- Update
No. 20 -
Relevant
Case-Law of the European Court for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(1st
January - 30 June 2003)
(Summary of
Judgements & Decisions)
1. Court's
Judgements
Lagerblom v.
Sweden (Appl. No. 26891/95, Judgement of 12 January 2003)
The applicant is a Finnish
national
who settled in Sweden in the 1980s. In February 1993, he was charged with a
criminal offence. He was convicted in May 1994. The sentence was confirmed in
appeal in June 1995. During the whole procedure, the applicant, for whom a
lawyer was appointed, spoke in Finnish and submitted documents in Finnish. He
also wanted to be represented by a different lawyer, one who understood
Finnish. Before the Court he complained on the basis of Art. 6 § 3 of the
ECHR,
that he was not allowed to be defended by a lawyer of his choice. As a
consequence his appointed lawyer, who did not or understand speak Finnish,
could not carry out his duties properly. The Court started by saying that the
right to chose one's lawyer was not absolute, notably when free legal aid is
concerned.
In appointing lawyers domestic courts should have regard to the wishes of the
accused but these can be overridden when necessary for the interests of
justice. In this case, the Court noted that the applicant's command of Swedish
was sufficient to communicate with his lawyer and that in any case
interpretation was provided during the hearings and when submitting documents
in Finnish. For all these reasons, the Court decided that there was no breach
of Art. 6 § 3 of the ECHR.
Mamatkulov
& Abdurasulovic v. Turkey (Appl. No. 46827/99 & 46951/99, Judgement of
6 February 2003)
Both applicants are nationals
of Uzbekistan who fled to Turkey in 1998-1999 because of their
involvement in anti-governmental activities and crimes. Once in Turkey, they
were arrested and detained with a view to being extradited to Uzbekistan. All
the domestic remedies failed because the Turkish courts considered that the
applicants' criminal activities in Uzbekistan were of a non-political nature.
They applied to the Court in March 1999 claiming that their extradition would
constitute a violation of i) Art. 2 and Art. 3, since
political opponents are seriously ill-treated in Uzbekistan, ii) Art. 6, because of
the unfairness of both the Turkish extradition procedure and the criminal trial
in Uzbekistan and, iii) Art. 34 (right to individual application
before the Court), insofar as their extradition, in violation of
the interim measure, prevented them from properly presenting and defending
their case before the Court. Indeed, on 18 March 1999, the Court indicated an
interim measure whereby it requested Turkey not to extradite the applicants,
pending the examination of their claim. However, the Turkish authorities
disregarded the interim measure and extradited the applicants to Uzbekistan on
27 March 1999. With regard to the part of the claim based on Art. 3 of the
ECHR, the Court considered that while there were reports indicating that
political opponents faced serious human rights violations in Uzbekistan, it was
not demonstrated that the applicants themselves faced a real risk of being
subjected to ill-treatment. Moreover, medical reports from the Uzbek medical
authorities did not show that the applicants were mis-treated while in
detention in Uzbekistan. Also, the Uzbek authorities had given assurances to
Turkey that the applicants would not be sentenced to death and would be treated
correctly. Based on these elements the Court concluded that the risk of
ill-treatment was not sufficiently established. As for an eventual
violation of Art. 6 by Turkey during the extradition procedure, the Court
reiterated its jurisprudence on the inapplicability of that provision to
extradition procedures,[1]
which as such do not involve a civil right or a criminal charge. On the other
aspect of the Art. 6 complaint, the Court found that it did not have enough
evidence to determine whether or not the judicial proceedings in Uzbekistan
where conducted in violation of Art. 6 of the ECHR. Therefore on both these
grounds, the Court unanimously said that there was no violation of the ECHR. With regard
to Art. 34, the Court noted that the applicant's extradition prevented
them from communicating properly with their lawyers and from providing evidence
of violations of Art. 3 of the ECHR. The Court considered that in the context
of Art. 3 the non-respect of an interim measure could have irreparable
consequences, thus rendering the protection of the ECHR ineffective. The Court
then made reference to other international jurisdictions (International Court
of Justice, Interamerican Court of Human Rights) and treaty bodies (UN
Committee of Human Rights, UN Torture Committee) which decided in some recent
decisions and judgements that interim measures were somehow binding insofar as
their aim is to preserve the rights of the parties and prevent eventual
violations of the concerned international obligations. Based on this developing
jurisprudence, the Court noted that if the applicants were not able to provide
sufficient evidence to establish eventual violations of Art. 3 of the ECHR,
that was because Turkey extradited them to Uzbekistan, from where they could
not communicate properly with the Turkish lawyer in charge of their case in
Strasbourg. Consequently, six judges out of seven (the Turkish judge dissented
on this point) concluded that the disregard of the interim measure
constituted an indirect violation of Art. 34 of the ECHR. It must be noted that in
accordance with Art. 43 of the ECHR, this judgement has been referred to the
Grand Chamber. The Grand Chamber has the power to review a judgement when the
case raises serious questions affecting the interpretation or application of
the ECHR or a serious issue of general importance. Therefore, this judgement
is not final.
Jakupovic v.
Austria (Appl. No. 36757/97, Judgement of 6 February 2003)
The applicant is a
national of Bosnia Herzegovina who went to Austria in 1991 to join his
mother who was already living and working there. Following several criminal
offences (burglary, possession of arms) he was issued with a 10 year
residence prohibition in 1995. This decision was confirmed in
successive appeals and the applicant was deported to Bosnia Herzegovina in
1997.
Before the Court, the applicant complained that the residence prohibition
constituted an interference with his right to family life and consequently a
violation of Art. 8 § 1 of the ECHR. The Court indicated
that its task in such cases was to determine whether a fair balance was struck
between the States' interests (prevention of crime) and the applicant's rights.
In this case, the Court noted that the applicant was 16 when he was expelled.
Moreover, Bosnia had just been through a conflict and the applicant's father
has been reported missing since the end of the conflict. There was no evidence
that he still had relatives living there. Turning to the criminal offences, the
Court considered that while the applicant was convicted twice for burglary, he
was only given conditional sentences of imprisonment. Moreover, there were no
indications that he made use of the arms for which he received a prohibition of
possession. Based on all these elements, the Court decided the Austrian
authorities did not strike a fair balance between the interests at stake.
Consequently there was a violation of Art. 8 of the ECHR.
Ocalan v.
Turkey (Appl. No. 46221/99, Judgement of 12 March 2003)
On 9 October 1998, the
applicant was expelled from Syria, where he was living
for many years. He ultimately went to Kenya, from where, on the evening of 15
February 1999, he was taken on board of an aircraft at Nairobi airport and
arrested by Turkish officials. He was then flown to Turkey. On arrival in
Turkey he was questioned by the security forces from 16 to 23 February 1999. He
received no legal assistance during that period and made several
self-incriminating statements which contributed to his conviction. His lawyer
in Turkey was prevented from travelling to visit him by members of the security
forces. On 23 February 1999, the applicant appeared before an Ankara State
Security Court judge, who ordered him to be placed in pre-trial detention. The
first visit from his lawyers was restricted to 20 minutes and took place with
members of the security forces and a judge present in the same room. Subsequent
meetings took place in the same conditions. After the first two visits from his
lawyers, the applicant’s contact with them was restricted to two one-hour
visits a week. The prison authorities did not authorise the applicant’s
lawyers to provide him with a copy of the documents in the case file, other
than the indictment. It was not until the hearing on 2 June 1999 that the State
Security Court gave the applicant permission to consult the case file under the
supervision of two registrars and his lawyers permission to provide him with a
copy of certain documents. He was indicted on 24 April 1999 for carrying out
actions calculated to bring about the separation of a part of Turkish territory
and of forming and leading an armed gang to achieve that end. The Public
Prosecutor asked the court to sentence the applicant to death. On 29 June 1999
the applicant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to death. The Court of
Cassation upheld the judgement. On 30 November 1999 the European Court of Human
Rights, applying Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (interim measures), requested
the Turkish authorities not to carry out the sentence so as to enable the Court
to proceed effectively with the examination of the admissibility and merits of
the applicant’s complaints under the ECHR. In October 2001, Article 38 of
the Turkish Constitution was amended, abolishing the death penalty except in
time of war or of imminent threat of war or for acts of terrorism. On 3 October
2002, the Ankara State Security Court commuted the applicant’s death
sentence to life imprisonment. The Court made the following finding with regard
to the various aspects of the complaint;
Detention:
The Court held,
unanimously, that there had been:
· no
violation of Article 5 § 1 (no unlawful deprivation of liberty) of
the ECHR in that the applicant’s arrest and detention had not been
unlawful;
· a
violation of Article 5 § 3 (right to be brought promptly before a
judge) given the failure to bring the applicant before a judge promptly after
his arrest;
· a violation
of Article 5 § 4 (right to have lawfulness of detention decided
speedily by a court) given the lack of a remedy by which the applicant could
have the lawfulness of his detention in police custody decided.
Fair trial
The Court held:
· by six votes
to one, that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 in that the
applicant was not tried by an independent and impartial tribunal;
· and
unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a
fair trial), taken together with Article 6 § 3 (b) (right to adequate time
and facilities for preparation of defence) and (c) (right to legal assistance),
in that the applicant did not have a fair trial.
Death penalty
The Court held:
· unanimously,
that there had been no violation of Article 2 (right to life);
· unanimously,
that there had been no violation of Article 3 (prohibition of
ill-treatment) of the ECHR, concerning the implementation of the death penalty;
· and, by six
votes to one, that there had been a violation of Article 3 concerning
the imposition of the death penalty following an unfair trial.
Treatment and
conditions
The Court held,
unanimously, that there had been:
· no
violation of Article 3 of the Convention, concerning the conditions in
which the applicant was transferred from Kenya to Turkey and the
conditions of his detention on the island of İmralı.
Other complaints
The Court also held,
unanimously, that there had been:
· no
violation of Article 14 of the Convention (prohibition of
discrimination), taken together with Article 2 as regards the implementation of
the death penalty;
· no
violation of Article 34 of the Convention (right of individual
application).
Finally the Court held,
unanimously, that no separate examination was necessary of the
applicant’s remaining complaints under Articles 7 (no punishment without
law), 8 (right to respect for private and family life), 9 (freedom of thought,
conscience and religion), 10 (freedom of expression), 13 (right to an effective
remedy), 14 and 18 (limitation on use of restrictions on rights).
Yilmaz v.
Germany (Appl. No. 52853/99, Judgement of 17 April 2003)
The applicant is a Turkish
national
who was born in Germany in 1976. In 1992, he was granted an indefinite
residence permit. However, between 1995 and 1996 he committed a number of
criminal offences (robbery, assault, sexual assault) for which he was sentenced
to prison. In 1998, he was informed that in view of his criminal record he was requested
to leave Germany or face expulsion. Even though the applicant had a German
girlfriend, with whom he had a child, all the appeals against this
administrative decision failed and the applicant had to leave Germany in 2000.
Before the Court, the applicant claimed that his expulsion to Turkey and the
indefinite ban from German territory constituted an interference with his
family life and therefore a violation of Art. 8 § 1 of the ECHR. The Court
first confirmed that the decision to expel the applicant was prescribed by law
and pursued a legitimate aim, i.e. the prevention of disorder or crime. It then
determined whether such a measure was proportionate and necessary in a
democratic society. The Court noted that the applicant was a second generation
immigrant. He studied in Germany, he had an indefinite residence permit and he
had a German partner and a young child. Also, his parents and his two sisters
live in Germany. With regard to this last point, the Court recalled the
protection of Art. 8 applies to adults if it is demonstrated that there is a
dependency link, other than the usual affective bonds. Finally,
the Court found that the applicant was relatively young when he committed the
criminal offences, for which he was sentenced to three years imprisonment in
total. In light of all these elements, the Court concluded that while the
expulsion of the applicant was not as such a disproportionate measure, the fact
that the authorities decided to issue an indefinite ban from the territory,
made it go beyond what is necessary in a democratic society. Therefore, the
Court decided that there had been a violation of Art. 8 of the ECHR.
2. Court's
Decisions
A.
Cases Declared Admissible
Krstina Blecic
v. Croatia (Appl. No. 59532/00, Decision of 30 January 2003)
The applicant is a Croatian
citizen
of Serb descent. In 1953, she and her husband were granted a specially
protected tenancy on a flat in the town of Zadar. Following his death in
1989, she became the sole tenant. In July 1991, she travelled to visit her
daughter in Rome. Shortly afterwards armed conflict broke out in Dalmatia and Zadar
was subjected to heavy shelling. In October 1991, the Croatian authorities
terminated the applicant’s pension and medical insurance, as she was not,
at that time, a Croatian citizen. In view of her age and poor health, the
applicant decided to remain in Rome. In November 1991, a family occupied the
applicant’s flat. In February 1992, the municipal authorities
took proceedings against the applicant to terminate her tenancy right on the basis
that she had been absent for more than six months without justification. The applicant
relied on her lack of means and poor health as reasons for staying with her
daughter. The Municipal Court found these reasons insufficient to justify her
absence and terminated her tenancy. After successive appeals including to the
Constitutional Court, the applicant's tenancy right was ultimately terminated.
Before the Court the applicant claims that the judicial termination of her
tenancy right constitutes a violation of Art. 8 (right to respect for her
home)
and Art. 1 Protocol 1, since she was deprived of a possibility to buy
the flat under favourable conditions. The Court first looked at whether it
was competent ratione temporis to consider this
complaint,
since the facts and part of the domestic proceedings took place before the
entry into force of the ECHR in respect of Croatia (5 November 1997). To make
that determination, the Court observed that the last domestic judicial
decision, the Constitutional Court's decision of November 1999, was in fact
directly decisive for the applicant’s Convention rights. Therefore, the
Court considered the application compatible ratione temporis. The Court
finally considered the application admissible on both grounds.
Moldovan &
13 Others and Rostas & 9 Others v. Romania (Appl. No. 41138/98 and Appl.
No. 64320/01, Decision of 3 June 2003)
Following a deadly bar
fight involving two Romas from the village of Hădăreni in September
1993, the non-Roma population of the village decided to take revenge on all the
Romas living there. As a result, some 13 houses belonging to Romas were burnt
and other properties destroyed. The two Romas involved in the bar fight were
beaten to death. The police did nothing to protect the applicants and even
assisted the mob during the riot. While the criminal proceedings concerning the
eventual involvement of police officers into these incidents were unsuccessful,
those concerning the non-Roma villagers lead to the conviction of twelve of
them. Some were convicted of extremely serious murder and others of
destruction, offences against morality and disturbance of public order. The
Court of Appeal and later the Supreme Court increased the prison sentence for
some of them and decreased it for others. Those convicted of extremely serious
murder were ultimately pardoned by Presidential decisions and released. The
Romanian government also allocated some funds for the rehabilitation of the
destroyed houses. Before the Court, the applicants claim that since the
destruction of their houses they have been living in very poor conditions, amounting
to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Art. 3 of the ECHR. They also
complain under Art. 6 about the length of criminal proceedings and
about the fact that in the absence of proceedings against the police officers
involved in the riots, it is impossible to determine to what extent the civil
responsibility of the State could be established. They further claim under Art.
8
that due to the partial or superficial rehabilitation of their houses, they cannot
resume a normal family life. They invoke Art. 14 (discrimination) in
conjunction with all the a/m articles. The Court declared the application admissible
on all grounds.
B.
Cases Declared Inadmissible
Mogos and
Krifka v. Germany (Appl. No. 78084/01, Decision of 27 March 2003)
The applicants, a couple
and their five children, are stateless persons of Romanian origin.[2]
In 1990, they left Romania for Germany where they sought asylum claiming
that being Romas they faced persecution. In 1993, they renounced
their Romanian nationality. Their application for asylum, as well as their
attempts to obtain residence permits in Germany were rejected at all stages of
the procedure. On 7 March 2002, the applicants (with the exception of the first
two children, who were married to German nationals) were expelled to Romania,
notably pursuant to an agreement concluded between the two States in 1998,
whereby Romania declared that it was prepared to accept its former national who
had become stateless persons. They have been staying since then in the transit
centre of Bucharest Airport, refusing to enter Romania but wishing to return to
Germany. Before the Court, the applicants complained that the implementation of
the agreement signed between Germany and Romania violated Art. 6 § 1 of
the ECHR.
Moreover, their expulsion as such violated Art. 3 and Art. 8 of the ECHR. The Court
declared the case inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, since the
applicant's lawyer did not deem necessary to go before the Federal
Constitutional Court. Indeed, in the opinion of the applicants’
representative, this constitutional action had no prospect of success.
Roslina Chandra
and Others v. the Netherlands (Appl. No. 53102/99, Decision of 13 May 2003)
The principle applicant
is a Dutch national of Indonesian origin. She left Indonesia in
1992 while she was still in the process of divorcing from her husband. The four
children remained in Indonesia in their father’s care. In the
Netherlands, she met and settled with a Dutch national and she was granted a
residence permit for the purpose of living with him. She obtained Dutch citizenship in 1996. In
the meantime, she was granted custody of the children and she
therefore wanted them to join her. They arrived in the Netherlands in 1997 with
a short stay visa of 90 days. Their request for a residence permit was
rejected
by the Dutch authorities which considered that the close ties between the
mother and her children were severed by the separation back in 1992 and that in
any case she did not have the means to support them. Moreover, for the Dutch
authorities, there were no obstacles to the family living together in Indonesia.
The successive appeals against this decision were unsuccessful. Before the
Court, the applicant claimed that the refusal to deliver a residence permit
constituted an interference with the family life and therefore a violation of Art.
8 of the ECHR. The Court considered first that the children lived all
their lives in Indonesia and had therefore strong links with that country.
Moreover, two of them attained the age of majority and given the age of the
others, 15 and 13 years old, they were not as much in need of care as younger
children. The Court further found that the children could live in Indonesia
with other relatives or even with their mother, who could develop a family life
in that country. For all these reasons, the Court concluded that by refusing
the requested residence permit, the Netherlands did in fact strike a fair
balance between the applicant's interests and its own interest in controlling
immigration. The case was therefore declared inadmissible.
C.
Cases Adjourned
NTR
D.
Cases Struck out of the List
NTR
E.
Friendly Settlements
NTR
F.
Applications Communicated to Governments
Mogos v.
Romania (Appl. No. 20420/02)
The applicants, a couple
and their five major children, are stateless persons of Romanian origin.[3]
In 1990, they left Romania for Germany where they sought asylum claiming
that being Romas they faced persecution. In 1993, they renounced
their Romanian nationality. Their application for asylum, as well as their
attempts to obtain residence permits in Germany were rejected at all stages of
the procedure. On 7 March 2002, the applicants (with the exception of the first
two children, who were married to German nationals) were expelled to Romania,
notably pursuant to an agreement concluded between the two States in 1998, whereby
Romania declared that it was prepared to accept its former national who had
become stateless persons. Since 7 March 2002 the deported applicants, including
the three children, have remained in the transit centre of Bucharest Airport,
refusing to enter Romania but wishing to return to Germany. The case has been
communicated to the Romanian government under Art. 3 (ill-treatment), Art. 5
§ 1 (detention), Art. 2 Protocol No. 4 (freedom of movement), and Art. 14
(discrimination) in conjunction with Art. 3 and Art. 2 of Protocol No. 4.
Basnet v.
United Kingdom (Appl. No. 43136/02)
The applicant is a national
of Nepal,
who sought asylum in the UK in October 2000. She claimed that she
suffered ill-treatment on account of her husband’s political activities. He
was arrested in April 2000 as was their son six weeks later. Neither had been
seen since. Her asylum application was rejected on the basis that she
was not facing persecution, her claims did not amount to a sustained pattern or
campaign of persecution and she could have attempted to seek redress through
the proper Nepalese authorities. There were also significant discrepancies in
her account. The applicant appealed to the Special Adjudicator. Although she
was legally represented, she prepared the written submissions herself. Her appeal
was rejected on the ground that her account was unreliable, inconsistent
and that there was no reasonable likelihood of her being targeted, detained,
tortured, ill-treated or killed in Nepal. The applicant prepared written submissions
for the Immigration Appeals Tribunal (IAT), repeating her claims and explaining
that the inconsistencies noted by the Special Adjudicator were due to poor
translations. While IAT hearing was scheduled for April 2001, the
applicant submitted a medical certificate indicating her inability to attend on
the appointed date. Her solicitors withdrew just before the hearing, which went
ahead nonetheless. The IAT decided to disregard the applicant’s
further documentary evidence since it had not been filed in triplicate and
the applicant had not explained why she had not made these arguments earlier.
The IAT upheld the Special Adjudicator’s decision. The applicant sought
leave to appeal, arguing that her failure to supply documents in triplicate was
due to her lack of professional help, as she had not been
able to pay her solicitors. She further submitted that the inconsistencies
detected in her statements were due to factors such as trauma-induced memory
loss and language difficulties, since the interpreters assigned to
her were not proficient in her language. Following the refusal
of leave to appeal, the applicant applied to the Court of Appeal, which
rejected her application in November 2002. The applicant’s expulsion was
scheduled for 10 December 2002 but on the basis of Rule 39 the Court
asked the UK not to carry it out. The case was then communicated to the
Government under Art. 2, Art. 3, Art. 5 and Art. 6 of the ECHR.
Ovihangy v.
Sweden (Appl. No. 44421/02)
The applicant is an Iranian national of Kurdish descent who sought asylum in Sweden in April 1999. He claimed that he became a political activist in 1990 and that he was arrested, detained and tortured in 1994, after which he avoided political activity. However, in February 1999, following the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, he participated in a public demonstration, handing out posters and leaflets. The military intervened and the applicant went into hiding. He learned of the arrest of his father and brother and secretly left the country for Turkey, from where he travelled to Sweden. His asylum application was rejected both in first and second instance. The Swedish asylum authorities considered that, apart from those who worked actively for Kurdish political goals, the members of this ethnic minority were normally left in peace. As the applicant ceased political activity in 1994, his fears were exaggerated. The applicant made two successive new asylum applications, producing a medical opinion showing a risk of suicide should he be deported and providing further information about the risks he would face in Iran and a medical diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. They were again rejected. In October 2002, he was put on a plane to Istanbul, escorted by two police officers. However, attempts to make him board a plane to Teheran from Istanbul failed and he was therefore taken back to Sweden where he was kept in detention until 23 December. A further psychiatric assessment concluded that because of the long-lasting strains to which the applicant had been exposed (torture, political persecution), his mental health would be significantly prejudiced should he be forcibly expelled and that there was a high risk of suicide. On 2 January 2003, the expulsion order was stayed. In addition to arguing that his expulsion would be contrary to Art. 3, the applicant contends that his detention was illegal, since it exceeded the period of two months permitted in Swedish law. The complaint has been communicated to the Government under Art. 3 and Art. 5 § 1(f) of the ECHR.
Ndangoya v.
Sweden (Appl. No. 17868/03)
The applicant is a Tanzanian
national
currently serving a seven-year sentence in Sweden for aggravated assault. He
was married to a Swedish national, whom he accompanied to Sweden in 1991. Both
spouses were already infected with HIV. They had two daughters
in 1991 and 1996. The applicant received a residence permit in July 1996. He
divorced his wife in 1997 and in 1999 he was convicted of aggravated assault.
In addition to the term of imprisonment, the court of appeal ordered that he
should be banned for life from Sweden. The applicant claims
that he has a close relationship with his daughters and has produced letters in
support of his claim. His place of detention is far from their home, creating
psychological difficulties for his former spouse and his daughters. According
to a medical expert, the applicant would have little chance of continuing
his treatment for HIV if sent back to Tanzania. This would entail the
development of Aids, leading to death in 3-4 years. The application was
communicated to the government under Art. 2, Art. 3 and Art. 8 of the
ECHR.
Melnychenko v.
Ukraine (Appl. No. 17707/02)
The applicant is a Ukrainian
national
holding refugee status in the USA. He was previously an
officer in the State Security Service of Ukraine, assigned to the
President’s office. During the course of his work, he made audio
recordings of phone calls between the President and other persons regarding the
possible involvement of the President in the disappearance of a journalist. The
applicant left the country two days before the tapes were made public in
Parliament in November 2000. He was granted refugee status by the USA in
April 2001.
In January 2002, the Socialist Party of Ukraine nominated the applicant to
stand for the upcoming parliamentary elections. However, his candidature was
rejected on the basis that he was not permanently resident in the country and
that he had provided inaccurate information about his actual place of residence
and his residence during the previous five years. The applicant maintains that
he still has a permanent address in Kiev. The complaint has been communicated
to the Government under Art. 3 of the Protocol No. 1 (right to free
election)
and Art. 14 (discrimination) of the ECHR.
G.
Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court - Interim Measures
NTR
3. Supervision of
Execution of Judgements by the Committee of Ministers
KKC v. the
Netherlands, ResDH(2003)38 adopted on 24 February 2003
In this decision the
Committee of Ministers satisfied itself that in accordance with the judgement
of 21 December 2001[4] the Dutch
government did issue to the applicant a residence permit without restrictions
and paid to him the sum of 1,400 Euros in respect of costs and expenses.
4. Other News
On 15 January 2003, Malta
signed
and ratified Protocol 7 of the ECHR.
On 29 January 2003,
Francisco Javier Borrego Borrego (Spain) was elected as judge at
the European Court of Human Rights.
In March 2003, four judges
of the Court went to Moldova to take evidence from witnesses in the case of Ilascu
and Others v. Moldova and the Russian Federation. Interviews
with the witnesses took place in Chisinau and in Tiraspol. This case has been
declared admissible on 4 July 2001 and is currently pending before a Grand
Chamber of the Court.[5]
Protocol 12 of the ECHR
(prohibition of discrimination) has been further ratified by Croatia and San
Marino. Having also been ratified by Cyprus and Georgia, it needs another 6
ratifications in order to enter into force. It has been signed by 28 member
states of the Council of Europe.
On 3 April 2003, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro signed the
ECHR,
as well as Protocol 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13.
Protocol 13 of the ECHR
(abolition of the death penalty in times of war) entered into force on 1
July 2003.
It has been signed and ratified by 15 member states of the Council of Europe.[6]
UNHCR LO Strasbourg,
22 July 2003
[1] See Judgement of the Court in the case of Maaouia v. France, 5 October 2000, Appl. No. 39652/98. Update No. 15, August 2000 - December 2000.
[2] For the part of the complaint concerning Romania, see under Applications Communicated to Governments, Mogos v. Romania, Appl. No. 20420/02
[3] For the part of the complaint concerning Germany, see under Cases Declared Inadmissible, Mogos and Krifka v. Germany, Appl. No. 78084/01
[4] See Update No. 17, July - December 2001.
[5] See Update No. 16, January - July 2001.
[6] Andorra, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Georgia, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Romania, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine.