their compatibility with Art. 6 of the ECHR and that Spain's responsibility could not be engaged for the activities of the Ecuadorian judicial authorities. With regard to the risks of ill-treatment, the Court concluded that, based on assurances received from the Ecuadorian authorities, that part of the claim was manifestly unfounded. Moreover, the Court recalled that should the applicant face human rights violations, he could resort to the Interamerican Court of Human Rights. Finally, the Court judged that since the applicant got married after he was extradited from Lebanon, it is his present detention in Ecuador and not Spain's decision to pursue the extradition procedure which is preventing him from having a family life. Therefore, that part of the claim was also declared manifestly unfounded and the application was declared inadmissible.

 

Slobodan Milošević vs. the Netherlands (Appl. No. 77631/01, Decision of 19 March 2002)

 

The applicant, Slobodan Milošević the former president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), was transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague on 29 June 2001 and has been detained since then. He brought summary civil proceedings against the Netherlands State before the Regional Court of the Hague arguing, inter alia, that: his transfer to ICTY was illegal under FRY law; ICTY lacked legal basis in international law; ICTY was not impartial in the sense of Art. 6 of the ECHR. Consequently, he asked for his release. The Regional Court found that ICTY did have sufficient legal basis; that it offered sufficient procedural guarantees and that the Netherlands having transferred its jurisdiction over ICTY's indictees to ICTY, the domestic courts were not competent to consider the applicant's release. He lodged an appeal against this decision but he later withdrew it. Before the Court, the applicant considered that his detention in the Netherlands contravened; Art. 5 § 1 of the ECHR since such detention did not have a legal basis in domestic law; Art. 5 § 2 since additional charges were brought against him after his arrest; Art. 6 § 1 in that ICTY is not a fair, independent and impartial tribunal established by law because of its methods of creation and the refusal of the Prosecutor to examine the action of the NATO member states during the March 1999 bombings. The applicant also claimed that the designation of amicus curiae by ICTY itself, because of his refusal to appoint a lawyer, was a violation of Art. 6 § 3 (right to defend oneself or to choose a defender). The Court considered that since the applicant withdrew his appeal against the August 2001 judgement of the Regional Court, he did not exhaust domestic remedies. The case was therefore declared inadmissible.   

 

Jovanović vs. Croatia (Appl. No. 59109/00, Decision of 28 February 2002)

 

The applicant, a national of Croatia of Serb origin, took part in the August 1990 referendum for the formation of the so-called Serbian Autonomous Territory of Western Slavonia. He was consequently dismissed from his job at the Požega Penitentiary since participation to such a referendum was considered a criminal offence and incompatible with service in State organs. After all his domestic proceedings failed in reversing the decision, he applied to the Court on the basis of Art. 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and Art. 10 (freedom of expression) of the ECHR. However, the Court recalled that upon accession to the ECHR, Croatia recognised the Court's competence for events occurring after 5 November 1997. Consequently, event though the last domestic judicial decision was dated October 1999, the dismissal as such was an instantaneous act which took place before the entry into force of the ECHR in respect of Croatia. The application was therefore declared inadmissible as falling outside the Court's competence ratione temporis.

 

            C. Cases Adjourned

 

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D. Cases Struck out of the List

 

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E. Friendly Settlements

 

Samy vs. the Netherlands (Appl. No. 364999/97, Judgement of 18 June 2002)

 

The applicant, a national of Algeria, was arrested on suspicion of theft in August 1996. It appeared that he was illegally staying in the Netherlands and he was placed at the alien's detention center in view of his expulsion. In March 1997, he was released since the authorities could not identify his country of origin. The Hague Regional Court found that his detention ceased to be lawful as of February 1997 and condemned the State to pay compensation to the applicant. The case, introduced before the Court in March 1997, was declared admissible on the basis of Art. 5 § 4 in December 2001. However, in April 2002, the Government of the Netherlands informed the Court that it had decided to pay additional compensation to the applicant. In light of this friendly settlement of the dispute before the Court, the case was struck out of the list.

 

F. Applications Communicated to Governments

 

Shamsa Abadel Salam & Shamsa Anwar vs. Poland (Appl. No. 45355/99; 45357/66, Decision of 10 January 2002)

 

The applicants are Libyan nationals who were detained because of illegal stay in Poland. They were supposed to be expelled to Libya on 24 August 1997, but all the expulsion attempts failed because the applicants refused to continue their journey once arriving in the transit countries. They were detained by the Warsaw Airport immigration police upon return to Poland. Their various legal actions against the detention were all unsuccessful. The District Prosecutor considered that those refused entry in the country and placed in a special area of the airport are considered to be expelled of the country. The application to the Court has been communicated to the Government under Art. 5 § 1 of the ECHR.

 

Kambangu vs. Lithuania (Appl. No. 59619/00)

 

The applicant, a national of Angola, was arrested  in March 1998 while crossing the border between Lithuania and Belarus. He alleged that his passport had been stolen and that he intended to go to the Embassy of Angola in Moscow to obtain a new one. He was arrested and kept in police custody before being transferred to the Aliens Registration Centre (ARC) on the ground that his presence in Lithuania was illegal. He applied for asylum and a temporary permit pending the determination of his application was delivered. In October 1998, his application for asylum was rejected and an expulsion order was issued. He appealed against both decisions. In November 1998, the Regional Court ruled in his favour in respect of the refusal to grant him asylum and the expulsion order was subsequently revoked. However, in June 1999 the authorities rejected his application for asylum. The applicant appealed against this decision and challenged his continued stay at the ARC. In October 1999, the Higher Administrative Court found that his continuous stay at the ARC did not constitute detention. The Court of Appeal rejected his appeal against the refusal to grant him asylum. Upon the applicant’s further appeal, the Higher Administrative Court found in December 1999 that the application for asylum had not been properly examined and quashed the decision refusing him asylum. In January 2000, he was allowed to leave the ARC after obtaining a new passport from the Embassy of Angola in Moscow. The application has been communicated to the Government under Art. 5 § 1 and 4, Articles 13 and Art. 2 of Protocol 4 (freedom of movement).

 

Bilashi-Ashiri vs. Austria (Appl. No. of 3314/02)

 

The applicant is a national of Egypt who sought asylum in Austria in April 1995, claiming that he feared persecution because of his involvement in Islamic groups. His initial application for asylum was rejected, as well as his demands for a reopening. He filed a new application in January 1998, submitting press articles describing him as a member of an armed Islamic group. The examination of this application is still pending. In the meantime, after sentencing him in absentia for membership to an illegal association threatening national order and security, the Egyptian authorities requested his extradition in July 1998. The competent Court of Appeal refused the extradition insofar as it relied on political offences, but granted it with regard to the other non-political offences. This decision was confirmed by the Court of Appeal, after having been quashed by the Supreme Court. The applicant was placed in detention pending extradition. However, UNHCR Vienna granted mandate refugee status to the applicant in March 2002. The case has been communicated to the government on the basis of Art. 3 of the ECHR.

 

G. Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court - Interim Measures

 

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3. Committee of Ministers

 

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4. Other News

 

- On 18 December 2001, the United Kingdom decided to invoke the provisions of Art. 15 of the ECHR (derogation in time of emergency). It made a Declaration, of which the relevant paragraph says that:

 

"The Government has considered whether the exercise of the extended power to detain contained in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 may be inconsistent with the obligations under Article 5(1) of the Convention. As indicated above, there may be cases where, notwithstanding a continuing intention to remove or deport a person who is being detained, it is not possible to say that "action is being taken with a view to deportation" within the meaning of Article 5(1)(f) as interpreted by the Court in the Chahal case. To the extent, therefore, that the exercise of the extended power may be inconsistent with the United Kingdom's obligations under Article 5(1), the Government has decided to avail itself of the right of derogation conferred by Article 15(1) of the Convention and will continue to do so until further notice".

 

- On 29 January 2002, Turkey decided to withdraw the derogation it had made in 1992 under Art. 15 (derogation in time of emergency), concerning Art. 5 of the ECHR (right to liberty and security) with respect to provinces under the state of emergency.

 

 

- On 4 February 2002, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe invoked Art. 52 of the ECHR (Inquiries of the Secretary General) with regard to Moldova. In its request the Secretary General asked the Government of Moldova to provide explanations on the manner in which the internal law ensures effective implementation of all the provisions of the ECHR.[4] In its reply dated 28 March 2002 the Government of Moldova recognised that part of its internal legislation was not in compliance with the provisions of the ECHR, but provided unsatisfactory response to the most crucial points, notably Art. 9 (freedom of thought), Art. 10 (freedom of expression) and Art. 11 (freedom of assembly and association) of the ECHR.

 

- Azerbaijan ratified on 15 April 2002 the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), as well as Protocol 6 (abolition of death penalty) with immediate entry into force. Azerbaijan made the following declaration;

 

"The Republic of Azerbaijan declares that it is unable to guarantee the application of the provisions of the Convention in the territories occupied by the Republic of Armenia until these territories are liberated from that occupation".

 

- Armenia handed on 26 April 2002 to the CoE SG the instruments of ratification for the following texts; the ECHR (immediately entered into force), Protocol No. 1 (immediately entered into force), Protocol No. 4 (immediately entered into force), Protocol No. 7 (entry into force on 1 July 2002). Armenia did not formulate any reservation or declaration on these various texts.

 

- Protocol 12 (general anti-discrimination clause) was further signed by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 24 April 2002 and Croatia on 6 March 2002. It was also ratified by Cyprus on 30 April 2002. It needs 10 ratifications in order to enter into force.[5]

 

- Protocol 13 (Abolition of the Death Penalty in all Circumstances) was opened to signature on 3 May 2002. It has been signed by 33 member states[6] and ratified by 3[7] so far. It needs 10 ratifications in order to enter into force.

 

- On 7 June 2002 Georgia ratified Protocol 1 to the ECHR, which guarantees among other rights the right to property. The Protocol entered into force immediately. Georgia formulated a number of reservations indicating, inter alia, that;

 

"1. Application of the article 1 of the Protocol does not extend over the persons, who according to the Law of Georgia on "Internally Displaced Persons" hold or will hold an IDP status, until the circumstances under which IDP  status was granted cease to exist (regaining territorial integrity). According to the present law, State shall ensure implementation of property rights of IDPs on the places of their permanent residence, after alleviation of conditions enumerated in the paragraph 1 of the article 1.

 

(…)

 

8. Georgia states that due to the situation in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region, Georgia is deprived of possibility to be responsible over the respect and observance of the provisions set forth in the Present Convention and Protocols. Before regaining territorial jurisdiction in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions, Georgia will decline all responsibility over violations of the provisions set forth in the Protocol 1 by self-declared, illegal government authorities on these territories."

 

- Malta ratified Protocol 4 to the ECHR on 5 June 2002.

 

- On 26 June 2002, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe elected Mr. Lech Garlicki as judge in respect of Poland.

 

 

UNHCR LO Strasbourg,

15 July 2002

 

 


[1] It must be noted that there was unanimity among the sitting judges concerning the violations of Art. 5 § 1, Art. 5 § 2, Art. 5 § 4 but that violations of Art. 4 Protocol 4 and Art. 13 in conjunction with Art. 4 Protocol 4 were decided by four votes to three.

[2] His wife and children left voluntarily in June 2000, since they could not sustain themselves anymore.

[3] For more on the interim measure procedures in Spain and before the Court see ECHR Update No. 16, January 2001-July 2001

[4] This request was triggered by the suspension of the activities of the Christian Democratic People's Party (CDPP) and the lifting of the parliamentary immunity of the leader and two other members of the CDPP.

[5] Protocol 12 has been signed by 29 member states and ratified by 2.

[6] Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Russia, Slovakia and Turkey have not yet signed it.

[7] Ireland, Malta, Switzerland.