CDMG (2003) 13
EUROPEAN
COMMITTEE ON MIGRATION
(CDMG)
PREVENTING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION:
JUGGLING ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES, POLITICAL RISKS AND
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
by
Claude-Valentin MARIE
(Consultant)
Strasbourg, March 2003
IMMIGRATION FLOWS IN EUROPE: AN OBJECTIVELY CONTROLLABLE SITUATION................... 7
NEW PROVISIONS RECENTLY ADOPTED OR UNDER DISCUSSION............................................. 29
THE SEVILLE PACKAGE : POLICE CO-OPERATION BEFORE
POLICY HARMONISATION.............. 32
THE EFFECTS OF ENLARGEMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE: EU
REQUIREMENTS........................... 37
CLOSURE OF AND CONTROLLED ACCESS TO THE LABOUR
MARKET....................................... 47
THE PRAGMATIC MANAGEMENT OF TEMPORARY LABOUR
IMMIGRATION.............................. 50
PERSISTENCE OF ILLEGALITY AND NEW ILLEGAL PRACTICES
ON THE LABOUR MARKET...... 50
THE DESIRE FOR CONTROL, MARKET NEEDS AND DEMOGRAPHIC
FORECASTS...................... 50
Illegal immigration has been near the top of the
political agendas of the member states of the Council of Europe for almost two
decades. They are all worried about the scale of the phenomenon and the ways in
which it is changing, as well as its effects on the countries involved, and are
concerned that it should not exacerbate social tensions and conflicts. It is a
major domestic policy issue for all of them. No government wants to give its
electorate the impression that it has lost control of its borders, and this
goes some way to explaining the eagerness to strengthen control mechanisms
rather than bother about the root causes of the problem, which are to be found
in the unequal development of North and South.
The new factor over the last decade has been the often
tragic nature of this type of migration, which increasingly often involves
human deaths at sea, in lorries, on planes, or, notoriously, in the Channel
Tunnel. Such events have in some cases had serious repercussions on public
opinion. For example, the Dover tragedy, which saw the death of 58 illegal
immigrants, elicited strong emotional reactions throughout Western Europe, as
well as in China, where the immigrants had come from.
There was a similar reaction to the two African
teenagers who tried to reach the Europe of their dreams by stowing away in the
undercarriage of a plane and whose story became all the more poignant when
their letter explaining their choice was made public. But who remembers them
now? One might even conclude that such tragedies have become so commonplace as
to lose all impact, public opinion no longer being mobilised except to protest
against the inconvenience caused by the "presence" of foreigners
(Sangatte), rather than being moved by the deaths announced almost daily.
The other lesson of the last decade is the change in
how international migration is perceived. It is now accepted that it can no
longer be dealt with simply in terms of relations between host countries and
countries of origin. The acceleration of population movements at global level,
the proliferation of channels of mobility, the repeated reactive movements, the
accumulation within a single country of the functions of departure, transit and
settlement, all require a new political approach to "international
population movements".
They are now part of a new geopolitical environment
produced by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Communist bloc,
the prospect of EU enlargement, the resultant redistribution of interests to
the East and South of Europe and, obviously, the concomitant sovereignty
issues. Despite their profound differences, the debates (even the potential
conflicts) over the Spanish enclaves on the Mediterranean or the Russian
enclave of Kaliningrad on the future eastern border of the Union are evidence
of this.
All the countries of the former eastern bloc are now
simultaneously countries of origin, transit and, increasingly, fairly long-term
settlement. The tightening of control procedures in Western Europe immediately
made itself felt, blocking groups that had seen them simply as places of
transit. The migrants themselves are from all corners of the globe: Central and
Eastern Europe, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka,
India, Bangladesh and elsewhere. Countries clearly do not have the means to
deal with them and yet there is no shortage of pressure on them to do so,
particularly on candidates for membership of the European Union. Those
countries know that their ability to control the waves of migrants who pass
through their territories will be taken into consideration when the final
decision is made.
This new European migratory area and the diversity of the forces to be
observed there are also part of the new environment. They strengthen the
hypothesis of new "migratory movements" in which the patterns, the strategies of the
protagonists, the itineraries, the methods of interacting with the world of
politics and administrative departments and the very conception of migration
constitute a break with traditional models.
There is therefore a need for a different perception
of international and transnational population movements, particularly since the
new migration patterns concern not only the East, but also the South, although
the underlying rationales and the relationships of domination of which they are
a part are not identical.
The political situation has also changed on the
domestic front. The climate surrounding the issue of immigration is steadily
deteriorating. Distrust and suspicion are everywhere. Growing sections of the
population regard it not merely as a serious problem but as a threat. While the
success of populist movements cannot be attributed to this issue alone, a
significant part of their attraction for the electorate lies in their talk of invasion,
insecurity and loss of identity.
Already, before this situation developed, the two
major preoccupations of governments of every political persuasion was to combat
illegal immigration and reduce asylum applications. Nothing seems to have
prompted them to change their view.
In the last decade all countries have tightened the
conditions governing the entry, residence and employment of foreigners and the
right to asylum. At the same time, techniques for identifying individuals have
become more sophisticated and administrative powers have been strengthened,
while the possibilities for appealing against decisions not to admit someone or
to deport have been restricted.
These changes have been made by widely varying legal
means ranging from simply adjusting regulations to constitutional amendment, by
way of transforming the regulations in force into Acts of Parliament. This
gradation is significant: it shows that the question of immigration and its
control affects three issues of fundamental concern to states: the exercise of
sovereignty, the control of territory, and the definition of citizenship.
The inextricable link between immigration policy and
the social model a country aspires to could not be more clearly
underlined. This highlights the
need for a careful study, not only of the laws passed and the regulations
adopted, but also of the principles on which they are based [1]
Of all the reforms introduced, the most emblematic of
the spirit of the age are without doubt those on asylum, family
reunification and mixed marriages. In each case, the concern has
been less to lay down the conditions under which foreigners should be received
than to set out measures that make it possible to turn away as many as
possible. The ambition has been, and remains, to police foreigners rather than have an immigration policy.
The amendments made to the right of asylum are
indicative of this choice. The rule is not to legalise established situations
or open the doors to more potential candidates. The issue is epitomised in the
strict distinction between "economic refugees", whose applications
are considered groundless and are therefore doomed by their very nature to be
rejected, and "genuine political refugees", whose profile is
constantly remodelled according to ever more stringent criteria.
But the unanimous choice of stringency (strict control
of immigration and limiting long-term settlement) does not prevent countries
giving themselves the means of reintroducing (selective and/or temporary)
labour policies. They have all been careful, through various mechanisms
(quotas, temporary contracts, secondment, international provision of services,
etc), to leave the door open to further temporary foreign arrivals, striving to
see that they correspond strictly to market demand.
This dual approach is only superficially
contradictory. Even in a period of slower growth, employment potential has
remained significant for foreigners in both Northern and Southern Europe and
was still greater when accelerated growth at the turn of the millennium made
more obvious both the shortage of labour and the reluctance of those on the
market to accept simply anything in terms of conditions of employment and pay.
In the early 1990s the words of the president of the
Federation of German Industries, to the effect that the deteriorating
employment situation did not prevent the enterprises of his country recruiting
foreigners, were echoed at the other end of Europe by the managing director of
Confindustria in Italy: "We need immigrant labour. There is no competition
between Italians and immigrants on the labour market"2.
This echo can still be heard today and is indeed
resonating and becoming louder since, to strictly economic concerns, are now
being added those imposed by demography: Europe is getting old. On 6 January
2000, the general secretary of the French Union of Metallurgical and Mining
Industries (UIMM), Denis Gautier-Sauvagnac, was reported in the French daily Le
Monde as stating, "In
view of the demographic crisis there will be in 2005, it would not be absurd to
reverse migratory flows".
The myth of "zero immigration" certainly seems to have had its day,
but perhaps not yet the ideological use made of it.
The question is which fundamental ideas underlie the
choices now being made. While a desire for openness is now being expressed, it
is also explicitly confined to an elite, the imperatives of control being
strengthened for others with respect to both family reunification and political
asylum. All the legislation countries have recently passed and the proposals
under discussion reflect this desire to reconcile the needs of the economy and
the fears of the electorate.
The concern is no longer simply to ensure
"closure", but also to "select" and to ensure
"rotation". How can "flows" be adjusted to "demand"
in terms of quality and quantity? According to what criteria should the
selection be made? How is the emergent competition for the best qualified to be
tackled? How can the temporary nature of residence be ensured? In short: how
can the best be attracted, those who have become useless be got rid of and the
undesirables kept out?
The Seville Summit was a perfect reflection of this
rationale. The programme adopted is far from the ambition of a common
comprehensive policy formulated a few years earlier at Tampere. In the
forefront of this ambition was, for example, the wish for a new approach to
relations with countries of origin and transit. "The European Union
needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights
and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit." Even the rejected proposal that
development aid to countries of origin and transit be made subject to
conditions seems far from the real step forward at the Tampere Summit.
Once again, the ambition of a genuine European
immigration and asylum policy
has given way to the policing of foreigners, which does not preclude a selective labour policy.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall there have been
three major phases in the development of immigration to the European Union. The
first, which covered roughly the first half of the 1990s (1989-1994), saw a net
volume of between 1 and 1.5 million entries per year, with a preference for Germany,
while some member states (Ireland and Portugal) still experienced net
emigration. From 1995, the effects of the restrictive policies adopted began to
be felt. The EU as a whole saw a sharp fall in entries and above all a change
in the direction of flows: fewer entries in Germany, but a sharp increase in
entries in the United Kingdom and, still more so, the countries of Southern
Europe. From "traditional countries of emigration", the latter became
"countries of immigration". Economic recovery at the turn of the
millennium saw the trend reverse again and significantly more entries: 700,000
in the EU as a whole in 1999 and 2000, as against 500,000 in 1997. They
particularly concerned the Nordic countries and the United Kingdom, but also
Ireland, Spain, Italy and Portugal, strengthening their status as countries of
immigration.
The factors accelerating international migration are
the same everywhere. There are first those specific to the countries of origin,
which drive people into exile: social and political upheaval, a deteriorating
environment, economic instability and low incomes, lack of social and economic
prospects, lack of education and health services. There are then the factors
that facilitate their "dispatch": a more accessible travel market,
the weakness of border controls or a legal vacuum in the transit countries,
contradictions in legislation and administrative rules in the countries of
arrival, of which traffickers take full advantage. Lastly, there are the
factors that favour settlement in a host country: demand for illegal labour,
access to education and social and medical services, the presence of an
established community of the same origin, how asylum applications are
processed, whether or not there are identity checks.
Applying for asylum is now one of the main ways of
entering Europe. The majority of migrants, ie about 300,000 every year, lodge
such an application on their arrival in one of the countries of the EU. The
countries most concerned are Germany (78,000) and Great Britain (98,000), but
others such as the Netherlands and Denmark also receive large numbers. This
situation and the fear to which it gives rise is strongly exploited by populist
and xenophobic parties and goes some way to explaining their electoral success
in Europe. Only Greece and Portugal seem for now to be spared. Be that as it
may, the question of asylum is among the prime concerns of governments, which
have constantly amended their legislation over the last ten years to make it
more restrictive.
Available official data set at 19 million the number
of non-nationals living legally in one of the fifteen member states of the
European Union. Fewer than a third (30%, ie 6 million) are citizens of member
states. This proportion has barely changed over the last twenty years, an
indication of the very low level of mobility within the EU[2].
The European Commission and business leaders are extremely concerned about this
situation. They believe such "rigidity" accentuates imbalances
between regions with high levels of unemployment and those with shortages of
labour. Economic decision-makers see it as a handicap for European
competitiveness. This reluctance to move to another country is an extension of
that seen within member states themselves, where there is strong compartmentalisation
between employment catchment areas. When questioned on this point, the great
majority (70%) of business leaders said they believed their need for labour
would increase and almost half mentioned problems in recruiting experienced
executives. But, according to two-thirds of them, "The problem is not
lack of ability in Europe; it's just that the people aren't in the right place."
This structural rigidity and the apparent shortage
that results to a great extent explain the increase in immigration by people
from other countries, whose numbers increased from 2.3% of the total population
in 1985 to more than 3.4% in 2000[3].
More specifically, with respect to asylum applications, after the peak of the
years 1990-1993 (the wars in Former Yugoslavia), they have, overall, remained
stable: according to the HCR, 384,000 in 2001, as against 393,000 in 1999.
In the
countries with a long migratory tradition, most new arrivals tend to go large
cities because of the great concentrations of immigrants and the employment
prospects on offer. This is the case, in the United Kingdom, of Greater London;
in Germany, around major cities such as Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Munich,
Dusseldorf, Hamburg and Berlin[4];
and in France, in the Paris region, the North and around Lyon. In the last few
years, however, there has been a trend towards less concentration or even
dispersal to new towns and cities. This is either because the authorities want
to disperse asylum seekers (Great Britain), or the result of the action of the
criminal networks themselves, which favour the settlement of new arrivals in
provincial towns and cities. Where migrants go may also depend on the
opportunities a particular place offers from the point of view of their
strategy: this is the case of Dover, the primary port of arrival in the United
Kingdom, and its environs, and of Sangatte and the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region in
France. In Austria, it is the L”nder of Lower Austria and Burgenland that are
the most affected.
Foreigners of all origins account for a total of 5.1%
of the population; for people from third countries the percentage falls to 3.5%
or 13 million out of a population of almost 380 million. Added to this there
are, obviously, illegal migrants, the number of whom - by definition unknown -
is the subject of wide speculation. When all is said and done, the figures are
relatively small. Thus, contrary to what populist, xenophobic movements suggest
to lend credence to fantasies of "invasion", the data do not support
the idea of a Europe submerged by uncontrolled waves of immigration. They
reflect objectively "controllable" migratory movements, the realities
of which support neither the contention of an "invaded Europe"
nor that of a "besieged fortress".
As a preamble, a few general remarks are needed to
introduce the subject of illegal migration. The first is to point out that it
is not something new in Europe and we should take care not to forget that it
has sometimes been the subject of highly official encouragement and is often
still tolerated (despite firm denials) when there is much at stake
economically. What is new in the last ten years, on the other hand, is the
scale of trafficking in illegal immigrants and of the tragic consequences for
the populations who are victims of it. And we shall see later that there is
still a significant gap between the energy used to tackle migrants and that
exerted to combat traffickers.
The second remark concerns the expressions used to
refer to the situations in question. I have decided never to use the term
"clandestine" in this report to refer to foreigners living illegally
in a country. This is not simply a question of nice semantics, but in my
opinion a fundamental issue. The words used influence the way the situation in
question is regarded and, by extension, the political philosophy governing how
it is dealt with. The term "clandestine" has the major effect of
strengthening the public perception that migrants themselves generate crime and
are a potential "threat", thus seeming to justify their situation
being dealt with by policing alone, and a policy in which a rationale of
security prevails over all others[5].
Thus, more than illegal immigration itself, what has
been new over the past fifteen years is the political construct of migration as
a "threat" to European societies and its "criminalisation"
through mechanisms introduced to protect ourselves against it. It has therefore
been decided to use the term "non-documented or irregular migrant
workers", according to the recommendation made by the United Nations
General Assembly in Resolution 3449 (XXX) of 9 December 1975.
The third remark concerns the apparent contradiction
between the rights of migrants, whether documented or not, and the exercise of
state sovereignty. It should first be pointed out that the "illegal
situation" of a migrant derives from legal rules establishing the right to
enter and reside in the country in which he or she is settled[6].
While infringement of such rules is unquestionably an offence, it does not make
the individuals concerned criminals or deprive them of their rights. On the
contrary, freedom of movement and the choice of place of residence are regarded
as fundamental human rights[7].
The contradiction is that this "fundamental freedom" clashes with the
right recognised to states to decide who is authorised to enter, settle and
work in their territory.
One of the major issues of immigration policies is
precisely the limitations fundamental rights place on the exercise of state
sovereignty. The right to live with one's family is a good example of this.
Since it is guaranteed by international law, states may not prohibit it save in
exceptional circumstances. They never fail, however, to try to limit access by
introducing ever more restrictive legislation, thus increasing the risk that
those affected will find themselves in an illegal situation.
An even more tricky conflict between state sovereignty
and fundamental rights exists with respect to the rights of illegal migrants,
which are generally contested on the grounds that such rights would be an
official encouragement to illegal immigration. They are therefore either
ignored or impeded. The risk, here again, is not just that protection for
illegal migrants will be affected but that the rule of law itself will be undermined.
This does not mean, however, that the right of states
or groups of states (Schengen) to control their borders should be contested,
every distinction abolished between legal and illegal situations or the idea of
complete freedom of settlement advocated on the basis of "fundamental
rights". This would be a mistake, and indeed wrong.
On the other hand, "security" cannot be used
as an absolute justification for constant violations of human rights. It is
this permanent tension between two apparently contradictory requirements that
any genuine immigration policy must strive to address. While state sovereignty
in this area cannot be contested, it can no longer be unbridled if the
democratic nature of the state itself is to survive intact.
The fourth and final remark, directly following from
the previous one, concerns illegal immigration itself, which is generally
presented as a single, homogeneous phenomenon, though, on the contrary,
attention should be given to its diversity. Foreigners in an illegal situation
cannot be lumped together: there are varying situations which do not obey the
same rules and whose prevention requires different solutions. Firstly, it
should be remembered that most illegal situations are not the result of the
illegal crossing of borders. Specialists are fully aware of this and the
public, who are rightly appalled by the most spectacular situations presented
by the media, should also be made aware of it.
In fact, only a minority enter illegally: some present
forged documents at the border, others try to cross it away from border posts
or to elude control by hiding in trains, lorries, cars, coaches or caravans,
merchant ships, containers (on ferries, goods trains or ships) and even the
undercarriage of aircraft. There are also attempts at arrival in small craft,
rubber dinghies or, less frequently, light aircraft, via unguarded ports and
airports or uninhabited parts of the coast, not forgetting those who try to get
through the now famous Channel Tunnel.
While these situations and real dangers (above all for
those who risk them) exist, they do not concern the majority of illegal
migrants in Europe, who enter legally with a visa (sometimes fraudulently
obtained). Their stay becomes illegal only later for a wide variety of reasons:
some do not leave when their permit expires (visa, temporary work permit,
student card, seasonal worker's card, etc); others use a permit obtained for
other purposes (working with only a tourist visa); still others try to legalise
their situation fraudulently by a "marriage of convenience" to a
citizen of the country of residence, a citizen of an EU member state or a
citizen of another state who has legal residence. Then again, there are those
whose applications for asylum have been rejected but who refuse to comply with
a deportation order.
One last word on the uncertainties surrounding the
actual scale of illegal immigration: it is still almost impossible to
establish. The figures usually provided are based on computation methods too
diverse to indicate anything more than trends. Only the results of police
questioning and legalisation operations are verifiable.
Trafficking in human beings has been growing steadily
since the early 1990s and is now ranked fifth among the activities of organised
crime[8].
International[9] and European[10]
law encourage a distinction between "illegal trafficking in migrants"
and "trafficking in human beings" since they refer to specific legal
situations, forms of organisation and regional locations. The data available on
"illegal trafficking in migrants" show it to be the work of flexible
criminal organisations capable of adapting rapidly to changes in measures taken
by the various states (changes in the law and regulations or progress in police
investigations) by changing their modus operandi and constantly reorganising their networks and routes[11].
They set up a complete system of division of labour and use the most
sophisticated mobile communications technologies (CB, private mobile radio and
cell phones) in order to keep track of new initiatives by the border police of
the countries passed through and to direct "convoys" to the least
policed crossing points. They prefer areas where they can pick people up and
set them down quickly so as to escape the intervention of the border police of
the countries they pass through.
Over the years the networks have become more
"professional", not hesitating to improve the deal they offer. In Albania, for example, the price
demanded gives a sort of guarantee. In the event of failure, the smugglers
guarantee their "customers" other attempts. This practice is also
found in Morocco, where some smugglers guarantee a second attempt if the first
fails, unless the migrant is apprehended after landing. The actual routes have
not changed radically over the past ten years, although the flows have to some
extent been redistributed from one to another. The main gateways to the EU are
still the Strait of Gibraltar between Morocco and Spain, the Italian coast in
Puglia and Sicily, and the land crossing from the countries of Eastern Europe
via Bulgaria and Poland to Turkey.
Upstream, the system fuels a thriving business in
trafficking in visas based on more hierarchical commercial set-up which take
advantage of every possible type and level of corruption. While the traffickers
do provide their customers with forged or falsified travel documents, they make
still greater use of agreements between European countries authorising
crossborder movement without visas and the corruption of officials (whether or
not they are civil servants) occupying diplomatic posts in the countries of
origin or transit.
An example of this type of corruption was recently
revealed in France following the arrest of Bulgarian prostitutes in possession
of business visas issued by the French Embassy in Sofia, (falsely) certifying
that they were to be trainees in various French enterprises. When they were
questioned, the young women immediately implicated the officials of the visa
section in Sofia. A French Ministry of Foreign Affairs inspection (November
2000) concluded that the section concerned was "seriously
dysfunctional"[12].
Suspicions of corruption were strengthened by an investigation by the Belgian
police of prostitutes checked in Belgium who had visas from the same source. In
spring 2001, Bulgarian newspapers disclosed that a French civil servant was
providing his accomplice, an employee of a Sofia travel agency, with visas and
that she then sold them for between 1000 and 3000 francs[13].
In May 2001, the French investigators found a large number of forged documents
that had been accepted as documentary evidence, agreements with travel agencies
which did not possess an international tourism licence[14]
and a doubtful choice of firms supposed to employ young Bulgarian women as
trainees.
In this connection, it should also be noted that the
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs has admitted the existence of eight
complaints against diplomatic staff for trafficking in visas or passports over
the past two years. Five of them - in Iran, Armenia, Togo, Tunisia and Benin -
have led the Ministry to initiate legal proceedings. Two other cases have been
revealed by complaints by private individuals in Rwanda and Bulgaria. The
Ministry has given assurances that it has instituted a policy of "zero
tolerance" and that every suspect situation will lead to court proceedings
and internal investigations.
Afghans are usually handled by their national
networks, which are involved in large-scale trafficking (often in lorries).
Sometimes they have people from other countries of the Indian sub-continent or
South-East Asia as travelling companions. The main route used crosses five
states of the CIS (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan) to Russia and arrives in Germany via Ukraine, Slovakia and the
Czech Republic. Some go from Russia to Germany via Belarus and Poland; others
go through Slovakia via Poland or Austria[15].
They are usually set down near the border in order to avoid identification of
the vehicles and transit countries and being sent back to a "safe"
neighbouring country. Some are transported by air: direct flights are avoided
in favour of transit through Moscow or Prague, which are gateways to Germany.
It should also be noted that the large number of Afghan refugees living in Iran
(between one and two million) has led to the opening of a route via Iran and
Turkey.
Turkey is the hub for illegal entry to the EU by
Iraqis[16],
who then go to Italy, where they are encouraged to apply for asylum. The time
it takes for their cases to be examined is used by the traffickers to organise
the onward journey and by the immigrants to recover from the rigours of the
first part of the journey. Their identity papers are usually confiscated and
they learn a "traveller's tale" (the same for everyone) to tell in
the event of questioning. There is a twofold objective here: to conceal the
trafficking routes and methods and to provide credible information for the
acceptance of an application for asylum. Moscow is also used as the main
transit city for Indian immigration, following a flight from New Delhi.
Subsequent transportation is clandestine, by lorry, bus or train to Poland or
the Czech Republic, through Belarus, Ukraine or Slovakia. Some fly on from
Moscow to Prague or Warsaw[17].
The onward journey is by road to the German frontier, which is crossed at night
on foot in small groups of five to ten. Once they are in Germany, the migrants
are again picked up by small lorries or cars, which take them to the interior
of the country.
Most of the Sri Lankans transported in this way belong
to the Hindu minority fighting the Buddhist Singhalese majority for an
autonomous state (Tamil Eelan). Their journeys are usually very long and
expensive, the favoured destinations being Great Britain, Canada and Australia.
Germany is often used as a country of transit, despite the lack of direct
flights, which complicates the journey, which entails a flight to a first
country of transit, then travel to Germany by road. Germany is also an
important country of transit for Romanians, who go first to Prague to contact
smugglers who will organise the crossing of the German border. From there, they
are taken to Belgium in cars (often rented for the purpose) before continuing
their journey to Great Britain or Ireland.
Germany and the United Kingdom are unquestionably the
favourite countries of settlement. In recent years the latter has experienced a
considerable increase in both illegal entries and asylum applications, no
longer concerning only single young men, but increasingly whole families and
female heads of families. The nationalities are more and more varied[18],
including the former Soviet Union, the Baltic States, by way of Central Europe,
Central Asia, Latin America and various parts of Africa. Of these, the Chinese
and Pakistanis favour Great Britain more than do the others. After going
through Hong Kong, Thailand or Singapore, where they are given false passports
(generally those of dead compatriots), the Chinese fly to Paris. The Iraqis,
Iranians and Pakistanis go through Istanbul, where they receive false passports
before going on to Brussels or Amsterdam.
As is the case everywhere else, the increase in
illegal immigration has been accompanied by the growing role of traffickers and
a worrying increase in the corruption connected with their activities both
abroad and in the UK. Another change is the scale of trafficking in women,
which did not involve the United Kingdom until very recently. Most of them come
from Eastern Europe, particularly Albania and Former Yugoslavia, or from the
Far East. Their increasing presence confirms the growing involvement of
organised criminal gangs.
There seems to be a division of "territory"
among the gangs. The Chinese, for example, wield their influence only over
their fellow citizens. The Albanians who run the Adriatic crossing seem to
control the traffic in women from the Republic of Moldova, Yugoslavia, Ukraine
and the Baltic States destined for prostitution. Nigerian traffickers use the
United Kingdom as a transit point for the traffic in women and girls from West
Africa, also destined for prostitution in the other countries of the EU. But
alliances between different ethnic groups or nationalities are now developing
more frequently in order to confront a particular problem or take advantage of
a skill. This explains the increasing numbers of arrests of large groups of
migrants of different nationalities. The United Kingdom is also used as a
transit point by those wanting to settle in Canada or the United States, which
they try to reach after obtaining forged documents of a better quality than those
used to cross Europe[19].
They are joined in their attempt by those whose applications for asylum have
been refused.
Germany is affected by two main illegal immigration
routes. The first, which goes through South-Eastern Europe, with Turkey as the
hub, has replaced the more traditional route through the Balkans since the war
in Former Yugoslavia. It is used mainly to transport people from the Arab world
and the Middle East, and has a number of possible itineraries: one via
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, another via
Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Austria, while a third goes by sea via Greece,
and Italy or Spain.
The second is an eastern route from the Russian
Federation, transiting through Ukraine, the main points of entry or transit
being the airports of Moscow, Kiev and, increasingly, Belgrade and Sarajevo,
particularly for immigrants from Asia. The onward journeys take various routes
through Romania, Hungary and Austria to Germany; Slovakia - the Czech Republic
- Austria - Germany; Slovakia - Germany; or Belarus - Poland - Germany.
The services responsible[20]
deported more than 33,000 foreigners in 1999 and counted during eleven months
of the following year 29,000 illegal entries (mainly by people from Romania,
Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Moldova and Iraq) and 22,000 illegal foreign residents
(from Ukraine, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Russia and Poland).
Germany remains the prime destination for people from
Eastern Europe travelling by land through the "green border" [illegal
crossings] or the Austrian post of Heiligenkreuz. Romanians take various routes
according to the region they come from: people from Transylvania go through
Barcelona via Prague, while those from Moldova and the area of Bistrita go to
Turin before taking the train to Barcelona. According to Europol, Tirana
airport is also used.
However, Germany is also an important country of
transit, particularly to the Scandinavian countries (for people from Iraq and
Former Yugoslavia), Great Britain or Ireland (for people from Romania and
Moldova[21])
and to the Iberian peninsula[22]
(for people from other Eastern European countries). The same is true of
Switzerland, which is for some above all a country of transit. This is, in particular,
the case for Chinese smugglers working the Balkan route, who use it to
transport their fellow citizens to the EU, Canada and the United States.
Controls at Zurich airport show that there has been a significant increase in
this traffic in recent years.
In 2001, there were 48,700 arrests for illegal
crossing on the eastern border (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia),
ie two-and-a-half times the number of arrests in 1998. The largest group were
Romanians, followed by nationals of Ukraine, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and
Yugoslavia. Many were trying to reach Germany via Carinthia and the Tyrol. The
itineraries followed to reach Austria vary according to the migrants' country
of origin and their ultimate destination. For example, people from Kosovo usually
arrive by coach via the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Hungary; those from
Romania go through Slovakia and the Czech Republic.
Arrests on the Spanish coast of foreigners trying to
enter illegally by crossing the 12 kilometres of the Strait of Gibraltar have
been increasing steadily since the early 1990s: the number rose from 3600 in
1999 to 18,000 in 2001. Arrests by the Moroccan authorities on land or sea -
some 15,000 in 2001 - have to be added to this figure. It is known that the
Strait of Gibraltar is one of the main gateways for illegal entry to the EU.
The very dangerous crossing (more than 200 deaths by drowning were recorded in
2001) is organised by smuggling networks established on both sides of the
Strait.
For a long time departures were principally from the
northern coast of Morocco in the coastal region between Tangier and Kenitra,
not far from the capital Rabat. Although only 13 kilometres separate Spain from
Morocco at the narrowest point of the Strait, the smugglers are often forced to
make crossings of several hundred kilometres in order to escape the ever more
rigorous controls. The increased security of the Strait also explains the shift
of the departure area towards Al-Aioun (the principal city of Western Sahara
1250 kilometres south of Rabat) and the surrounding area[23],
from where the "pateras" leave for the islands of Lanzarote and
Fuerteventura in the Canaries. The increased security of the Strait, on top of
more stringent controls at Melilla and Ceuta, has forced the smugglers to
introduce this new route. In December 2001, the price of a place was 200,000
pesetas [Ä1200], ie double what it had been two years previously. Employment
contracts in Spain were selling for 800,000 pesetas [Ä4800]. Over 4000
foreigners were arrested in this area in 2001. Between 1 January 2001 and 1
March 2002, total arrests had already exceeded 5000.
Two-thirds are accounted for by Moroccans, the others
by people from the countries of sub-Saharan Africa who converge on Morocco with
the aid of organised networks. Some arrive by air at Casablanca airport, while
others arrive only after a long journey before leaving for the Europe they have
dreamed about. They arrive in Al-Aioun after crossing Mauritania[24]
and Western Sahara packed into lorries, although the border is considered
uncrossable, being protected by radar and landmines supposed to protect Western
Sahara from attacks by the Polisario Front[25].
Another route leaves Mali or Nigeria, transits through Algeria (at Maghnia)
before arriving in Oujda (in Morocco). The other possibility is to go by sea by
stowing away on ships that put in at ports in Senegal, Liberia, Nigeria and
CÙte d'Ivoire.
We are a long way from the little bit of illegal work
fishermen allowed themselves in the early 1990s, disembarking their passengers
on the Spanish coast. Petty "smuggling" has given way to actual
trafficking, which is less risky than trafficking in drugs. The small
fishermen's wooden "pateras" have been replaced by the powerful
Zodiacs of the networks established on both sides of the Strait. Departures are
from the beaches between Tangier and the Spanish enclave of Ceuta. North
Africans, most of them Moroccans, are among the main "customers" of
the pateras[26]. On the
Spanish coast the new arrivals are put into "taxis" which take them
to the farms, building-sites and restaurants where, according to the season,
the needs for cheap labour are greatest. The farms of Murcia, Almeria and
Huelva have for years been the main clients. "Sometimes, even before the boats have left
the Moroccan coast, we notice a movement of cars with Murcia or Almeria number
plates looking out for the arrivals," says the head of the Tarifa civil defence
services.
Not all foreigners arrive in Spain on board
"pateras", however. As is the case elsewhere, most arrive by plane
with a valid three-month residence permit (or visa), which they extend by
changing country, relying on the provisions of the Schengen Agreement. This
happens in the case of Latin American nationals, for whom it is obviously the
only possible way and who are increasingly spared the need for a Spanish entry
visa, even if they transit through other European airports (usually Amsterdam
or Lisbon). Some of those who land at Lisbon go on to Spain by car[27].
Others, such as the Peruvians, who are required to obtain a visa, try to do so,
thus fuelling a trade in false Ecuadorian passports. Some then travel overland
to S“o Paulo or Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, where they board a plane to
Lisbon. They then go on to Spain
by road.
Portugal is one of the smugglers' favourite routes of
entry into the EU. People of widely varying nationalities, using every possible
mode of transport (land, air and sea), account for the increase in illegal
immigration. They come from India, Pakistan, China, Senegal, Guinea (Conakry),
Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania. Many arrive legally with a visa or residence
permit and then stay on after it has expired. It is also very common,
especially among people from the ACPOL[28]
countries (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique), to use a student
visa with the intention of working illegally.
The greatest increase in recent years has been in
Brazilians and, above all, Eastern Europeans (Ukrainians, Russians, Moldovans
and Romanians). A large number are highly qualified (doctors, engineers,
academics, etc) and become building workers, nurses, nursing auxiliaries or
waiters. Many of them have taken advantage of the Act which, from January 2001,
has enabled foreigners in an illegal situation but with an employment contract
to obtain a temporary one-year permit renewable for five years. Small
Portuguese enterprises have been more than willing to offer such contracts and
legalise the situations of the people they were employing illegally.
Traffickers usually ask people from Eastern Europe for
a lump sum of between $1000 and $2000 in return for a two-week tourist visa,
transport, a job and accommodation[29].
When they arrive, other members of the network[30]
put them in contact with the heads of small "local" enterprises.
These are often sub-contractors of large construction companies, Africans from
former Portuguese colonies. The route taken is via Poland, Germany, France and
Spain. Some 50,000 Ukrainians, Moldovans and Russians are thought to have
entered Portugal in this way.
The Portuguese services specialising in organised
crime stress the importance of the role of the traffickers who, long after
migrants have arrived, continue to demand 5 to 10% of their monthly wages on
pain of reprisals against their relatives who have remained at home. A Moldovan
network of this type known as the Borman Network was recently disbanded and its
members prosecuted for membership of a criminal organisation. They are liable
to prison sentences of between 15 and 20 years. The case continues.
Conversely, Portugal as yet has received few asylum
applications (an average of 250 a year between 1995 and 1999). Romanians
accounted for the majority at first, but have now been outstripped by Africans
(from Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria and Angola), most of whose cases do not fit
the criteria of the Geneva Convention. They are fleeing the consequences of
widespread conflict rather than individual persecution and therefore have
little chance of being granted refugee status. Some of them obtain
"humanitarian" protection.
Italy, which has about 1.7 million legal foreign
residents (ie less than 3% of the working population), has been haunted by the
spectre of mass landings since 10,000 disembarked together at the port of Ö .
One of the most recent involved was the Monica, which brought a thousand migrants (including 200
women and 300 children, most of them Kurds, Syrians and Iraqis) into the port
of Catania in Sicily on 17 March 2002. Spotted by the French Navy, the merchant
vessel was conducted there by the Italian Navy. In order to obtain assurances
that the ship would not be sent back into international waters, some passengers
and members of the crew threatened to "throw the children overboard".
The cargo ship, which was controlled by criminal
organisations, had apparently left Lebanon a week earlier. These mass landings
are one of the strategies of the Albanian and Turkish criminal organisations.
As in the case of the East Sea[31], which was scuttled off the Var coast of
France, the objective of most of the migrants is to gain access somewhere on
the southern coast of the EU and then try to reach Germany, their
"ultimate destination", as quickly as possible. The passengers of the
Monica and the East
Sea had paid between $2000
and $4000 for the journey.
Kurds, Albanians and Kosovars transported by smugglers
are usually landed on the Adriatic coast, while North Africans tend to be sent
to Sicily. Since an agreement concluded with Morocco and Tunisia in August
1998, would-be immigrants have been repatriated in air force planes. The
situation is simpler for Turkish Kurds and Albanians, whose countries refuse
repatriation: they are "freed". Consequently, the number of
non-documented foreigners in Italy is constantly increasing. In order to remedy
this situation, the Berlusconi government decided to declare a state of
emergency in the ports. Since then, the police have intensified their
operations: in six months, deportations rose by 30% (76,000) and 208 smugglers'
craft were impounded, as compared with 148 in the previous eleven months.
Until the new Act was passed, all foreigners arrested
without papers in Italy were ordered by the courts to leave the territory. They
were issued with a "travel warrant" containing the injunction and
then released. Some of them remained in Italy without papers and tried to
organise their lives, others used the warrant to "emigrate" to
another European country. Asylum seekers who could not be deported were given a
temporary renewable one-year residence permit, valid only in Italian territory,
on "humanitarian" grounds. For many of these people too, Italy was
only a staging-post: they remained in touch with the people who had organised
their journey and the police took no interest in their next destination.
Under the new Act, asylum seekers are taken to a
"reception centre" guarded by the police. If they are unable to
legalise their situation within two months, they will be taken to the border.
Ten new centres are to be opened. The authorities anticipate an influx of
36,000 migrants per year. On an official visit to Morocco in mid-May, President
Carlo Azeglio Ciampi took care to stress to his hosts that "Italy and
the rest of Europe have a limited reception capacity". Coming from a Head of State widely
respected for his moderation and concern for social justice, this statement
highlighted the urgent need for a new order between North and South.
"It's as easy to enter this country as it is
to leave it for Europe,"
explains Ahmet Icduygu, a professor of politics specialising in illegal
immigration in Turkey. It would indeed seem difficult to close the
7000-kilometre Turkish coastline and the 2800 kilometres of its mountainous
border with Iraq, Iran and the former Soviet republics. Turkey is first and
foremost a country of origin: to its numerous nationals hoping to work in the
European Union are added the Kurdish minority escaping South-Eastern Anatolia,
which has been devastated by civil war.
But Turkey has also become a veritable hub of
international traffic in migrants. The Eastern route is in the process of
supplanting the crossing of the Strait of Gibraltar (which is increasingly
difficult and too often fatal) and making the country one of the main
"gateways" to Europe for would-be immigrants. The European Police
Office (Europol) estimates that a significant proportion of illegal migrants
[or people on the way to becoming such] enter Europe through what they call the
"eastern and Balkan flank", one of the five major migration routes
into the European Union. Istanbul also has the reputation of being one of the
world's major markets for false passports. This reputation extends as far as
African capitals, where a visa can be obtained easily and cheaply: in Dakar a
15-day tourist visa for Turkey sells for $200 (about Ä210).
This situation began to emerge in the mid-1990s. The
restrictive visa policies of the European countries which blocked other ways of
entry and turned would-be immigrants towards new channels played a major part.
They arrive from the Middle East (Iranians and Iraqis for the most part), Asia
(Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Sri Lankans,) and Africa (Nigerians, Somalis and
Congolese). Others are people who have been refused asylum and settle more or
less permanently without papers, either looking for work or awaiting another
opportunity to leave. Still others (from the countries of Eastern Europe)
arrive in Turkey hoping to be able to work there illegally.
The Turkish Ministry of the Interior admits that
Turkey is "a country of transit for migrants from Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and Bangladesh". The ways of crossing the border have been
changing. The land border between Turkey and Greece[32]
has gradually been supplanted by the sea route - large cargo vessels leaving
the Aegean or Mediterranean coasts of Turkey for Italy or small craft going to
the Greek islands near the Turkish coast, with the risk of frequent accidents.
The cost of the passage is around $3000 (about Ä3100). With 300 to 500 people
aboard, the income from one crossing may be as much as $1 million (Ä1.05
million) per vessel, generally in a very poor state and bought for a tenth of
that[33].
The would-be immigrants are taken after nightfall to quiet creeks near Istanbul
or on the Aegean coast beyond the straits in order to reach international
waters as quickly as possible and avoid being sent straight back to Turkey.
Where checks are made on the road prior to embarkation, attempts to corrupt
Turkish security officers are frequent.
The situation is, however, beginning to change. This
is a result, firstly, of strengthened controls in the EU and the pressure it is
exerting on Turkey, using its candidacy for membership as a lever[34].
On top of this there is the increasing burden of long-term transit by those
hoping to immigrate to the EU. There are now thousands of Iraqi Kurds, Afghans,
Iranians, Pakistanis and West Africans (Guineans, Ghanaians, Gambians,
Sengalese[35]) waiting in
Istanbul for a possible departure to Greece or Italy. For some, it is a long
time before an opportunity presents itself. Furthermore, Turkey is also
becoming a final destination for others (Moldovans, Ukrainians, Romanians and
Bulgarians) who work there illegally for varying periods before returning home.
The management of these new situations, which are gradually transforming Turkey
into a "country of immigration", is a serious problem for the Turkish
authorities, which are not equipped for the purpose.
In spite of everything, arrests of foreigners without
papers are increasing. According to the Turkish authorities, who refute EU
accusations of laxness, there were 95,000 and 93,000 arrests in 2000 and 2001,
as against 11,000 in 1995. According to an Interior Ministry report, more than
360,000 foreigners have been apprehended in this way over the last five years,
and 175,000 deported. In July 2002, the Turkish security forces played an
important role in the dismantling of the Turkish part of an international
network[36].
From Turkey, the organisation offered entry to Italy by boat or lorry for about
Ä300 and provided false papers. The traffic was organised by a group of Turkish
smugglers[37], who
accompanied would-be immigrants (most of them Kurds) to Italy and then helped them
to cross the various European borders. According to the Italian police, during
the first six months of this year the traffic brought in some Ä360,000 in Italy
alone[38].
Despite the arrests made, the Turkish authorities
admit that, given the scale of the problem, they still have a great deal to do.
The country has neither the funds to set up holding centres, nor the means of
sending home people who do not come from neighbouring countries[39].
It is therefore demanding EU aid to strengthen its land borders, first of all
those with Iran and Iraq, and organise the repatriation of arrested foreigners.
"We are a country of transit, but the increasing number of arrests
shows that we are also a barrier. And we expect major co-operation from the
Fifteen to help us confront this problem, which is primarily theirs," said a senior official in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A project costing as least Ä1 billion is being
studied. It provides for radar
surveillance and, in the long term, the construction of an electronic fence[40].
A joint action programme was drawn up in Ankara on 19
June 2002. Three working groups were to be formed by 1 September to study, as
in the case of other candidates for membership, ways of developing technical
assistance and integrated management. The project is scheduled to be set up in
2003. One of the remaining delicate problems concerns agreements for the
readmission of migrants from Turkey without papers arrested in an EU member
state. Only an agreement with Greece enables illegal migrants to be sent back
across the border, if the Greek authorities can prove the route taken.
The reputation for being a "trafficking hub"
is undeniably prejudicial to Turkey's candidacy for admission to the EU. Hence
the historic vote by the Turkish parliament (3 August 2002), which, in adopting
its programme, was careful not to forget the EU's requirements regarding
immigration, asylum and combating traffickers in human beings.
The trafficking across the Sahel is not well-known and
receives little media coverage. Nothing is known about those who venture into
the region, let alone those who lose their lives there. Their death is shrouded
in anonymity and upsets no one except, one day, one family, sometimes long
after they thought "he got through". Only the exceptional events are
"news"[41]. In a
recent study, Ali Bensaad[42]
showed that Niger was the hub of migration across the Sahel., The flows from
West Africa, including those from English-speaking Nigeria and Ghana, converge
on Agadez, beyond the TÈnÈrÈ Desert. Nigerians account for about 50% of such
migrants, Ghanaians for 30%, people from Niger for 15%[43].
They have tripled in number since 1999.
The transit is manna from heaven for Northern Niger,
the most deprived region of a country which is one of the poorest in the world.
Starting from Agadez, the journey is made in lorryloads of more than a hundred
people[44].
Transporting people is far more lucrative than transporting millet and salt and
the lorry owners have been easily persuaded. Part of the town has been
reorganised as a result. The local people[45]
run the "authorised travel agencies", lorries and food stores for
provisioning the crossing. Former migrants have specialised in providing
"services" to their compatriots: they run cheap eating-houses,
boarding-houses and shops selling odds and ends (jerry-cans for transporting
water, torches, blankets, etc).
They are also "touts" and direct new arrivals to agencies in
return for a commission. According to the authorities of Niger, "It is
all perfectly legal. These are Africans who have a perfect right to transit
through Niger. The rest is their responsibility." Furthermore, every "agency" has to
register those leaving with the local police and pay a tax for each person. The
sum varies between 1000 and 2000 CFA francs (between Ä1.53 and Ä3.06). This
does not stop the police later putting up numerous roadblocks in order to
extort money from the migrants, on the pretext of checks.
Ali Bensaad emphasises that Agadez is thus giving
itself the illusion of reviving its history and the splendour it enjoyed., in
the sixteenth century, when it was a pivot of trade across the Sahara, the
meeting-point of the major caravan routes linking the Mediterranean with the
Hausa country and Mali with Egypt. In the then prestigious city of 50,000
inhabitants, apart from gold, the major trade was in slaves. According to Ali
Bensaad, at that time as many slaves were transported to Libya and Algeria as
migrant workers travel today to the same countries. History is never lacking in
irony nor the human mind in cynicism.
Ukraine has rapidly become a significant country of
transit, particularly for people from Afghanistan, but also for Sri Lankans,
Indians, Bangladeshis and Chinese[46].
Some use study as a pretext for obtaining a residence permit. Checks in
universities by border police and the security services have shown that half of
the 15,200 students who arrived in 1999/2000 did not attend university and had
no known domicile. The tightening up of entry procedures in the countries of
Central and Western Europe has forced most to stay in Ukraine, although they
were only in transit there. They are therefore taking advantage of the social
and political stabilisation of the country, the improvement in the economic
situation, the proliferation of undeclared jobs, the comparatively low cost of
living and a still inadequate immigration control system. At the same time, a
great many Ukrainians try to emigrate, hoping to find better paid jobs abroad,
and often end up in a similarly illegal situation.
Like its neighbours, Bulgaria is suffering the effects
of transit migration from the Middle East, the CIS countries (particularly
Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine) and Romania, without being equipped to cope[47].
Some migrants enter legally through the northern border and then try to cross
the frontier to Greece or Macedonia illegally. Others make numerous attempts at
illegal entry (false passports, visas and safe-conducts, hidden away in trains,
ships and motorised vehicles). Still others apply for asylum to give themselves
time to organise their onward journey (alone or with the assistance of
organised networks) to an EU country. As for those who settle, many enter
legally and stay on after their residence permit has expired (Romanians,
Ukrainians, Moldovans, Iraqis, Tunisians and Russians), others have been
refused asylum and failed in their attempts to enter an EU country (people from
Iraq, Afghanistan, Armenia and Sierra Leone).
In most cases, the traffickers working in Bulgaria are
nationals who receive logistic support from fellow citizens involved in other
criminal activities. According to the Ministry of the Interior, some 270
Bulgarians (working within the national territory or in the Netherlands, the
Czech Republic, Poland, etc) are involved in trafficking in women for the
purposes of prostitution. As for the foreign traffickers, they live legally in
the country, from where they build up their network with other gangs organising
the transfer of people from the CIS, other parts of the former USSR,
Afghanistan, Kurdistan, China, India, Sri Lanka, etc.
Estonia sees itself as a "second country of
transit" for routes to the Scandinavian countries or the EU, either by
ferry (to the Nordic countries) or by plane (to the countries of Western
Europe). The first transit is usually through Russia, from where the would-be
immigrants (from India, Pakistan, China, Afghanistan, etc) arrive by bus or
train. The smugglers are usually nationals of the countries crossed and
therefore include Estonians. The Chinese are the only exception: while other
migrants use traffickers in each country of transit to help them through each
stage to their ultimate destination, the Chinese are generally handled by the
same network for the entire journey from China to the final destination. Here,
as elsewhere, the Chinese traffickers take complete charge of their compatriots
and strive to maintain control of the whole route organised for their illegal
immigration, except when they transit through Russia, where they use Russian
smugglers.
The foreigners who settle illegally in Estonia are for
the most part nationals of the republics born of the dismantling of the Soviet
empire (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine). Some enter and live illegally, others work
illegally (mainly in restaurants and shops) while holding only a tourist visa;
still others, after an initial legal stay, have failed to obtain an extension
of their permit. These last often then apply for asylum or contract a marriage
of convenience in order to legalise their situation. Very few people who have
been refused asylum settle in the long term.
In Slovenia, the most frequent type of illegality is
the organised crossing of borders.
Migrants enter from the Republic of Croatia and leave for Italy. They
are mainly Iranians, Turks and Romanians[48].
In view of the small area of the national territory, however, the whole country
is in fact affected by their transit, except for the mountainous northern
region. The majority of the migrants (principally the Iranians and Turks)
arrive by taking the route Istanbul (Turkey) - Sarajevo - Tuzla (Bosnia and
Herzegovina) - Croatia - Slovenia. Others stay longer in the country, mainly
nationals of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Macedonia. They arrive legally with short-term residence permits and stay on
after they have expired. They settle mainly in the major urban and industrial
areas, where they hope to find employment. Other forms of illegality are
statistically negligible.
In the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, illegal transit
immigration organised by Macedonians and a few foreigners has accelerated
greatly, both with respect to the border with Albania en route for Italy and
other EU countries and towards Greece. There are two major routes across the
Greek or Albanian border: from the Yugoslav-Macedonian border to Greece, and
from Bulgaria to Greece or Albania. The route starting from the northern border
is the one most commonly followed, often by Romanians hoping to work in Greece,
and also by the trafficking networks that control the route between Greece and
the countries of Western Europe. The Yugoslav-Macedonian border is particularly
heavily used by Bulgarians and people from the former Soviet Union, most of
whom try to enter Greece illegally (a few stay in Macedonia to find illegal
work there). There are also Turks (Kurds), who stay briefly before leaving for
Albania. However, few people settle in the country illegally. Few foreigners
stay on illegally after their residence permit or seasonal work contract has
expired or try to enter except to join their families. Few arrive with an educational pretext[49].
Most illegal migrants in Latvia arrive from the
Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Most of them try
to cross the "green border" legally or illegally. In many cases, they
enter legally with visas, some of them obtained thanks to an invitation
(sometimes issued simply to oblige) from relatives living in the country.
During their legal stay they try to obtain false passports from trafficking
networks to enable them to stay in Latvia or, conversely, to leave the country
for Western Europe or Scandinavia. Some stay on after their visas have expired
and work illegally. There is also another group composed of Asians and
Africans, whose itineraries vary greatly. There are Ghanaians, some of whom are
enrolled as students at the university; Indians, Nigerians and Moroccans who
have disembarked illegally at the port of Ventspils, some intending to go on to
Sweden; Iraqis, some of whom have come via Russia (with official papers issued
in their country of origin), others via Estonia or Finland (with forged
papers).
It was in 1992, when independence had only just been
declared and its borders opened, that Lithuania first found itself confronting
the problem of illegal immigration, with the first transits en route to Western
Europe. The migrants and particularly the traffickers immediately tried to take
advantage of the new situation. At first the smugglers were exclusively Asians
resident in Europe. They gradually forged ties with members of the law
enforcement agencies and other people familiar with the situation in the border
area and its system of control. They also turned tourism to their advantage. A
number of tourist agencies opened branches in Lithuania.
Lithuania's borders with Russia and Belarus are the
most commonly used access points. The main route crosses the eastern border
between Lithuania and Belarus and goes on westward across the border with
Poland. Most illegal entries therefore take place from Belarus territory and
the migrants then try to reach Poland. Attempts to leave Lithuania are also
made through the port of Klaipeda or the frontier between Lithuania and the
enclave of Kaliningrad (Russian Federation).
Most of the victims of this traffic are from Asian or
Far Eastern countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh, China and Vietnam. They include people looking for jobs, young
women destined for prostitution (from Ukraine, Belarus and Russia) and asylum
seekers. The cost of the illegal journey from Belarus to Poland has quintupled
since 1992 (from US$500 to $2500 per person). The traffic continues throughout
the year, even in winter, an indication of how well organised it is.
Recently, immigrants have begun to make a detour along
internal routes linking Moscow and Kaliningrad. The possibility that they will
try to enter Lithuania cannot be ruled out. According to the border police,
many foreigners deported from Lithuania in 1999 managed to reach Kaliningrad,
although their itinerary of return to their countries took them from Belarus to
Moscow, then to Turkmenistan and on to Kabul and they were escorted by
representatives of the Afghan Embassy in Moscow. Another, less common, type of
traffic, seen for the first time in 1994, is the illegal transportation of
foreigners from Belarus to Poland though Lithuanian air space in light
aircraft, which are usually burned on arrival.
Having long been a favoured country of transit,
Lithuania is also having to cope with a substantial rise in asylum
applications. While some put forward unquestionable political grounds (people
from Afghanistan and Chechnya), others (Sri Lankans, Indians, Pakistanis,
Bangladeshis, Belarussians, Chinese and Russians) use the procedure for want of
any other option. Furthermore, most of them soon escape from the reception
centre or withdraw their application before the examination procedure has been
completed[50]. The very
particular case of imprisoned foreigners should also be mentioned. Most of them
are from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, Georgia, Belarus and Ukraine. The
majority do not have valid identity papers and cannot be repatriated since they
did not acquire citizenship of one of the CIS countries when the Soviet Union
broke up.
The fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Soviet
system, then the conflict in Yugoslavia gave rise to much anxiety in Europe,
which was exacerbated by the racist attacks in Germany in the early 1990s,
particularly the burning of the immigrant centre in Rostock by neo-Nazis. These
events were a very significant factor in statesí determination to overhaul
their control policy and strengthen co-operation on migration issues.
The early 1990s saw legislation and regulations on
this subject introduced in every EU member state at a rate as fast as that of
recent months. Furthermore, the work has not stopped since, either domestically
or at bilateral, inter-governmental or Community level. One can only deplore
the competition or even contradictions resulting from all these many levels of
initiatives and decision-making. One thing has, however, remained constant and
is common to all: the priority given to "security" in the approach to
the issue.
As a result, all aspects of immigration have been the
subject of restrictive measures. Identity checks have been stepped up, the
conditions for issuing residence and work permits have been made more stringent
and the categories of persons who may not be deported reduced. The rules for
issuing visas have been revised, the accommodation of foreign visitors has been
more closely monitored, rights of appeal limited, possibilities for detaining
foreigners who can be deported have been broadened and the penalties for
assisting the illegal immigration and employment of foreigners have been made
tougher. New, automated systems for the registration of foreigners and for
seeking information about them have been developed and work is under way to
make official papers inviolable. These changes have been accompanied everywhere
by a transfer of the main powers in this area to ministers responsible for
internal security. Three areas are symbolic of the general policy thrust:
family reunification, mixed marriages and political asylum.
The full scale of family reunification was evident
immediately the decision was taken to halt labour immigration in the mid-1970s.
Since that time it has been one of the major means of migration. It is also a
constant target for states which have consistently tried - if not to oppose[51]
- at least to restrict it. The restrictive policies of the last fifteen years
have accentuated the trend, increased the obstacles to exercising the right and
as a consequence put the families concerned in a precarious situation.
Controlling family reunification is now an important
means of restricting the movement of nationals of third countries[52]:
generally it is authorised only subject to conditions regarding the applicant's
length of residence, appropriate housing and resources enabling him or her to
support the family. Some countries have added more specific conditions to these
general rules, such as requiring foreigners wishing their family to join them
to have renewed their work and/or residence permit at least once. In the United
Kingdom, the Bill now being discussed by Parliament seeks to extend to two
years the period during which the applicant must have lived with the foreign
spouse before the spouse will be authorised to stay permanently. In France, the
Prefect's decision depends upon the opinion of the mayor of the district of
residence, who must give reasons. Once the Prefect's authorisation has been
obtained, reunification has to take place in one go, unless this is not in the
children's interests. Even in this case, it must take place within six months,
and the reunification of the family may be called into question if the
conditions that led it to be authorised no longer obtain upon arrival in
France.
Long regarded as an indicator "of
integration", "mixed" marriages have also started to come under
suspicion. They are therefore now the subject of increasing vigilance and
measures have been taken to decrease their number, in particular by giving
mayors powers to refuse to celebrate unions they suspect of being marriages of
convenience. Legislation on this matter is increasingly stringent everywhere;
there is a risk that systematic doubt will deteriorate into prima facie suspicion.
Thus the Dutch Civil Code allows public registry
officials to authorise or refuse a marriage between a Dutch citizen and a
foreigner. The public prosecutor may also annul a marriage that has already
been contracted. Similar provisions have been introduced in France. Mayors may
inform the public prosecutor when they doubt the sincerity of a union they are
due to celebrate. The prosecutor may then postpone celebration of the marriage
for a month and may subsequently oppose it; the couple may contest the decision
before the courts. When a marriage has been contracted, a residence card is
issued to the foreign spouse only after one year of marriage and on condition
that the spouses have lived together during that period.
In Austria, the 1997 Foreigners Act[53]
limited the period of validity of the first two residence permits issued to a
national of a non-EU country after marriage to one year. An open-ended
residence permit is issued only in the third year. The authorities may also
check the applicant's family situation after the first year of residence. It
has recently been made an offence to act as "a professional
intermediary for fictitious marriages". It is also an offence to make false
declarations regarding kinship in order to abuse family reunification. The new
Foreigners Act (2000) allows family members to work only after five years'
legal residence.
In the United Kingdom this subject has received a
great deal of attention in recent years. Section 24 of the 1999 Immigration and
Asylum Act, which came into force on 1 January 2001, requires superintendent
registrars to inform the Home Office of marriages they suspect of having been
entered into for the purposes of avoiding immigration controls[54]. It gives superintendent registrars
powers to ask couples to submit evidence of the names, ages, marital status and
nationalities of both parties. They may refuse to conduct the ceremony if they
are not convinced that the man or woman is exercising freedom of choice in
entering into the marriage.
An Immigration Service office has special
responsibility for receiving such information from registrars. As soon as it is
received it is examined and its relevance immediately assessed. If further
investigation is required or if a specific measure appears justified, the case
is transmitted to the appropriate Immigration Office so that further
investigations may be made. Staff have been recruited for this purpose and
special training organised. The Immigration Service has also allocated new
resources for the prosecution of people who arrange this type of marriage. A
team has recently been set up in London with the express task of combating this
sort of abuse. It has arrested more than 236 people involved in the offence. Of
these, 118 have been charged or received a warning and 42 turned away or
deported. Some have received prison sentences, of up to seven years.
For all that, significant progress has been made on
these matters. The first is the shift from the notion of "the right to
family reunification" to that of "the right to family life". A
growing number of countries refer to it in their legislation on the entry and
residence of foreigners[55]
or in regulations[56].
Some give it a constitutional value. In Germany, for example, Article 6 of the
Basic Law states: "Marriage and the family shall enjoy the special
protection of the government".
The 1990 Act on the entry and residence of foreigners states that family
reunification is a right deriving from the constitutional protection given to
marriage and the family. This substitution is not merely a question of
semantics, but should allow a greater degree of equal treatment among all
foreigners whatever their national origin. The other progress that has been
made, also in the field of equal treatment, stems from the contribution of
international instruments[57],
pending the adoption of the directive drawn up by the European Commission.
Furthermore, unmarried couples have been given the right to benefit from family
reunification[58] in the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom (including homosexuals, 1997). It should
also be noted that in June 1997 the United Kingdom repealed the "primary
purpose rule", which required the spouse or future spouse to prove
that the primary purpose of the marriage was not immigration. It had been very
strictly applied by British civil servants and the courts[59].
It is the approach to asylum which is unquestionably
most indicative of the general policy adopted since the early 1990s. There is a
shared wish to reduce as much as possible access to the protective status of
"refugee" under the terms of the Geneva Convention. The rule
everywhere is to distinguish between "genuine political refugees", whose profile is determined
according to ever more selective criteria, and "economic refugees", whose requests for asylum are
regarded as illegitimate in principle. The standards and criteria drawn up have
led to ever more differentiated treatment of populations according to their
origin and status ("refugees", "tolerated persons",
"humanitarian status", etc), the concern being to prevent people transferring
from one of these categories to another.
Essentially, all countries have adopted the same
general measures: more stringent entry criteria, speedier examination of cases
and lengthening of the list of countries whose nationals are not authorised to
apply. Objectives have been the same everywhere: to avoid the submission of
so-called "manifestly unfounded" applications, speed up procedures so as to weed
out "spurious applicants" quickly and remove those who have been
refused refugee status from national territory. To this common policy emphasis,
each country has added other, more specific measures, all of which are aimed at
strengthening the powers and means of investigation[60]
of the government departments responsible.
At the same time, appeal procedures have been revised,
rarely in favour of the
applicants. The stated objective is to relieve the appeals system of
"superfluous" duties so as to "keep it" for major
decisions. The result is that, without having been altogether eliminated, the
right of appeal has everywhere been made more difficult[61].
This is what happened in the Netherlands in the early 1990s, for example
(Foreigners Act of September 1993), Belgium (Act of 6 May 1993) and
the United Kingdom (Act of 1 July 1993).
It was certainly in Germany that the amendments were
most symbolic of the changed attitude to asylum in Europe. In 1993 the three
reference Acts governing the entry and residence of foreigners (the Basic Act,
the Foreigners Act and the Asylum Procedures Act) were substantially amended
with the threefold objective of preventing "abuse of the right to
asylum", falling into line with the general principles of the Schengen
Agreement, and deciding which countries were "safe"[62].
The approach was crowned by the most symbolic change of all: the amendment of
Article 16 of the Basic Law (the German Constitution).
In Denmark, the legislation on foreigners, which had
already been strengthened by the previous Social Democrat government, was further
tightened by the Prime Minister, the Liberal Anders Fogh Rasmussen, shortly
after his victory in the general election of November 2001. The new Act was
passed on 31 May 2002 and came into force on 1 July as Denmark was taking over
the rotating presidency of the European Union. The Prime Minister said that
Denmark would serve as an example to other countries. The Act tightens
restrictions in three essential areas: the right to asylum, family
reunification and acquisition of Danish nationality.
Asylum is now restricted to refugees covered by
international conventions, in other words, persons suffering or threatened with
persecution on the grounds of race, religion or political convictions.
Permanent residence permits will now be issued to them only after seven years,
instead of the present three. It is only after that period has elapsed that
they will be covered by the social protection system. If the situation in their
country improves, they will be sent back, and their cases will be re-examined
if they visit their country for a holiday. The duty of local authorities to
provide refugees with housing within three months of their arrival has been
abolished: they are now required to do so "as soon as possible".
The conditions for family reunification have been made
more stringent. This right will in future only be granted to persons who have
first deposited security of Ä7000 in a bank account, proved their ability to
support the new arrivals and have adequate housing. Persons over the age of 60
no longer have the right to family reunification. The rules on marriage to a
foreigner wishing to come and settle in Denmark have also been amended. The
minimum age for this type of marriage is now 24, and this also applies to
Danes. The foreigner wishing to marry must prove that his or her "ties" with Denmark are stronger than those
with his or her country of origin. It will be increasingly difficult for Danes
of foreign origin to bring a spouse of foreign nationality to Denmark.
Nationals of EU and Nordic countries are excluded from these measures.
In Italy the purpose of the new Act[63]
is to facilitate deportations, tighten control over the conditions of renewal
of residence permits, prolong the length of time people are held in reception
centres and restrict family reunification. The key measures include taking the
fingerprints of all non-EU nationals when they apply for a residence permit or
renewal of one; detention in a police-guarded "reception centre" of
foreigners with no residence papers, who will then have two months to try to
legalise their situation and, if they fail, will be deported[64];
immediate deportation of those not admitted and those refused asylum; a maximum
of one year's imprisonment for people who have been deported and are again
arrested on Italian soil; speeding up deportation procedures; using naval
vessels to combat the illegal landing of migrants; preliminary requirement of
an employment contract in order to obtain a two-year residence permit with the
risk of losing the permit if the job is lost and being required to leave the
country within six months; tightening of the criteria for family reunification.
The penalties for employers taking on foreigners without work permits have been
increased (three to five years' imprisonment and a Ä5000 fine for each person
employed illegally).
Portugal has amended its legislation on immigration
for the second time in two years[65]
with the declared objective of reducing entries by nationals of non-EU
countries. Any foreigner who arrives or stays in Portugal illegally is liable
to an administrative deportation order and likely to be forbidden to enter
national territory or the EU for a period. Furthermore, the fines imposed on
enterprises employing foreigners have been supplemented by one to four years'
imprisonment and they are required to pay the costs of repatriation. As in the
rest of the EU, the new Act attempts to respond to the public's
"fears" and at the same time satisfy employers' demand for foreign
labour. The government is to set annual quotas according to the situation of
the employment market and rigorous selection will favour the entry of those
most highly qualified.
In the United Kingdom, the Nationality, Immigration
and Asylum Bill is now going through Parliament under an accelerated procedure.
It has been passed by the House of Commons, been submitted to the Lords for
approval and is likely to receive the Royal Assent in October. It, too, gives
priority to the way applications for asylum are processed, speeding up
procedures so as to avoid the long-term settlement of applicants awaiting a decision.
Those who have passed through a "safe country" (France or Germany,
for example) will be sent back there while their appeal is being considered,
and those whose applications are "manifestly without foundation" will
be sent back to their countries. In addition to placing tight restrictions on
judicial appeals, the government plans to use charter flights for the speedy
deportation of those whose applications have failed. According to the Home
Secretary, David Blunkett, the decision to deport will be taken literally
within a day or two of the submission of an application for asylum. It is
planned to repatriate forcibly those people who refuse to leave the United
Kingdom. Registration and assessment offices may be set up abroad. The
government is also considering the possibility of putting "pressure"
on countries that refuse to co-operate with the repatriation of their
nationals. The Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short,
has made it known that she disagrees with this last idea.
In the Netherlands, the new coalition government[66]
has placed the matter at the top of its agenda along with security, intending
to make speedy legislative amendments. It is planned to place still more
stringent limitations on new arrivals and to overhaul procedures for processing
asylum applications. Applicants without "papers" will have to prove
their identity quickly and show that it was impossible for them to apply before
they entered the Netherlands. The new minister responsible for immigration,
Hilbrand Nawijn, suggests that they should be kept in "detention
centres" for at least two months while their applications are processed[67]. If their applications are rejected,
they will be deported. Unaccompanied minors, who will not be admitted, will be
deported, and assistance may be granted to their country of origin. Countries
which refuse to readmit their nationals risk losing their development aid.
Family reunification will be more strictly controlled. This right will, in
particular, be refused to foreign residents who do not earn at least 130% of
the minimum wage, ie about Ä1600 a month[68].
Only children under 16 will be admitted and the minimum age for claiming it
will be raised from 18 to 21. Security of Ä6600 will be required (half of which
may be recovered) to finance the integration of the new arrival.
The new government in France is also preparing a
reform of the asylum laws. What is known about the planned reform is similar to
what has been done elsewhere: shortening the time taken to process
applications, simplifying procedures. It is thus planned to weed out "unfounded" applications quickly by making more
frequent use of the fast-track 48-hour examination procedure (known as the priority
procedure) in the case of
those whose asylum applications are considered "manifestly unfounded". Unlike other applicants, they will
not receive a temporary residence permit or benefit or accommodation.
Similarly, the clause on the suspension of the Geneva Convention will be
amended[69].
Lastly, in response to endless criticism, the two forms of asylum (under the
Convention and territorial) will be brought together under a single heading
under the authority of OFPRA (which will be given increased resources);
everyone will therefore be able to appeal to the Refugee Appeals Commission[70].
The Act will probably also require applicants for asylum to be interviewed. In
2001 only 60% were interviewed and many cases were therefore processed without
any contact with the person concerned.
The new and highly symbolic aspect of the reforms
introduced in the last few years is the requirement that foreigners show
themselves to be "integrated". Enshrined in law, the requirement is
now laid down as a condition for any improvement in their administrative
situation and for the stable reunification of their families. The foreigner is
required, usually in the "integration contract" offered, to bear the
cost (fully or in part) of the training inherent in the "duty of
integration". In some cases, the courses offered are themselves compulsory
and failure in the final examination may be punished by refusal to issue a
residence permit.
In Denmark, the new Act, in force since July, provides
that a permanent residence permit and the related social advantages will be
granted only after a period of seven years, instead of the previous three. But
the permit will be issued only if the tests on the language, culture and
history of the Kingdom have been passed and a written commitment made of "willingness
to abide by the legislation"
of the country. Furthermore, the permit will be refused if the applicant has
debts. Foreigners who have been sentenced in Denmark to a prison sentence of
between six months and two years will have to wait ten years. A longer sentence
will deprive them of the right to a permanent residence permit. Danish
nationality will be granted only after nine years in the country, as opposed to
seven previously.
In Austria, the new Foreigners Act, applicable from
January 2003, requires foreigners from third countries who have lived in
Austria for less than five years or are newly arrived to sign an "integration
contract" requiring
them to learn the language and familiarise themselves with the "customs" of the country on pain of withdrawal
of the residence permit. Each person is required to attend a hundred hours of
classes (with attendance checks), half of the cost of which will be funded by
the authorities, half by the individual concerned, at the end of which he or
she will be required to demonstrate satisfactory knowledge of Austrian culture.
In the event of failure to do so, a further quota of hours will be imposed
entirely at the individual's expense. If he or she fails a second time, his or
her residence permit may be withdrawn. Any lack of assiduity will be penalised
by a reduction in or complete withdrawal of the government contribution. The
ultimate penalty may be refusal to extend the residence permit. Long-term
unemployed people who are reluctant to attend classes may find their benefit
suspended. Furthermore, an amendment now makes knowledge of German compulsory
for the acquisition of Austrian nationality. The Act applies to all foreigners
from non-EU countries, including Swiss and Americans, and covers family members
who arrive for the purpose of family reunification. Only certain highly
specialised "executives" and technicians whose skills are in great
demand may be exempted, but their spouses will not be granted exemption under
any circumstances[71].
In the Netherlands too, all newly admitted foreigners must take part in an
"integration programme" at their own expense, half of the cost of which will be refunded
if they pass the final examinations.
The United Kingdom government wants to strengthen
"Britishness". To this end, new arrivals will first have to learn
English: the authorities will provide classes and an examination will test
their ability to read and write everyday English. They must also know how the
institutions work, absorb British culture and be inculcated with British
public-spiritedness. They will
have to take a citizenship test before being integrated. The Home Secretary has said that
everyone who comes to live in the country should accept the values on which
citizenship is based so that the acquisition of nationality is no longer
reduced simply to the advantages of the passport, the Home Secretary has
suggested changing the procedure by holding a "citizenship ceremony"
during which the applicant will swear an oath of allegiance to the Queen,
undertaking to defend the laws and democratic values of the United Kingdom. A
language examination would be introduced for people applying for British
nationality. Immigrants who fail would be offered training.
May and June 2002 saw intense activity by EU
governments on the issues of asylum and collective policing of the external
borders of the Union, subjects that were among the priorities of the agenda of
the Seville Summit of 21 and 22 June 2002. In preparation for the Summit, ministers
of justice and home affairs meeting in Santiago de Compostela
(February 2002) relaunched work on a "Comprehensive Plan to Combat
Illegal Immigration"
which provides for tighter border controls, improved security of visas and
travel documents, improved exchange of information, the formulation of common
standards for the repatriation of illegal immigrants, measures against
employers recruiting illegally, a database for visas with scanning of travel
documents, radar and satellite surveillance of the coast, greater co-operation with countries of
origin and harmonisation of legislation against the organisers of illegal
immigration networks and the traffic in human beings.
The Dover tragedy, the frequent boats full of migrants
that run aground and the repeated incidents at the entry to the Channel Tunnel
have convinced EU leaders that no country can curb illegal immigration on its
own. They have therefore agreed to strengthen co-operation at their common
external borders. This governmental mobilisation was also, however, a response
to the electoral success of populist and extreme-right-wing movements almost
everywhere in Europe and, still more, to the growing influence of their ideas
at every level of society.
In addition to the proliferation of bilateral meetings
(between Heads of Government or ministers responsible for the matter),
preparatory work was done by ministers, in particular the EU Home Affairs
Ministers in Rome on 30 May 2002. It is of interest, not only because of the
importance and detail of the measures considered[72],
but because the ministersí thirteen counterparts from the candidate countries
were invited, including those whose commitment to combating illegal immigration
was regarded as inadequate. This step is indicative of the new context in which
the action of European governments on the subject is taking place. Moreover,
the subject of their discussions - the idea of new European borders - clearly
showed the importance of the issue.
An action programme "for administrative
co-operation in the fields of external borders, visas, asylum and immigration" was drawn up and examined two weeks
later (13 and 14 June 2002) by a Justice - Home Affairs Council meeting in
Luxembourg, before being submitted to the Heads of State and Government in
Seville for approval. It provides for tighter security at ports and airports
and on coastal borders, repatriation of foreigners refused entry, a
co-financing mechanism and the running of pilot schemes by interested states[73].
A series of measures was decided upon: exchanges of border officials; the
creation of an encrypted Intranet for the exchange of information on forged
documents; setting up a common training programme; creating networks of
immigration officers in member states and networks of liaison officers in the
major airports of the Union and third countries; joint investigation of crime
related to illegal immigration; adoption of a common procedure for border
controls and the repatriation of non-documented immigrants; gradual
harmonisation of procedures for issuing visas; joint operations in emergency
situations and on high-risk borders, etc[74].
The countries also agreed to co-ordinate their efforts to help the countries of
emigration which are trying to prevent the departure of their nationals.
"Readmission" agreements are to be negotiated with Algeria, Morocco,
Russia, Albania, Turkey, China, Sri Lanka, Macao, Hong Kong and Pakistan. Most
of the measures should be operational within a year.
Pilot operations could quickly be launched. Italy has
offered to supervise joint action in airports. France has offered to pilot a
"specialised centre for combating criminal networks", and joint repatriation schemes for
foreigners present illegally. It was decided to move forward in stages, with
co-operation restricted to small groups of countries[75].
According to the German Minister of Justice, Otto Schily, it is primarily a
question of pooling the resources of the various national police forces in a
spirit of co-operation and co-ordination. The Italian Minister believed the ultimate
objective was not so much a single border police force as to link up sources of
data and information and harmonise police training. The action plan emphasises
that teams drawn from two or more member states would have the role of backing
up the national services of member states, but would not replace them. Such
pilot schemes, open to interested countries, might become the linchpin of a
future European corps of border guards.
This "intergovernmental" co-operation and its on-going
monitoring and evaluation will be co-ordinated by a body which will take over
and extend the tasks of the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and
Asylum[76]
set up in 1997 under the Treaty of Amsterdam[77].
The chiefs of the border police of the Fifteen will sit on it in order to give
it greater authority. The Committee might become the linchpin of a future
European border police force. The Commission is proposing to speed up and
extend the organisation of joint missions at certain borders and is considering
the possibility of setting up an integrated European unit.
The principle of assisting countries directly faced
with an influx of immigrants from Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans, in
particular Italy[78], Spain and
Greece[79],
was also approved, as was sharing the cost of border controls by using ships
and aircraft in order to follow and intercept boats transporting migrants and
trying to land them illegally.
The question of distributing the burden of mass
arrivals of migrants is not new. Germany and Austria, for example, raised it
during the wars in Former Yugoslavia, when they found themselves in the front
line of population movements. Italy has also been concerned with the question
since the first mass landings on its shores. Recently, the Berlusconi
government again criticised the European institutions for not shouldering their
responsibilities in this regard. According to Mr Bossi, Italy, "the
third largest contributor to the European budget", should have demanded that the EU pay for the
defence of external borders. "Europe should play its part. Europe
should bear the cost of returning illegal immigrants. We have been left to face
the Mediterranean alone,"[80]
he said to the Italian paper La Repubblica. The Greek Prime Minister, Costas Simitis, whose
country is faced with the same risk, said in Athens on Tuesday 19 March 2002
that he would make it the top priority of the Greek presidency of the Union at
the beginning of 2003.
In reality, the EU has only two instruments at its
disposal for confronting the problems arising from the mass arrival of
migrants: the Directive on temporary protection and the European Refugee Fund.
The first provides that the Council may "in the event of a mass influx" activate an exceptional reception
procedure at EU level requiring each member state to issue temporary residence
permits. The second, which was set up in September 2000, provides for the
co-financing of reception facilities for asylum-seekers and integration
measures, as well as limited assistance in the event of a mass, unforeseen
influx. It should be pointed out that the Fund has a budget of only Ä216
million for the period 2001-2004 and that mass landings are not regarded "situations
of mass influx".
The idea of a border police force was launched by
Italy and taken up by the German Minister of the Interior and then the French
Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, in his speech on the future of the Union. The
plan was then formalised by Antonio Vitorino, the Commissioner for Justice and
Home Affairs[81]. But it is
a very delicate subject: in addition to the important legal, including
constitutional, problems it raises, it goes to the very heart of the question
of sovereignty. For example, how can public authority prerogatives be delegated
to officers who do not have the nationality of the member state to which they
are posted? The Nordic countries strongly opposed the idea and reject any idea
of shared surveillance of their borders. The proposal was not therefore
included in the conclusions of the Seville Summit. However, the Commission
believed the process was under way with the immediate launching of pilot
projects open to all member states interested in closer co-operation between
their police forces at borders.
An example of a new type of co-ordinated control is
the experiment conducted between 24 April and 21 May 2002 in the 25 major
airports most affected by illegal immigration[82].
Christened Risk Immigration Operation, it was conducted by five member states (Italy,
France, Spain, Germany and Belgium)[83]
in co-operation with their other EU partners, as well as Norway, Poland,
Hungary, Bulgaria and Lithuania[84].
The ministers meeting in Rome made an initial review of the operation. In one
month, 4600 people had been turned away and 993 false passports found.
Thirty-four traffickers had been arrested. Most of the foreigners apprehended
came, in descending order, from China, Ecuador, Brazil, Angola, Nigeria and
Senegal.
The experiment showed that Roissy was one of the
airports in the Schengen area most targeted by the networks, either as an
ultimate destination or as a place of transit, followed by Amsterdam, London,
Milan, Lisbon and Madrid. The main places of embarkation were Beijing, Quito,
Hong Kong, Rio de Janeiro, S“o Paulo and Lagos. The Home Office Ministers
believed the operation was typical of the kind of pragmatic initiative capable
of being organised without delay in order to strengthen illegal immigration
controls and test joint action procedures, in particular by exchanging
observers. They therefore decided to renew the experiment and, on a proposal
from France, to extend it to the major ports of the EU[85].
Italy pleaded for immediate intergovernmental measures to be taken, suggesting
the establishment of a "rapid reaction force" that could be deployed in
"critical" areas. The prospective "European Border Guards" would not replace national forces but back them up in
emergency situations or for the control of border areas usually left unguarded.
The other major issues discussed in Seville included
the "conditional nature" of development aid. The Spanish Presidency
proposed including in agreements concluded between the EU and third countries
(of origin or transit) a clause on co-operation on the joint management of
migratory flows requiring the countries to strengthen controls, combat
trafficking in migrants more effectively, readmit their non-documented citizens
and foreigners who transited through their country and, if necessary, amend
their legislation accordingly. The continuance or suspension of the agreement
would be dependent on compliance with these requirements and the least
cooperative countries would see their aid revised downwards or even stopped altogether.
The approach might be extended to new co-operation or association agreements,
which could be suspended for the same reasons.
The idea of using development aid in this way as a
"weapon" to
combat illegal immigration had been put forward by the United Kingdom and taken
up by the Spanish Presidency. It was approved by Italy and Denmark, and Germany
was in favour of it for a time: "It is impossible for a country that
does not comply with its international obligations not to suffer any
consequence," the
German Minister Otto Schily stressed. "Firmness is required," his Italian counterpart Claudio
Scajola concurred.
The proposal was rejected, however[86].
It came up against stout opposition from Sweden and France, followed by
Luxembourg, Finland and Portugal. According to the opponents of the measure, it
would above all penalise populations, worsen the economic situation of the country punished and, paradoxically, result
in an increase in migratory flows[87].
The Summit therefore refused to project the image of a "Fortress
Europe". "We cannot accuse and punish the developing world because
unfortunate people who have no hope of subsistence at home want to come here," said the French Minister of the
Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy[88].
While wanting more effective control of illegal immigration, he believed it was
not possible "to convince the countries of origin simply by dint of
punishments at the end of it all". Sweden took the opportunity to say that the European timetable
should not be set by "xenophobes".
The refusal to penalise third countries of origin and
transit leaves the question of their involvement in the regulation of
international migration and the fight against trafficking in people entirely
open. How can they be brought into a genuine, equitable partnership over this
issue? How can distrust of such co-operation be dispelled? More broadly, what
links should be made between immigration policies and development aid?
All in all, the programme submitted in Seville was
designed to be detailed and precise with respect to everything connected with
border controls and combating illegal immigration[89].
In this regard, it unquestionably responded to the concern for
"security" expressed by the Tampere Summit in March 1999. On the
other hand, it did not put states on the road towards the common asylum and
immigration policy envisaged at the same Summit. The Laeken Summit (December
2001) had already deplored the many delays and wanted the common policy to be
relaunched. No progress has been made since then. Once again, no decision has
been taken, no deadline set. The Commission's proposals have been set aside for
the time being. For lack of political will, the harmonisation of immigration
and asylum policies will continue to have to wait.
It will be remembered that the Amsterdam Treaty set
2004 as the deadline for the introduction of a single European asylum system.
At the Tampere Summit in October 1999, the European Council solemnly reaffirmed
the importance the Union and member states attached to absolute respect for the
right to seek asylum. We are far from that now. In Seville, priority was
clearly given to control and security in a rationale of intergovernmental
co-operation, to the detriment of a real "Community" approach. The aim seems to be to
convince public opinion in the member states that the governments have taken a
firm decision to take action in order to guarantee their "security".
In order to assert their right to join the EU, it is
imperative for the ten candidates for the first wave of enlargement planned for
2004 (Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia,
Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria)[90]
to strengthen their border controls. Poland and Romania are at the top of the
list of those being pressed by the EU to ensure that their eastern borders,
(soon) to be those of an Enlarged Europe, are watertight. They are both aware
that the membership process will also depend on the progress made in this area.
The analysis made by the Romanian General Alexandru Ionas, Director of the
Regional Centre for Combating Crossborder Crime, emphasises that this amounts
to a complete turnaround: "Until 1990, the obsession was to secure the
western border against the 'imperialists'. The priorities now lie in the east.
Police mentalities will have to be changed and we must work against trafficking
networks"[91].
At the end of July 2002, an agreement was signed on this matter between Poland
and the EU. The number of border guards is to be increased by 5300 to bring it
to 18,000 within four years. A dozen new border posts are to be set up,
equipped with helicopters and infrared detection equipment.
The same requirements have been made of Romania.
"It is in our interest to show Brussels that we are capable of managing
our borders, which will become the eastern borders of the Union." In an interview with the French
paper Le Monde, the
Romanian Prime Minister clearly emphasised the importance of the issue for his
government and did not hesitate to give assurances of its willingness, not
least with respect to controlling the emigration of its nationals[92].
"Since visas for Romanians going to the Schengen area were abolished,
we have refused to allow almost 200,000 persons who did not have sufficient
guarantees to leave the territory. In 2001, 450 non-documented Romanians were
repatriated under the readmission agreements we have signed with many states."
Romania has therefore undertaken a huge programme to
secure its borders and stop illegal immigration, that of its own nationals as
well as that of foreigners transiting through its territory, sometimes
requesting assistance from the European Commission. "It is difficult
for us to fulfil the role of the guardians of Europe by ourselves," stresses the Minister of the
Interior. "We have 2000 kilometres of frontiers to guard, a section of
which borders the former Soviet Union." The call seems to have been heard since the EU
has made a considerable contribution to the modernisation of border policing
(equipment, training and legislation). Between 1998 and 2001, such aid was in
the order of Ä28 million.
The authorities have been working to adapt their
legislative, regulatory and administrative arsenal to bring it into line with
Community standards. "Romania is so obsessed with its entry into the
Union that the question of migration is being dealt with as a priority," says one Western diplomat. The
conditions for the granting of visas to nationals of countries with high
migratory potential have been tightened[93],
the legislative and regulatory framework has been amended and co-operation
improved between the services responsible for border policing. A special effort
has been made with respect to the northern border (with Hungary, the gateway to
the EU) and the eastern border (with Ukraine and Moldova as ways of entry): the
"future borders of the European Union", in the words of the chief of the border
police.
A large number of technical co-operation initiatives
have been taken in order to help candidate countries. PHARE is one of the main
ones. Most EU countries and all the candidates for membership are involved in
it. Its aim is to help the latter supplement or revise their national
legislation, adapt their institutions and procedures to EU standards and
acquire practical experience of co-operation with member states. Their civil
servants are provided with training and working seminars in all these areas[94].
The co-operation established between Bulgaria, Austria
and Germany is a good example of this. It aims to set up a computerised system
and draw up rules and procedures for a visa policy that complies with the
Schengen requirements. In May 2000, a programme focusing on combating illegal
immigration was embarked upon with the involvement of the European Commission
delegation in Sofia. A training centre has been established for the consular
staff of the Bulgarian Republic. Bulgarian experts have gone to member states,
in particular to find out about the latest developments in visa policy, border
controls, the authenticity of identity documents, police co-operation, etc.
At the same time, European experts have gone to
Bulgaria to improve Bulgarian legislation and practice in the fight against
illegal immigration. The exchange ended in September 2000 with an international
seminar on the subject of illegal immigration (transit and settlement), to
which experts from the other candidate countries were invited. Another example
of co-operation and training involves Estonia, where the officials of the
Border Guards Administration (BGA) and the Citizenship and Migration Office
(CMO) received training on the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees and the Declaration on Territorial Asylum. A national action
programme was drawn up for 1999 and 2000 with the Council of Europe and the HCR
as principal partners.
[Enlargement of the Union, migration and sovereignty
issues] New borders or a new "wall":
Russia concerned about the
"enlargement/closure" of Europe
Measures to make the new eastern borders with Russia,
Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova secure, and particularly the introduction of
visas, have had a major, direct effect on movements in an area where border
trade plays a major role for the people of countries that have been seriously
impoverished by the transition to a market economy. A significant proportion of
those populations lives in fear of the end of their barter trade[95].
Ten million people cross the borders between Poland and Ukraine and Belarus
every year and their trade is estimated to be worth more than $1 billion to
Poland.
But there are also hundred of thousands of Russians in
Estonia, Ukrainians in Poland, Poles in Ukraine, Hungarians in Ukraine and
Romanian-speaking Moldovans who will have to reorganise their ways of life and
relationships with their families. The Romanian Prime Minister admits this
straightforwardly, taking full responsibility for the consequences of the
choice: "It is more difficult for Moldovans to enter Romania in the
hope of going further West. This has complicated our relations with Chisinau,
but this is the price we have to pay." It should be pointed out that the majority of
the population of the Moldovan capital is Romanian-speaking. The case of
Kaliningrad, a future Russian enclave between Poland and Lithuania, is
emblematic of the changes in prospect. The Russian President, Vladimir Putin,
rejects the idea of a visa for the population of the enclave (even a cheap one)
since he sees it as a violation of Russian sovereignty. The comparison with the
Iron Curtain is systematically made, so much so as to force politicians to
justify themselves on this point: "We want a friendly border, not an
iron curtain," says
the Polish Deputy Interior Minister, Piotr Stachanczyk. Should one fear that
there will be another Berlin Wall, further East? This is what Russia is
concerned about.
The use of military models and metaphors to discuss
the issue of international migration is steadily increasing. In London, for
example, the Prime Minister's plan to use Royal Navy vessels to secure the
Mediterranean and RAF aircraft for "charter flights" for the
deportation of foreigners refused entry were immediately referred to by the
press, public opinion and the political classes as "the new Battle of
Britain". In Italy a
few years ago, faced with the spectacle of coastguards powerless to inspect the
cargo ships and other fast launches landing their cargoes of would-be migrants,
politicians did not hesitate to speak of a "new Caporetto", an allusion to a First World War
disaster for the Italian army.
And this militarisation of immigration controls is not
merely a matter of words. While the prospect of the Royal Navy in the
Mediterranean is still at the planning stage, in Italy the equivalent is
already a reality. The systematic use of the Navy to prevent landings on the
Italian coast by boats loaded with foreigners has been approved by the Chamber
of Deputies (29 May 2002).
In fact, all this is nothing new. In Austria, the 1420
kilometres of the eastern border (with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary
and Slovenia), which is a favourite area for crossing into EU territory, are
guarded by the Austrian army[96].
The initiatives of recent months follow the same
pattern as those implemented over the last ten years: they are independent
initiatives which further accentuate the already strong disparities between the
fifteen member states. As in the past, each passes legislation with no concern
as to how it will affect its neighbours. It may be the time limit for
administrative detention that differs (12 days in France, unlimited in the
United Kingdom), or the criteria for examining asylum applications: some
(Germany) examine only those from nationals of countries on the list of those
where human rights are threatened, while others (France) examine all of them.
Here, applicants are refused the right to work (France), there (the United
Kingdom) the right is granted after six months. The right to family
reunification is restricted everywhere, but legislation differs from one
country to the next: it is limited to children under 12 in Germany, but allowed
up to the age of 16 in France. The differences are even greater with respect to
prosecution for people trafficking.
To a very great extent, it is the
"intergovernmental" rationale, based purely on security
considerations, which prevails when changes are made and each time it seems to
move further away from the idea of Community harmonisation. Another effect of
the differences is a constant change of direction in the flows of migrants, to
the countries which at that particular time seem "most liberal" to
the would-be immigrants or the traffickers. This is now having serious
consequences. The planned harmonisation of asylum policies (reception, ways of
examining applications, conditions for granting asylum, the status of refugee)
seem now to have reached an impasse and the instruments already introduced do
not seem to be achieving their objectives.
The Sangatte affair, over which there has been a long
dispute between the French and British governments, is a good illustration of
this. According to the former, the residents of the Centre "do not want
to apply for asylum in France; they want to go to Great Britain" and it considers them humanitarian
cases that it cannot expel. Until recently, the latter was accusing the French
of laxity and constantly demanding the closure of the Centre. Sangatte has thus
become the symbol of the inconsistencies of asylum policies in EU countries.
The people living there find themselves in a sort of legal no man's land. Their
situation does not correspond to any precise status. They cannot be returned to
their countries of origin because of the risks they would run but nor can their
cases be processed for asylum since they have not applied for it in France as
they consider themselves to be in transit. As the United Kingdom is not part of
the Schengen area, it is the Dublin Convention that applies.
The Franco-British agreement mentioned above confirms
that, in the absence of any real progress towards harmonising asylum policies,
it is always the security angle that prevails, to the detriment of the rights
of the refugees. The tragedies that have marked the lives of the people housed
in the Sangatte Centre in the last few years are a good example of the negative
consequences of procrastination over asylum policy harmonisation. By failing to
harmonise their policies, countries paradoxically leave the traffickers great
room for manúuvre, enabling them to adapt their routes according to opportunity
and direct their "customers" towards the destination they present to
them as the most "welcoming". For the Kurds and Afghans of Sangatte,
this unquestionably means the United Kingdom, and they have succeeded in making
the Dublin Convention ineffective.
By laying down the principle that the asylum
application should be examined by the first country in which the foreigner
arrives, the Convention sought, inter alia, to improve the processing of asylum applications
through better co-ordination of the action of member states. The decision of
the "State responsible" was to be valid for all the EU partners.
Applicants were therefore sure of having their application examined, but lost
the possibility of choosing the country that would process their case. The
Convention was intended to result in sound management of asylum policy by
putting an end to two equally damaging practices. The first, known as
"asylum shopping", involved asylum-seekers submitting several
applications, looking for the country which seemed to them most favourable.
Conversely, the second, which led to so-called "refugees in orbit",
was a way for countries to avoid shouldering their responsibilities by not processing
applications.
The plan was not proof against reality: when
applicants arrive without identity papers or a visa, it is impossible to trace
their previous itinerary and so establish which country is responsible for
their application. Instructed by the traffickers, asylum-seekers do their best
to cloud the issue. If their itinerary cannot be established, it is impossible
to determine the country "responsible" or in most cases to deport
those whose safety is threatened in their own countries. As in the past, States
then try to pass responsibility for handling the case on to one another.
As a result, by refusing to apply for asylum in the
country of transit (France, in the case of Sangatte), the asylum-seekers to
some extent regained their ability to "choose" their destination. The
impasse thus became absolute and the two countries concerned each said the
other was responsible. In the meantime, the people hoping to cross the Channel
continued to pay the traffickers who held sway in the Centre so as to keep
trying to cross, whatever the difficulties and risks. The figures speak for
themselves: since it opened, 55,000 immigrants have been housed in Sangatte,
but only 400 have applied for asylum in France and half of those went to Great
Britain before even receiving a reply[97].
The sinking of the East Sea off the French coast in 2001, followed by
the departure of the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds from the Modane and BÈziers
Accommodation Centres for Germany, obeyed the same rationale. The migrants
preferred the welcome of their community across the Rhine to the status of
asylum-seekers in France. These examples emphasise the powerlessness of
autonomous "lines of defence" when they are confronted with the
determination of migrants and, above all, the strategies of traffickers who
exploit the contradictions between states to the benefit of their business.
Sangatte symbolises the bankruptcy of asylum policy in
the European Union, and the absurdity of the situation there underlines the
need for such a policy. Nick Hardwick, Chief Executive of the British Refugee
Council, seemed to accept this when he said that Sangatte was the symptom
rather than the cause of the refugee problem and that closing Sangatte would
not solve the problem of the inconsistencies of asylum policy in Europe or the
failure of the French authorities to attend to refugees in France.
The French Minister of the Interior does not disagree:
"The sudden, precipitate closure of the Centre would create more
problems that it solved [Ö] There is a problem downstream, which is England,
and a problem upstream before arrival in our territory. The possibility of
working on British soil when one has been granted asylum attracts illegal
immigrants. We will not be able to solve the problem of Sangatte as long as British
legislation is favourable. Upstream of Sangatte, there are Belgium, Italy and
other European countries with which we have to draw up a co-ordinated Community
immigration policy. Sangatte does not concern only the British and the French.
We need to establish a new policy on immigration and the definition of asylum
status."
A Commission working paper of June 2001 accepted that
the Dublin Convention had not worked and had had no perceptible effect on the
number of requests for asylum in the European Union, and stressed its
excessively high operational costs. On 26 July of the same year, the Commission
presented a draft regulation reforming the Convention with a special ìSangatte
articleî laying down that any State that has "knowingly tolerated" the illegal presence of foreigners
for more than two months shall be responsible for processing their applications
for asylum. People working in the voluntary sector are worried that the
objective of the draft regulation is more to enable countries to "restrict
access to their territory" than to give refugees better guarantees. They
believe the solution would be to process the asylum application in the place
where the foreigner submits it for the first time.
It should be remembered that the Treaty of Amsterdam
set 2004 as the deadline for introducing a single European asylum system. This
requirement was solemnly recalled at the Tampere Council meeting in October
1999, which drew attention to the importance the Union and member states
attached to absolute respect for the right to seek asylum. We are far from that
now. For the moment, border controls at their most repressive continue to
prevail over the wish to protect individuals. This is in any case the trend
manifest in the most recent legislative reforms in many member states, once
again without there being any particular attempt to co-ordinate or harmonise
the new provisions introduced.
The threefold priority given to security, combating
illegal immigration, and intergovernmental action is in perfect harmony with
the numerous bilateral co-operation initiatives in recent months. The French
Minister of the Interior has been among the most active in this respect, having
numerous meetings with his Belgian, Italian, German and British counterparts. A
series of agreements has been signed with the particular aim of speeding up the
introduction of joint police controls along common internal borders in order to
combat illegal immigration and "crossborder crime". For instance, on
5 March 2002, France and Belgium signed an agreement authorising combined
Franco-Belgian teams to patrol the border between the two countries[98].
Another agreement of a similar sort has been ratified
by France and Italy, providing for land, rail and sea patrols and extending the
powers of the security forces concerned by giving them the right of pursuit
beyond the Franco-Italian border. Their numbers are to be increased and their
premises enlarged. The French minister described the objective in the following
terms: "Joint investigations of illegal immigrants and the traffickers
who exploit human suffering are needed straight away and the areas where there
is a 'right of pursuit' need to be extended. For France, this means the five dÈpartements bordering on Italy: Savoie,
Haute-Savoie, Hautes-Alpes, Alpes de Haute-Provence and Alpes-Maritimes."
More recently, Great Britain and Belgium also agreed a
new programme for joint border control. The former has undertaken to fund the
introduction of detection systems capable of checking lorries and other
containers on their way to the British Isles in the Belgian ports of Zeebrugge[99]
and Ostend. The agreement also provides for joint control of Eurostar
passengers to Great Britain in the international station at Brussels.
The programme is similar to the one agreed upon by
France and Great Britain on the Sangatte Accommodation Centre. On 12 July 2002,
the French Interior Minister and the British Home Secretary agreed that the
Centre would be closed by the end of the first quarter of 2003[100],
on condition the new British legislation on asylum has entered into force. In
order to make the United Kingdom less attractive, the country has, according to
Mr Blunkett, undertaken to dispel asylum-seekers' illusion that their
applications have more chance of success there than in France. New measures (in
particular, combating illegal working) are to be included in the Nationality,
Immigration and Asylum Bill now under discussion in the British Parliament.
The agreement provides for increased security around the
Centre. A fence will be erected round the goods station of Calais-FrÈthun by
September and new machines capable of detecting the heartbeat of someone
concealed in a lorry are to be installed in the port of Calais. They are
already in operation on the British side of the Channel in the port of Dover.
The United Kingdom will contribute to the financing of these installations and
collaboration between the British and French police forces is to be
strengthened.
Franco-British police teams will co-ordinate their
efforts to tackle the smugglers working in and around the Centre. They will be
deployed throughout north-western France, far beyond the borders of the
Pas-de-Calais. The Centre is to be closed within three to six months of the
entry into force of the new legislation in the United Kingdom. The
strengthening of security around FrÈthun is to be completed by the end of July.
The ministers are to meet there in September to see how work is progressing and
"set a date for closure". The problem is that the announcement of the
impending closure of Sangatte and the increased security in its environs will
probably have the effect of speedily scattering the immigrants all along the
north coast, where they will look for new ways of crossing in ports with
maritime links with England. This means that the problems mentioned above
remain and the risks for the would-be immigrants still more so.
Faced with the severity of the mechanisms introduced to restrict the movement, entry and residence of foreigners, control family reunification and marriage and limit the right of asylum, many voices were raised to denounce the threat to human rights. Principles, including those enshrined in law, were too often flouted and it was feared that a legal deficit prejudicial to nationals of non-EU countries and the inequality of treatment they received as compared to EU nationals and citizens would be exacerbated.
The drastic reduction in the possibilities of appeal
is factor in this. Administrative decisions on entry, residence and the right
to visit, the right to family reunification and, above all, the right to asylum
have been affected. For example, in the Netherlands lawyers and judges have
protested against the distinction established in law between Dutch citizens and
asylum-seekers with respect to the right of appeal. While the former have the
right of appeal in almost all, even the most frivolous, circumstances, the
latter are refused the right sometimes even in circumstances that are dangerous
for them. At the time, the Council of Presiding Judges shared these objections
and considered the restrictions placed on
asylum-seekers' right of appeal irresponsible, given that their lives might be
at stake.
The risks mentioned also include those connected with
the reliability of the ways in which data on personal identity are recorded,
stored and cross-referenced. Despite the assurances that have been giving
concerning conditions of access to such files, many non-governmental organisations
have complained that the development of identification procedures for, and
digital files on, asylum-seekers threatens to undermine public freedoms. They
also complain that the practice amounts to lending credence to the tendency to
lump together asylum-seekers, fraud and crime, which, in their view, infringes
fundamental human rights.
In this context, the risks of administrative and
social instability are proliferating. One of the most important concerns family
reunification and the loss of the rights given to a spouse from abroad in the
event of divorce or separation[101].
In Germany, a spouse from abroad obtains an independent permit only after four
years of living with his or her spouse[102]
or on the death of the latter. In the Netherlands, the residence permit is
withdrawn if the partners stop living together (through separation or divorce)
less than three years after reunification. After that time, an independent
permit is issued on condition that there has been at least one year's residence
within the marriage. The permit issued is valid for only one year, a
"period for seeking employment", and its renewal is subject to a job
being found. The same rules apply to unmarried partners. All observers consider
this lack of independent status a significant obstacle to integration, in
particular for women who come to join their husbands.
Furthermore, the law of the "counter" is
operating at its worst and there is a plethora of problems resulting from
pernickety, suspicious and too often arbitrary administrative practices. Some
people are refused reunification because their marriage is not recognised in
the country or because they do not have their children's birth certificates.
Others, who are non-documented and married to a foreigner with a residence
permit, come up against grave suspicions (marriage of convenience, polygamy,
prostitution) with the risk of their insecurity, whether administrative
(refusal to legalise) or social (refusal or cancellation of welfare benefits),
continuing indefinitely.
Still others suffer the sometimes tragic effects of
the "one-off reunification" rule[103]
or from the age-limit set for the arrival of children. Then there are the cases
of spouses of refugees awaiting a reunification decision, not to mention family
members who arrive without complying with all the procedural requirements. The
problems do not end once reunification has taken place. The most punitive are
the obstacles to access to the labour market connected with the delay before a
permit is issued, which may vary from six months (France) to two years (Germany
and Denmark), when indeed it is not refused.
In each of these cases there is a high risk of
administrative (right of residence) and/or social (right to welfare and family
benefits) destabilisation. In the case of women more specifically, it
exacerbates the inequality of treatment to which they are generally subject in
the implementation of migration policies, which still, to a very great extent,
bear the stamp of their origin. They have been conceived and drawn up according
to the model of the "single", "male" migrant worker going
abroad only temporarily. Women had no place, or no place of their own, in this
model. They have had to fight for one as spouses and still more so as women
with their own lives, their own plans and their own strategies[104].
These issues are far from being resolved and the consequences are all the more
serious because all types of migratory movements - including illegal
immigration for employment purposes - include high proportions of women. Women
are now estimated to account for 46% of the 13 million foreigners living in the
EU, and for the majority of new arrivals.
This shows that the unequal treatment between EU
nationals and nationals of third countries has been constantly growing in this
respect. While the former enjoy the effective guaranties of Community law, the
latter have to be content with a reference to the "right to family
life", which gives states discretionary power over its application[105].
For the moment, the Community system contains no regulations on the matter,
each country making its own laws, so the status of spouses varies from one to
another[106].
It is for this very good reason that NGOs have put the
issue of family reunification (and the related issue of the place and status of
women) at the top of their agendas. The European
Co-ordination for foreigners' right to family life and the European Union
Migrants' Forum have taken legal and political action against the obstacles
placed in its way and the consequent pernicious effects[107].
They have a threefold objective: recognition of the universal nature of the
principle itself, recognition of equality of rights for men and women, and
protection of the rights of the child. Similarly, the European Convention for
the Right to Family Life, drafted in 1995 and adopted in 1998, demands equality
of treatment for the nationals of EU and third countries, the possibility of
phased family reunification, compliance with the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, and equal status for men and women.
However, we also need to examine the extent to which
the means (legislative, regulatory and institutional) thus devised are really
effective and what actual impact they have. The fear expressed very early on
that making individual migration a criminal offence would have the effect of
favouring organised trafficking has proved justified. The paradoxical cost of
the policy implemented has been its development on an unprecedented scale, with
the setting up of networks that sometimes cover the whole route and provide
smugglers, transport and false papers and then "deliver" the migrants
to their future "employers".
In its first report on Trafficking in Persons in the
world, published on 12 July 2001, the US State Department estimated that more
than 700,000 persons were victims of traffickers every year. Presenting the
Report, Secretary of State Colin Powell wished to draw the world's attention to
the problem and trigger international reactions so that firm action was taken
against such trafficking. It is particularly important to follow the
recommendation since such trafficking increasingly often leads to the death of
its victims at sea, in lorries or in the Channel Tunnel. The number of deaths
has been estimated at at least 2000 in seven years (1993-2000) on the frontiers
of Europe[108], some by
drowning in the Strait of Gibraltar, some because migrants were thrown into the
sea by smugglers fleeing coastguards, others by suffocation during transport -
the list is not exhaustive.
The control of access to the labour market is also a
major instrument of control policy. Since labour immigration was halted[109],
the rule has been to limit to a strict minimum the arrival of workers from
non-EU countries with permanent status. Two objectives were put forward: to
protect the national labour market and give priority in employment to the
unemployed, whether nationals or legally resident foreigners.
Since then, restrictions on the admission of permanent
workers have been made ever more stringent. Two principles have been adopted
everywhere. The first is that no foreigner[110]
may work without first having obtained the permission of the competent
authorities. The second is that none of those authorities may issue permission
without first examining the employment situation in its country, or even within
the EU, in order to ensure that preference is given to nationals or foreigners
who have already been admitted[111].
This rule, known as the "labour test", is considered the best means of regulating the
entry of migrant workers. These common principles explain the great similarity
in the legislation of European states. They are regarded as essential, but are
also subject to numerous exceptions.
When it is granted (or renewed), permission to work is
accompanied by permission to reside in the country for the same period. Both
are usually issued by agreement between the competent departments and embodied
in an administrative document, either specific to each or combining the two.
However, joint management of work and residence permits is not always
effective. Sometimes the departments concerned maintain a high degree of
autonomy in the exercise of their respective powers in respect of the right to
reside, on the one hand, and the right to work, on the other. This makes
examples of dysfunction not infrequent[112].
The practical consequence of this link between the
right to work and the right to reside is that entry to the territory of a state
that has refused to issue a work permit is prohibited or that an individual
whose permit has been withdrawn or has not been renewed is obliged to leave.
While the loss of the job does not always have the direct effect of ending the
right to reside, in some cases the latter may be withdrawn if the authorities
consider the foreigner does not have the means to provide for himself or
herself.
In all
countries the employment of a foreigner who has no work permit is subject to
penalties, which also apply to failure to comply with restrictions (geographic
and/or sectoral) particular to the permit issued and when the person continues
to work once it has been withdrawn or it has not been renewed. In all cases
reoffenders are liable to heavier penalties. Generally speaking, it is the
employer who is regarded as the instigator and main beneficiary of the fraud
and therefore bears responsibility for it and is the only person liable to
prosecution.
In some countries legislation only provides for fines,
the amount of which depends on the number of people illegally employed. Other
countries are more severe and add a prison sentence. Sometimes the courts may
order further penalties such as temporary closure of the company, confiscation
of the proceeds from the work of illegally employed foreigners and any means
used for this purpose, and even debarment from public contracts. The employer
may also suffer administrative penalties requiring him or her to bear the cost
of expulsion of the illegally recruited workers and, possibly, their families
residing with them illegally. In France employers are liable to a "special
contribution" to the
International Organization for Migration. It is also in France that we find -
with the Act of 17 October 1981 - the (much less common) example of a civil law
penalty. This Act provides that, even where they have been illegally recruited,
foreigners have rights resulting from their status as employed persons: salary
and compensation is provided for in the event of termination of the employment
contract[113]. Employees
may also go to court to demand compensation for any damage they believe they
have suffered.
Compared with the severity of the penalties for
employers, those provided for for foreigners with no work permit may seem
lenient. They are usually threatened only with administrative penalties. In
fact, it is the threat of being accompanied to the border or deported which is
the major deterrent. This is sometimes accompanied by an administrative fine
(Spain, Italy and Portugal). In contrast to the situation described above,
where the main liability lies with the employer, some countries divide
liability between employer and foreign worker: in the event of an offence being
committed, both are liable to a similar penalty.
The persistence, recurrence and above all increasing
sophistication of illegalities have led most states to make penalties more
severe and amend legislation so as to punish more effectively those who break
the law through sub-contracting operations. The legislation makes it possible
to prosecute the principals or owners regarded as the real beneficiaries of
illegal employment. It also seeks to solve the problem of punishing employers
domiciled abroad. This is the case in France, where the notion of "employment
through an intermediary",
introduced by the Act of 10 July 1989, makes it possible to charge a principal
who profits from labour provided by a foreign worker with no work permit. It is
still more evident in the spirit of the Illegal Employment Act passed in 1997. The Netherlands has similar
regulations that render liable a principal whose co-contractor employs workers
with no work permit in sectors in which illegal working is frequent. The same
principle has been adopted in Germany[114],
making it possible to penalise a principal who knows (or whose ignorance is the
result of failure to take reasonable care) that his or her co-contractor is
employing people without work permits.
The persistence of these of forms of employment and
new illegal employment patterns have made it essential to strengthen control
mechanisms in three main ways: by setting up new departments, broadening the
powers of those which have none in this area, and developing interdepartmental
co-operation. France and Germany were the most innovative countries in this
respect in the 1990s, first with the establishment of specialised departments
with powers over entry, residence and illegal working[115],
then with the development of co-operation in order to pool their skills and
powers and mount larger-scale operations.
In Germany, co-operation between the departments
concerned with illegal working (labour office, customs, taxation authorities,
police, social security bodies, etc) was enshrined in the Act of 26 July 1994.
In France it is co-ordinated by the Interministerial Delegation for Combating Illegal
Working (DILTI). The delegation, which has no operational powers, is linked to
local Committees to Combat Illegal Working (COLTIs) which, under the leadership
of public prosecutors, bring together the competent local services (labour
inspectorate, police, gendarmerie, taxation authorities, social protection
bodies). In Luxembourg, a working group to combat "social dumping"
brings together the various competent departments (Labour Inspectorate, staff
from the Ministry responsible for Small and Medium-Sized Businesses, the
police, etc) and, in particular, has the task of organising concerted action by
those services.
Co-operation benefits from the increased powers of
each of the services[116]
and the introduction of new means of control[117].
The aim is to see that offences connected with illegal employment do not escape
prosecution for lack of information or because each department has specific,
but limited, powers. This pooling of both information and powers is
supplemented by the close relations maintained with prosecutors.
However, as we shall see later, stronger control
mechanisms and inter-departmental co-operation at national level are often
powerless against illegal practices organised at international level. The need
for joint action by several countries to prevent or punish new fraudulent
activities connected with the relocation of enterprises and their employees
from one country to another is clear to everyone.
Clearly, the decision to block the official
recruitment of foreign workers has not prevented the use of foreign labour -
whatever the statesí real intention may have been - nor its reappearance in
other forms for other enterprises in other sectors. Furthermore, as soon as it
was decided to halt official labour immigration, numerous applications for
exemptions were made and granted "on an exceptional basis". This was,
for example, the case as early as 1974 with the food, hotel and catering
industry in Germany; it was also the case with the steel and mining industries
in France in 1975-76, and in the Netherlands, where in 1974 the authorities
advocated setting up a system of temporary admission guaranteeing genuine
rotation of the migrant workers in demand[118].
These examples suffice to show that, as early as the mid-1970s, the need for
flexible management of temporary labour immigration was making itself felt in
all countries of the future European Union.
This explains why the principle of prior authorisation
for the issuing of long-term work permits has been the subject of numerous
exceptions, on a number of grounds: the specific nature of the applicant's
right to residence, his or her family ties, the work concerned (its nature
and/or duration), or, again, the links between the host country and the third
country of origin. As a result, some foreigners have quite simply been exempted
from the prior authorisation requirement. Other exemptions have been granted
for reasons connected with the nature or type of activity. Examples of the
categories concerned include sailors, the domestic staff of foreigners staying
for a short time and people working in a family business.
This apparently contradictory management of manpower
policy was observed in Germany in the early 1990s. While the Foreigners Act was reformed to strengthen the prohibition on
recruiting foreign workers in 1991, at the same time, the Employment of
Foreign Manpower Act was
amended to establish a series of exceptions to that prohibition, while the
Order on exemption from the prohibition on recruitment was amended to extend
the list of occupations exempt from special authorisation (for example,
professional athletes and professional coaches). Together these texts
constituted a sort of catalogue of new forms of temporary employment for foreign
labour.
Still more than prior permission to work, it is the
rule that permits are issued subject to the employment situation that has been used very "pragmatically"
everywhere. In every country it has been the subject of exceptions that vary
according to the economic situation and are justified on the grounds either of
the applicant's legal status or, especially, of the specific nature of the jobs
in question: some highly skilled and highly paid, others, on the contrary,
requiring very little skill and poorly paid. The employment situation is rarely
used as an argument against issuing permits in the former case and prior
permission is almost never refused, even if it is formally required. This is
the case of "key" staff in the Netherlands involved in in-company
transfers and trainees taking part in international exchange programmes, and,
in France, of seconded executives and highly skilled staff whose monthly salary
exceeds a certain amount. With respect to the latter, Spain provides a good
example of the special measures taken during that period to authorise the
employment of domestic staff from the Philippines or the Dominican Republic.
Still other measures were taken, maintained or amended in response to market
needs and, above all, changes in those needs, in particular seasonal work and
co-operation agreements with non-EU countries[119].
Most Western European countries have a very long
tradition of seasonal labour immigration, particularly in agriculture, while
the phenomenon is more recent in the service sector (particularly tourism) and
the building industry[120].
It is not tradition alone, however, that is responsible, since the countries of
Southern Europe are now very much concerned. Seasonal work is usually governed
by bilateral agreements with countries of origin and ad hoc social protection
rules. Added to these are special procedures for issuing visas or special
permits generally valid for three to six months, renewable for a maximum of
nine to twelve months. The intention is always the same: to discourage
permanent settlement[121].
The dispute in the Netherlands between the Ministry of
Social and Affairs and the Dutch producers (of asparagus, strawberries and
flowers) in the early 1990s was significant for its importance in the overall
functioning of the labour market. The Ministry wanted to put an end to the
great tolerance agricultural employers had enjoyed throughout the 1980s with
respect to the recruitment of seasonal foreign workers. In addition to the
illegalties observed, the government was motivated by the deterioration in the
national employment market and the wish to give priority to the employment of
unemployed people who were registered and drawing benefit, particularly the
long-term unemployed. The Dutch farmers then clearly stated their preference
for foreign seasonal workers. The dispute culminated with a court ruling in the
summer of 1994 authorising the farmers to recruit Poles.
This example, far from being specific, is on the
contrary indicative of the issues involved in the seasonal employment of
foreign workers in European agriculture and the responses to them (sometimes
closely linked to immediate economic conditions). It is also of interest
because it underlines one of the practical effects of the political changes under
way in Poland from the early 1980s onwards. The liberalisation already taking
place there very soon had a twofold consequence: it opened up new employment
prospects in the West for Polish nationals and at the same time provided
farmers in Western Europe with new recruitment opportunities for their seasonal
activities. The practice then spread to other employers. For example, during that period Germany concluded
agreements on seasonal employment with a number of Eastern European countries
(Croatia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic). The
situations observed in recent years not only confirm the trend but emphasise
the spread of the practice to the new countries of immigration in Southern
Europe.
Moroccans for the tomatoes in Andalusian glasshouses
in Spain, Poles for the vegetables in Germany, Russians for the harvest in
Ireland Ö seasonal work in Europe is ever "prosperous". Seasonal
workers escape all the restrictions mentioned above, and quotas, where they
exist, are often increased. This is the case in Austria, for example, where the
Act of July 2002 relaxed conditions of recruitment, increased quotas and
extended the list of sectors able to employ them. The government was responding
to a long-standing demand by employers' organisations by giving them the
possibility of having available a very flexible labour force adjustable to
fluctuating orders.
Thousands are also recruited every year in the United
Kingdom from April to November under an official entry scheme. There are
Latvians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Poles, Czechs and Belarussians. They are
paid the minimum wage, which is nevertheless substantially more than they could
hope to earn in their own countries. British farmers do extremely well out of
this, considering them to be reliable and good workers, especially when the
problems they have recruiting locally are borne in mind. As one put it, local youngsters of 18
have no desire to work on a farm and, anyway, are such poor workers they can
only be asked to perform the simplest tasks, such as picking daffodils[122]. Here too, in May 2002, the Home
Secretary announced an increase in the quota. While some farmers go through
official channels and recruit legally, many use intermediaries who very quickly
provide them with day-labourers, many of them non-documented. In Italy, the
quota was set at 83,000 for 2001. In the first five months of the year, 47,000
nationals of non-EU countries had already obtained temporary residence permits
for seasonal work.
Germany was the first to promote this type of
initiative, in the late 1980s. Since the fall of the Wall in 1989, in order to
respond to migratory pressure from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
in its best interests, it drew up a series of innovative measures to favour the
use of foreign workers, under the cloak of temporary employment contracts under
bilateral co-operation agreements. Agreements of this type which opened access
to its labour market to their citizens on certain conditions were concluded
with the Central and East European countries[123],
the Baltic States and Turkey. Examples are the contracts which set quotas for
labour bilaterally each year, taking account of the needs of German
enterprises. The Central Association of the German Construction Industry
estimated that more than 130,000 workers, considered by many to be in direct
competition with the national labour force, were recruited in the years
1990-1992. In 1992 the SPD demanded that their number should be limited to
100,000. In 1995, the overall total was set at 57,000. The most recent such
contracts are those concluded with Latvia, Macedonia and Romania.
These agreements were immediately the subject of
controversy. The SPD and the IGban union criticised them for infringing the
rules on competition and lowering wages. The advantage of this type of contract
is that the contracting enterprise does not have to pay the contributions to
the construction industry social insurance fund provided for in the collective
agreement, which are used to finance leave, benefits, vocational training and
supplementary pensions. The persistent complaints by unions, certain employers
and politicians about the increase in illegal employment resulted in an Act
being passed (18 December 1992) authorising the officials of the Federal Labour
Office and other services to inspect companies employing foreign workers. The
aim was to strengthen legislation on work permits and see that foreign workers
had the same pay and conditions as their German colleagues. A 1994 amendment to
the Order on residence permits empowered the Federal Minister of Labour to link
the number of work permits issued for construction industry contractual workers
to the total size of the workforce of the company concerned. The objective was
to protect the interests of small and medium-sized national enterprises. The
measure was clearly inadequate. For a whole week in March 1997 tens of thousands
of construction workers protested in Berlin against "wage dumping",
and on one occasion even tried to attack foreign workers.
Association agreements preparing for membership of the
EU were signed with the candidate countries of Eastern Europe[124],
with somewhat similar objectives. They made it possible, inter alia, to depart from the principle of taking
the employment situation into account by introducing a right to settle and
provide services freely. Officially, only workers described as "key
personnel" of the companies concerned were able to benefit from this, on
condition that they had been employed for more than a year. The wish to prevent
illegal immigration was clearly stated by the initiators of the agreements.
They had two objectives with respect to immigration: to curb the movement of
labour and channel the inevitable inflows by offering immigrants a legal
framework. The agreements were presented as contributing to the economic
development of the countries concerned[125]
by liberalising trade. The same preventive objective was central to the
negotiations between the European Union and the Mediterranean countries[126].
The agreement with Tunisia explicitly underlined this, recommending
co-operation on social issues in order to reduce migratory pressure and
re-integrate people repatriated because of their illegal status.
The fact that legal labour immigration (permanent and
temporary) is continuing makes the persistence of illegal working and, indeed,
new illegal employment practices all the more remarkable. Whether or not it is
associated with illegal immigration, illegal employment is highly symptomatic
of the way in which the labour market operates, or fails to operate, in all member
states. It is evidence of the large gap between the supply of and the demand
for labour. Assessments of the phenomenon still vary widely. Generally regarded
as " a scourge"
and "a factor of underdevelopment", illegal working also has its defenders, who see
it as "a sign of vitality" and "a safety valve" making it possible to offset the structural
rigidities of the economy. For the moment, the prevailing position in the EU -
at least the one expressed officially by politicians - is that strong action
should be taken against it.
For a long time the irregularities at issue were
limited to the employment of foreigners without work permits. This explains why
the mechanisms and measures adopted to combat it gave pride of place to
monitoring this type of employment, increasing the penalties for employers,
strengthening inspection of companies and sometimes laying down recruitment
quotas. But first France, then Germany, followed by other member states,
gradually agreed upon a broader approach to "illegal working", which
was considered to include other illegal practices concerning the work and
employment of Community nationals and citizens.
As early as the first half of the 1990s the approach to
illegal working began to change in a growing number of EU countries, which no
longer restricted the term to the employment of foreigners without work
permits. Thus, in 1993 the Luxembourg authorities considered that "the
regulation of flows of workers from third countries is not an end in itself; it
can be used for other purposes such as combating social dumping and the black
economy, and safeguarding health and safety at work"[127].
During the same period it was agreed in Germany that
the employment of foreigners without work permits was not the cause of the
sharp rise in illegal working in the construction industry, and that the
illegalities were to be sought in the area of working conditions, pay below the
authorised minimum, and sub-contracting of dubious legality[128].
As though to strengthen this point of view, the Portuguese government
approached the German authorities to defend the interests of its nationals
employed with no social protection and sometimes without pay in the context of
sub-contracting operations in Germany. The following year the Federal
Government decided to take tougher measures against all forms of illegal
working. The Federal Office for Employment was then given the task of tackling
all the abuses in the social and fiscal domain, using every means available to
it under the Labour Act and the Promotion of Employment Act.
In Italy, it was also demonstrated, but in a different
way, that, far from concerning only foreigners without work permits, employers'
illegal practices also affected people with work permits and, in even greater numbers, Italian
nationals. A study comparing data on work permits and National Social
Protection Institute (INPS) data showed that only half (114,554) the 228,229
foreigners who had work permits in 1991 were declared to the INPS for social
protection purposes as required by the Civil Code and regulations. This
corroborated the observations made by labour inspectors when they visited
companies[129]. Here
again, the most common offences were failure to enter foreigners in registers
of employees and failure to pay social security contributions.
In addition to the traditional employment of
foreigners without work permits, attention has focused on "the abuse of
secondment", in other words the temporary employment of European Union
workers under the conditions prevailing in their countries of origin. In
Germany the unions have for several years been demanding that the labour market
be protected from this form of "salary dumping", which is very common in the
building industry. The authorities then showed themselves to be increasingly
concerned about the spread of new, often more sophisticated, illegal practices,
observed in sub-contracting and provision-of-service operations, in particular
those involving foreign companies: "bogus
self-employed workers", "bogus sub-contracting and unlawful loaning
of staff" and abuse of temporary work.
Using "bogus self-employed workers" involves dissimulating an
employer-employee relationship under the cloak of a commercial
provision-of-service contract. The workers are presented as self-employed but
are in fact used by the company in the same way as employees. This is a common
practice in Germany, Belgium, France and the Netherlands. It makes it possible
both to get round the regulations on the employment of foreigners and to escape
other social obligations incumbent upon employers. It is sometimes made easier
by international agreements and treaties on the freedom to provide services.
"Unlawful loaning of staff" involves one company making staff
available to another in return for money under cover of a sub-contracting
operation. The principal uses the employees placed at its disposal by its
"bogus sub-contractor" without the expense and responsibility
resulting from employing people and, when they are foreign workers, without
complying with the relevant obligations. Such unlawful staff-lending operations
organised by non-EU enterprises taking significant advantage of the development
of transnational provision of services have been observed in a number of member
states.
The unlawfulness of these sorts of operations may
derive from the violation of provisions on temporary work and/or failure to
comply with regulations applicable to foreign employees[130].
It may also derive from failure to comply with the social legislation of the
country in which the service is provided or from the specific prohibition on
lending labour in agreements authorising international provision of services.
As a rule, the speed of performance and high worker mobility which these
practices necessitate make it extremely difficult for inspection services to
intervene effectively.
The transport sector is only one of many providing a
perfect example of these new forms of illegal working where the law is broken
in a combination of ways as a result of transnational activities. Luxembourg is
a sort of hub for the organisation of this type of operation. Furthermore, this
is not a new phenomenon: the Luxembourg Transport Union (the FNCTTFEL) has been
complaining about it for over ten years. In the early 1990s, it began to
protest against the illegal practices of transport companies from other EU
states (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany), fictitiously domiciled in
Luxembourg. Even at the time, one official of the Union estimated that, of the
400 foreign transport companies then established in Luxembourg, no fewer than
250 were, in his words, "letter-box firms". They had the required authorisation and worked
- mainly or exclusively - abroad with drivers who were, for the most part, from
Central and Eastern Europe. They disappeared at the slightest problem and in
any event when their manager was accused of wrongful dismissal or failure to
comply with labour legislation[131].
Illegal practices in the sector take a number of
forms. The simplest is failure to comply with labour legislation and collective
agreements (a driver paid for 173 hours work when he has worked for 416).
Recent checks in Austria confirm the scale of the phenomenon, even if its scale
in Europe as a whole has yet to be established. Half the 600 companies checked
were guilty of exceeding the legal limit on hours and 40 were employing foreign
workers illegally. However, there have long been more innovative and more
serious practices. An example is the use of "driver-managers", who
are often employees (sometimes undeclared) to whom the employer has sold shares
in the company. As the former employees have now become the "owners"
of "their" lorry (purchase, rental, leasing), the employer is no
longer required to affiliate them to social security (the drivers being
responsible for their own insurance) or to comply with the Luxembourg collective
agreement. In order to make enough money to fund their debts, these "bogus
self-employed" people have to work a huge number of hours and drive to the
limits of their physical capacity, with all the risks that involves.
The practice has not been curbed in the last ten years
or so. After the Willy Betz affair, named after the German company that became
famous for this type of operation, the Kralowetz affair, named after an
Austrian company based in Luxembourg, is a new example. This company employed
its Romanian and Polish drivers at salaries that undercut all the competition
and exploited them and exposed them to danger even more than its predecessor,
which had already been prosecuted for unacceptable practices of this kind[132].
Some of the drivers were driving day and night, sometimes up to 30,000
kilometres a month. The recent liquidation of one of the largest French
companies following checks by the Labour Inspectorate and a judicial
investigation showed another "exemplary" case. The investigation
showed that the company (illegally) used Polish drivers to drive its
French-registered lorries. They were employed by a Polish subsidiary and were
(illegally) transporting goods within Europe[133]
for a salary far lower than that paid to French drivers. The Labour
Inspectorate showed that the Polish subsidiary existed only on paper and was
used merely to provide labour.
According to people working in the sector, the practice is very common.
The European road hauliers organisation (OTRE)
criticises the lack of harmony in European social legislation: "There
are, for example, huge differences between social legislation in France (220
hours work per month including waiting, unloading, etc) and Spain (60 hours'
driving per week, not including loading)," complains its President, Jean-Pierre Morlin[134].
The FNTR, the French hauliersí organisation, says, "French companies
can only watch the Willy Betz lorries going by and wonder if this is an example
we should follow or something they should fight." As for the trade unions, they denounce the
effect of the complete liberalisation of road haulage and the heightened
competition that followed it. The spokesperson for the European Federation of
Transport Workers' Unions (FEST) said, "Liberalisation has been
destructive. There is strong
pressure on prices. We're in an industrial relations jungle."
Great hopes are placed in "regulatory"
intervention by Europe. A regulation should soon make a driver attestation
compulsory and begin to tidy up the situation, while the Directive adopted in
February should harmonise maximum driving time at 60 hoursí work per week[135].
Its transposition is planned for 2004. The FEST spokesperson makes a point of
stressing that seven years will have elapsed "between the complete
liberalisation of the sector in 1997 and the transposition of the first major
text setting standards".
For the moment, relocations are numerous and sub-contracting is prospering. A
provisional conclusion can be drawn from the words of a Portuguese driver
sub-contracted to work for a Swedish company under a Portuguese contract
enabling him to be paid far less than a Swedish driver[136]:
"We're immigrants. The Poles work in Portugal. The Portuguese work in
Sweden."
Unfair competition, social dumping, job losses, tax
and social insurance contribution evasion - such are the consequences of the
spread of illegal working, the transnational dimension of which is becoming
ever more clearly established in the EU. As we have seen, the practices
involved take various forms: failure to comply with the social legislation of
the country in which the service is temporarily being provided; the
organisation of international loans of staff in order to evade regulations on
temporary work; abuse of "secondment" and failure to pay social
security contributions; abuse of welfare benefits by people registered as
unemployed and receiving benefit and retired people working in a country other
than the one paying their replacement incomes.
The concept of transnational illegal working put forward to refer to such fraudulent
practices does not therefore refer to a strictly determined, legally defined
homogeneous situation, but covers a wide range of illegal practices to which
the international provision of services may give rise. Conceived in this way, transnational
illegal working is
threatening states' economic and social stability and is prejudicial to the
development of legal employment. Furthermore, foreign service providers'
failure to comply with domestic social legislation may lead national companies
to contest its application in their turn. Awareness of these dangers has led to
the devising of specific legislation and measures and to tighter controls.
There is no question but that the international
provision of services is advantageous for the development of trade between
developed and less developed countries and may eventually curb illegal
migration. However, the risk inherent in the sorts of fraudulent activities
described above cannot be ignored because of, firstly, the lack of resources of
the services responsible for seeing that the legislation in force is complied
with and, secondly, the ambiguity of the concept of "key personnel", which makes it difficult to
determine those who are actually permitted to move around in connection with
the service in question. Here again, the situation is not new[137].
The abuses observed have led, on the one hand, to principals being asked to
take greater care with operations involving sub-contracting chains and, on the
other, to a definition of the terms under which services may be provided by
foreign partners.
Contrary to the objective announced when labour
immigration was halted in the mid-1970s, the declared aim and what has been
said until recently, foreign workers have continued to contribute to economic
development throughout the EU.
This applies even in periods of recession and at times when there has
been a significant rise in unemployment. All countries have organised ways of
using foreign labour in various ways - seasonal work, secondment, the
employment of inhabitants of the border zone and sub-contracting - forms of
employment which, for the host countries, are a rapid, flexible and low-cost
response to demand that may be both specific and occasional. On top of such new
entries, labour markets have also profited from the contribution of foreigners
with the right to a
long-term work permit that is not conditional on the employment situation.
These "favoured categories" are mainly the result of family
reunification, but also include political refugees and those who are sometimes
referred to as "de facto refugees", having obtained permits on humanitarian grounds.
Foreign workers have continued to enter the labour
market legally in almost every EU country for the last 30 years and their
contribution to economic development has been significant and certainly much
greater that is generally admitted. This is true both of the countries with a
long-standing tradition of immigration and of those where it is a newer
phenomenon. Despite this more than significant contribution by legal labour
immigration (whether permanent or temporary), illegal working has continued to
prosper everywhere, whatever the mechanisms introduced to curb it. This
threefold observation - the legal entry of workers, the continuation of illegal
immigration, and the spread and changing patterns of illegal working - explains
why attention has constantly been paid to the regulation of labour immigration,
even though this has for long been pursued under the cloak of the unrealistic
slogan "zero immigration".
On the one hand, control mechanisms have been
strengthened, the powers of the services responsible extended and penalties
made more severe. On the other, recruitment has been facilitated, either by
more flexible application of the laws in force or through new co-operation
arrangements with non-EU countries. To consider labour market needs alone, the
issues involved in a genuine labour policy are more topical than ever, whether
we consider the traditional direct recruitment by a particular company or
contracts for the provision of services. The difficulty remains of the
dividing-line between temporary legal working and illegal working. In this
respect, the control mechanisms countries have adopted have not always proved
effective.
A debate is therefore needed for two purposes: the
first, to establish arrangements for genuine co-operation between the control
services of member states, taking into account the case-law of the European
Court of Justice, which prohibits countries from imposing excessive limitations
on service enterprises for control purposes, on the grounds of the principle of
not restricting free provision of services. The second is to take stock of the
legislation passed, the reorganisation of control services and the
co-ordination of their actions. An attempt should also be made to assess the
dissuasive effect of the new charges and penalties available to the courts.
Although punishment is necessary, it will be futile as
long as it is not supported by constantly renewed prevention. Accordingly,
combating illegal working also means examining the new requirements and needs
stemming from changes in the economic and social sphere in Europe. It means considering
forms of regulation capable of taking new economic constraints into account,
without making any concessions on the social protection of workers and
therefore the cohesion of European societies. There is also a need, this time
with the focus on prevention, for an in-depth analysis of the illegal practices
observed, what they tell us about the functioning of labour markets, and the
means of remedying them, not least by positive, overt regulation of labour
migration. What instruments should be introduced for the purposes of such
regulation? What benefits have the countries most heavily committed to this
path derived from it? What abuses has the implementation of these instruments
revealed? How can they be remedied? What lessons can be drawn for the benefit
of others?
The contradiction between governments' wish to curb
the influence of populists on their electorates and employers' impatience with
the lack of manpower seems to be becoming ever more acute. While the former say
they want to curb immigration, the latter are lobbying for an active manpower
policy. However, politicians themselves have known for a long time that the
slogan "zero immigration" is a myth, even though they say officially
that they are in favour of combating illegal immigration and strengthening
border controls. In order to counter the proposals of the most populist groups,
some have on occasion contented themselves with a simplistic response to a
question they know to be infinitely more complex.
The present debate within the British government is a
good example of an apparently contradictory approach of this kind. It is,
indeed, remarkable to set the stands taken and statements made by the United
Kingdom Chancellor of the Exchequer (Gordon Brown) to the effect that high
rates of growth were in part due to the presence of immigrant labour - which
stressed the benefits to the country of immigration - alongside those of his
colleague the Home Secretary warning of the threat it poses to "internal
security". In other words, the market needs further immigration, but the
electorate does not want it.
In order to justify the maintenance or even
strengthening of restrictive migration policies, the partisans of closure put
forward as arguments the relatively low rate of employment in Europe (61% for
the 15-64 age group; 51% for women) and the number of people unemployed. The
observation is well-founded, particularly since the rather euphoric growth of
the last few years has run out of steam and the situation has started to worsen
again. In June 2002, the unemployment rate in the 12 countries of the euro zone
was 8.4%, ie there were 11.6 million people out of work, a rise of 0.4% over
June 2001[138].
The trouble is that, in the face of unemployment which
is becoming increasingly structural in nature, active employment polices are
not having the hoped-for results, despite their sometimes impressive cost: more
and more vacancies (for both skilled and unskilled workers) are not being
filled and shortages are becoming more acute in some regions and sectors. The
economic upturn at the turn of the millennium accentuated the trend. Everywhere
- not only in the countries experiencing strong growth - employers are putting
pressure on governments, either directly or through their organisations, for a
more active labour immigration policy.
For instance, Ireland, whose economy was flourishing,
was considering the possibility of the immigration of 200,000 skilled workers
over seven years, just as Germany, where the situation was less rosy, decided
to open up jobs (20,000) to high-level computer specialists from India and
Eastern Europe[139].The
situation was so difficult that German company heads[140]
complained of the slowness and complexity of the procedures. Great Britain was
no different and launched a campaign to recruit technicians, offering one-year
renewable visas[141].
In Austria, the research institute Synthesis has estimated that there is a
shortage of 17,600 skilled workers in key sectors such as computer science,
technology and commerce for 2003 alone. In France, in addition to the
consultation initiated by the employersí confederation (Medef) with its
regional federations in order to identify "shortages", important
political leaders[142]
have spoken in favour of opening borders to the most highly skilled. As far
back as 1995 a (government investment) Plan[143]
report - drafted during a period when there was both a difficult economic
situation and mobilisation by the far right - said there was a "shortage
of manpower" which
meant there might be "an upturn in immigration, as was the case from
1950 to 1970". The
government noted employers' demands, in particular those of artisans and SMEs.
In 2001, the Commissariat GÈnÈral du Plan launched a huge seminar on the issue.
The National Institute for Labour, Employment and Vocational Training (INTEP)
is conducting a debate on the subject involving unions, enterprises and
government departments. As Denis Gautier-Savagnac of Medef points out,
"in view of the ageing population, by 2006 companies are going to need
skilled immigrant workers
Ö".
While the rapid changes in information technology and
their effects on the demand for labour led the German authorities to launch an
emergency programme in 2000[144],
the government did not believe the problem of shortages was confined to
computer specialists. Consequently, the Federal Ministry of the Interior gave
an independent committee the task of undertaking a completely impartial study
of all immigration-related issues, including shortages of manpower (nationally
and in the EU) and the possible need, despite the existing training programmes,
to use immigrant labour to ensure that the German economy was competitive. The
committee was therefore required to make all the recommendations it considered
relevant on the subject of "migration, shortage of manpower and
population trends"[145].
Furthermore, the new Immigration Act due to come into
force on 1 January 2003 already provides for a "selection procedure" for foreign workers useful to the
national economy and the programming of entry flows. Selection will be carried out in co-operation with German
consulates abroad. The basic criteria are: good health, a "good
reputation", a
recognised professional qualification and the ability to be financially
independent. A points system is to be introduced to take account, at least, of
age, qualifications, professional experience, family situation, command of the
language, and links with Germany and the country of origin. Priority will be
given to nationals of countries which are candidates for membership of the EU.
This "selection on the basis of points"[146]
will be combined with a system of quotas to be set annually by the new
Migration and Refugee Office in co-operation with the Federal Employment
Office. The new Act provides for the settlement of 50,000 skilled people in
Germany every year. "Highly qualified" foreigners (teachers,
researchers, specialists, etc) will not be subject to this selection procedure,
but will continue to obtain the right to indefinite residence. Furthermore, in
order to avoid "bottlenecks", employment offices will be authorised to admit
quotas of workers on a temporary basis.
The British government also agrees on the need to be
attentive to recent and foreseeable changes in internal and international
labour markets. This policy emphasis is epitomised in the title of Home Office
Aim 6: "Regulation of entry to and settlement in the United Kingdom in
the interests of social stability and economic growth, and facilitation of
travel by UK citizens".
In a lecture at the Institute for Public Policy
Research (IPPR) in September 2000 on the subject of ìUK migration in a global
economyî, the Minister for Immigration, Barbara Roche, stressed that the United
Kingdom was seeing the beginnings of labour shortages in key economic sectors
and that it was in competition for the brightest and best talents - the
entrepreneurs, the scientists, the high-technology specialists who made the
global economy tick.
Noting that international migration was a fundamental
aspect of the global system, which was becoming more and more closely
integrated, she emphasised what she saw as the three major requirements in this
connection: effective controls, a firm, just, credible asylum policy which
fulfilled the country's international duties and could not be exploited by
racketeers, and an immigration policy that responded to real expectations and
emerging needs.
A programme has been decided upon to assess the
sectors where shortages have been recorded. A sort of system to monitor sectors
with shortages has been set up and is periodically updated by the official
authorities concerned. In September 2000, it indicated shortages in the health
professions (doctors, nurses, surgeons, pharmacists and veterinarians), and in
information and communications technology and electronics. Groups are to be set
up to work in specific segments of the labour market to help identify shortages
of skilled staff, see that the provisions governing the issuing of work permits
respond to employers' needs and enable decisions to be taken on firmer
foundations. The first was formed for the information and communications
technology and electronics sector. A plan to attract foreigners with
"exceptional skills" to work in the United Kingdom was under study.
At the same time, in October 2000 steps were taken to
ease procedures for issuing work permits and facilitate the admission of
skilled workers from countries outside the European Economic Area (EEA) who do
not already have the right to work in the United Kingdom. The criteria imposed
on employers for obtaining a work permit have been made less stringent: they
specify the level of skill required to satisfy needs and remove the previous
requirement of having worked for at least two years since completing education.
A pilot programme known as the Innovators Immigration Scheme enables company
heads to open new businesses in the UK. The government has also suggested
holding a public debate on the positive and negative impact of increasing the
number of immigrants. The debate, in which all organisations concerned with
immigration are invited to take part, will be preceded and structured by a
research programme on the subject. The government intends to devise its policy
according to the results of this debate.
Portugal provides a good illustration of this. It is
probably the country where the lack of skills in the population is most serious
and the training system finds it most difficult to respond[147],
despite the government's efforts. Two-thirds of the working population aged 25-
64 have no skills. "The Portuguese lack basic education," complains Francisco Van Zeller,
President of the CIP (Confederation of Portuguese Industry), "Only 40%
of pupils who begin secondary education complete it. The government therefore
needs to undertake long-term structural reform." Furthermore, the very low level of unemployment
in recent years (4%) has encouraged young people to enter the labour market,
especially the building industry, very early. The shortage of skilled manpower
is unquestionably hampering economic growth and puts companies at a
disadvantage in relation to their European competitors[148].
As is the case elsewhere, some employers are demanding a new labour policy from
the government, one that is both more active and more selective. Bilateral
contracts are proliferating at the instigation of the countries of Southern Europe
in agriculture, services and the building industry.
In Italy, the heads of small and medium-sized
enterprises are the ones most concerned about the effects of the new
Immigration Act recently passed by Parliament. It seems to some "to run
counter to the flexibility that is more important than ever, and effectively
bars entrepreneurs from the decision-making process".[149]
They see it as making an already difficult labour market still more rigid. As
for deportation only six months after redundancy, many see it as a heresy since
"we'll lose all the skills the worker has acquired. My problem is being
able to recruit the labour I need. I prefer to recruit someone who's already
here, if he's available, rather than have to take on someone who has to learn
the job and the language from scratch every time I recruit".[150]
Alerted by demographic forecasts, Portuguese
politicians believe a more active immigration policy is needed. Because of the
great sensitivity of the issue, they even want renewed debate on the subject,
preceded by a detailed study. They believe it desirable that the management of
temporary labour migration should eventually be based on specific international
co-operation. For the moment, they are trying to resolve the dilemma facing
them: on the one hand, the obligation to comply with the restrictive
regulations common to all EU member states and, on the other, the perceived
need to relax rules on access to their labour market in order to respond to the
shortages already observed (in the building industry, catering and
agriculture). The system for issuing visas has been reformed and made less
bureaucratic and short deadlines have been set for issuing them. The system for
extending residence has been made more flexible[151]
and a legalisation system enables foreigners without work visas to legalise
their situation[152].
However, in all these cases, the issuing of visas is conditional upon the real
needs of the various sectors. In Slovenia, two recent studies - the annual
report of the National Employment Service and the Economic Research Institute
survey on "free movement of persons in the context of the enlargement
of the European Union"
- confirm that there is a shortage of labour, including unskilled labour, in
the building industry and agriculture, where most jobs are already occupied by
foreigners[153]. Despite
the efforts of the National Employment Service to give nationals priority in
recruitment, the conclusion was that there is a long-term shortage connected
with the structural rigidities of the labour market, in particular for seasonal
work[154].
The greatest demand should be for building industry trades (all trades), in
agriculture for seasonal work, and for high-tech specialities in computing and
information technology. The employment of foreigners in these sectors would
seem to be unavoidable. The new Foreign Labour and Employment Act nonetheless
encourages a strict, selective, approach to recruitment. It favours short-term
contracts (seasonal work and individual projects), but also requires foreigners
to receive equal treatment. More broadly, a medium- and long-term economic
development plan for the Republic of Slovenia is being drawn up which should
provide the basis for a new employment and immigration strategy[155].
It is not only government officials who concern
themselves with forward management: enterprises are far more imaginative in
this respect and have no hesitation in arranging for supply at the lowest cost
and in their best strategic interests at local, regional and global level. The Global
Resources programme that IBM, one of the world's largest computer
companies, has been implementing for two years is a good illustration of this.
The objective is to respond both to the shortage of computer specialists and to
competition from countries with low wage costs by providing itself at global
level with a sort of pool of specialists who can be called upon according to
need and for the duration of a particular task. They are employed by a computer
engineering and maintenance company[156]
and "seconded" to the "client" for a few months in order to
fulfil an "exceptional short-term assignment". They leave once the job is done,
often having obtained other sub-contracted work that they can do at home. Each
country involved applies the programme according to the labour legislation in
force.
IBM France regularly uses a large number (100 to 150)
of such "seconded" foreign employees (Vietnamese, Indians, Algerians,
Belorussians, Czechs and Hungarians). They are paid by their employer at the
rate prevailing in their country, which is far less than the minimum under
French agreements. The intermediary "employers" are computer engineering
and maintenance companies that already exist or have been specially set up[157].
Michel Antoine, social affairs manager of IBM at Corbeil-Essonnes[158],
explains straightforwardly: "If we didn't do it officially and in a
structured way, we'd still do it, perhaps not altogether legally. The use of
these foreign computer specialists enables us both to respond quickly to our
customers' needs, and therefore increase our market share, and to get the
better of any prospective competition." A study has shown that such "foreign
sub-contracting"
allows "costs to be rationalised and makes for flexibility" and represents a saving of 13% of
the cost of operations. The unions denounce the practice as "trafficking
in manpower". The
funniest thing is that the IBM works council at Corbeil-Essonnes has accepted a
contract of the same type for the development of its Internet site with an
Algerian company, which has seconded computer specialists to the company, who
then go back and do the work at home.
These shortages do not only affect the computer
professions and industry but also - and seriously - health workers in both the
public and the private sectors. The situation is serious in clinics and old
people's homes in Germany, while the United Kingdom has negotiated the recruitment
of nurses with Poland. France recruits in Spain but is threatened with still
greater problems in the next few years if nothing is done to compensate for the
consequences of the Act on the 35-hour-week and future retirements. Many
hospitals are already functioning only thanks to foreign doctors (most of them
from non-EU countries) who are generally on call in casualty and on the wards.
There are already more than 4000 such doctors, who are indispensable for the
running of public hospitals. In April 2002, in order to attract public
attention to their working conditions and highly uncertain future, they called
a strike, refusing to provide non-urgent care and do administrative work. A new
health professions demography observatory needs to be set up to assess the
imbalances in certain specialities and regions and propose solutions.
The demand is the same in the transport sector, which
has used employees from Eastern Europe for many years. In September 2001, the
Promotrans group opened a school of logistics in Budapest to respond to the
needs of French companies in Eastern Europe and it is planned to set up a
similar school in Poland. A Bordeaux company renting out vehicles with drivers,
GT, has set up in Ukraine and Belorussia. This was apparently done after
attempts to recruit drivers in France failed, although they included an
advertising campaign to attract young people through town halls, sports clubs
and integration associations. The director of the company's own school clearly
states the reasons for the project: "We want to find young people to
drive our lorries, not to make savings. They will be employed under the terms
of French legislation and we're prepared to train them".
So, despite an unemployment rate of 8.5%, shortages
are making themselves felt throughout the EU, although the sectors concerned
vary from one country to another (health, transport, information technology,
the hotel industry, etc)[159].
Things seem to be all the more difficult because national training systems are
not reacting quickly enough to the speed of technological change and seem
unable to respond to demand, at least for the moment. Attracting skilled
foreign workers who are immediately available to fill vacancies has therefore become
a major issue. There is now fierce competition between Europe, North America
and Australia to attract skilled people from the Southern hemisphere. The
classic outcome is to make countries of origin bear the burden of training and
thus run the risk of ruining a significant part of their development efforts.
This shows the extent to which the security policy
which has for twenty years being trying to curb immigration is unable to meet
the challenges of the times[160],
particularly since demographic factors are now adding to this problem. In 1999,
natural growth in the EU - 266,000 - was the lowest since the war. Some
countries (Italy, Germany, Sweden, Spain) already had a net decrease[161].
Without immigration, these countries would already be facing a fall in
population[162]. Others
(France, the Netherlands, Finland) seem likely to be able to escape this for a
few more years. With 7.3 births per 1000, Ireland had the highest birth rate in
the EU in 2001, followed by France (4.2).
According to Eurostat, in 2001 the population of the
EU increased by 0.4%, or 1.5 million people, three quarters of whom were from
third countries. The natural growth rate has been lower than the rate of
migration since 1989. Switzerland is a good illustration of such demographic
dependence on immigration: despite a falling birth rate, the population of the
Swiss Confederation continued to rise in 2001 (+0.8%) as a result of rising
immigration and a fall in emigration[163].
The result was that net migration doubled as compared with 2000. At the end of
2001 the foreign population had reached 1.457 million, ie 33,432 more than the
previous year (+2.3%), which more than compensated for the fall in the excess
of births over deaths. Moreover, the population with Swiss nationality is
growing only through naturalisations[164].
Be that as it may, by 2015 profound democratic change
will be making itself still more clearly felt throughout Europe. The proportion
of the population over 65 will be around 22%, as against 16% today and the
population of working age will have fallen sharply. In Italy, for example,
where Parliament has just passed a very restrictive Act, experts agree that all
the foreigners now living in the country (legally or illegally) will not be
enough to compensate for the fall in the country's birth rate: 9.4 births per
1000 per year, the lowest in Europe. Without immigration, the population of
Italy may fall from 58 million to 52 million by 2050. The situation seems to be
identical in Germany. Measures are now being studied there to anticipate the
effects of the ageing of and expected decline in the population. The steady
fall in the birth rate and the steady rise in life expectancy are causing
significant changes in the age structure of the population. According to the
estimates available, the number of people of working age will continue to rise
until 2012 and decrease steadily thereafter.
Here again, however, things are not so simple since,
while foreigners contribute significantly to birth rates in European countries,
experience has shown that this is true only for a short time, so quickly do
they model their reproductive behaviour on that of the host country.
Furthermore, while it is hoped that a mass influx of foreigners in the short
term will compensate for demographic shortfalls at least to some extent, more
attention should be paid than in the past to their reception and integration,
otherwise discrimination and social exclusion will increase. In Switzerland it
is believed that migration policy should not be the only instrument for compensating
for the slow increase in the working population. The authorities also want to
increase the proportion of people (especially women) working and improve
company productivity.
In any case, all, or almost all, European governments
- supported by a large proportion of employers - are reviving their manpower
policies. Officially, they are trying to be very selective with respect to new
arrivals, giving priority to the most highly skilled. Some also operate a
policy of "quotas",
reviewed according to the economic situation, for unskilled jobs (building,
agriculture, cleaning, the food industry, hotels and catering) since demand is
at the two extremes of the labour market. Indeed, this is what radically
distinguishes present times from the period of the great waves of economic
immigration in the 1960s.
The annual report of the OECD[165]
confirms the sharp rise in the migration of skilled and highly skilled workers
in 1999 and 2000, sustained both by the favourable employment prospects and by
the relaxation of conditions of entry. We cannot, however, ignore the fact that
this accelerated "brain drain" which is emptying countries of origin
of the forces essential for their development represents a real danger for the
future[166]. The
example of India is highly significant. It can certainly pride itself on being
the world's foremost exporter of skilled manpower. Once they have finished
their training, great waves of computer scientists emigrate to take up jobs
abroad every year. More than 50% choose the United States and about 20% the EU,
mainly the United Kingdom.
India is thus a veritable pool of technicians and
engineers who have been trained in English and offer high productivity for a
cost that undercuts all competition. In the United States American engineers
are paid two to three times more than their Indian equivalents. By employing
these immigrants, companies save at least one third of the cost of their
project. This explains why Microsoft USA employs some 3000. The contracts
offered are usually fairly short-term (two to three years). This tapping of the
brightest and best does not only take place in India. The International
Organization for Migration estimates the number of teachers, engineers and
doctors leaving Africa every year at 20,000, although the continent needs a
million more engineers and scientists for its development. Even Nigeria, the
richest country, has not been able to prevent the exodus of about 40,000
graduates.
As we have seen, Western countries are openly
organising the departure of the most highly skilled[167]
at the risk of aggravating the difficulties of the countries of origin. In turn, this will only increase the
wish to leave among intermediate categories who have no prospects of promotion
at home. We therefore have to find new forms of co-operation so that the
expansion of international labour migration can be used as a spur to
development, and make sure there is a fair distribution of the resulting
profits. There will be no true co-operation and no regulation of migration if,
as always, the host countries reap all the benefits (arrival of the most highly
skilled, savings on training costs), leaving the countries of origin most of
the disadvantages (departure of the most highly skilled, investment in
education with no return, impeded development, policing and social manipulation
of the least skilled). If we want to go at least some way towards correcting
this unequal distribution, it is the very philosophy of co-operation which has
to be rethought in such a way as to foster what the OECD calls the double
horizon principle[168]
applicable to migrants trained abroad and then helped to take part in the development
of their countries of origin[169].
This means, firstly, favouring the return of the most
highly skilled people, who can take back with them their new skills, the
network of contacts they have made in international scientific circles and,
possibly, private capital for investment, and the OECD report gives examples of
the important role returning emigrants have played in the accelerated expansion
of high technology sectors in Chinese Taipei, South Korea and Ireland. It also
means assisting the development in countries of origin of public or private
innovation and research bodies, and high-level university centres to interest
and attract back highly skilled nationals living abroad[170].
In order to do this, financial aid might be given to students to put the finishing
touches to their education abroad. This could be accompanied by a clause
committing them to return for a set period, as in the case of the study grants
offered in return for a commitment to work in the public services for the first
few years of working life. There are some programmes based on this overall
rationale[171]: they
should be reviewed and repeated elsewhere when their results are positive,
abolished if they are not and, above all, allocated the means appropriate to
the stated aim.
A programme has been set up in Germany to use the
experience of skilled immigrants to aid the development of their countries of
origin by setting up small and medium-sized enterprises encouraged by the
Federal Government. Funds have been allocated to a permanent credit fund for
people who wish to set up (or buy) a business, on condition that an equal
contribution is made by the partner country of origin. Skilled workers who are
interested may obtain a low-interest personal loan from the German investment
and development company (Deutsche Investitions und Entwicklungsgesellschaft)
and the partner national bank. Applications for loans are assessed on the basis
of the investment project, the moral guarantees provided by the borrower, and
his or her solvency. The maximum amount of the loan varies from country to
country. For example, for Slovenia, it may be up to DM300,000 and for Vietnam
DM100,000. 8,292 loans have already
been granted and more than 67,345 jobs created; this represents a total of
DM705.6 million, 364.3 million of which have been loaned by Germany. Bilateral
agreements have been made for the programme's implementation with the following
countries: Turkey, Chile, Eritrea, Albania, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Slovenia,
Macedonia, Vietnam and the Palestinian Authority (an agreement with
Bosnia-Herzegovina is in preparation).
However, the new co-operation arrangements need to go
further than commitments by nation states, necessary though such commitments
are. The low level of government aid for the development of the poor countries
means that international co-operation initiatives by local and regional
authorities are all the more valuable. Here again, they are taking advantage of
the gradual extension of their powers even if it means encroaching on what used
to be regarded as the preserve of central government. The "troisiËmes
assises de la co-opÈration dÈcentralisÈ"[172]
which were held in Paris in December 2001, provided an opportunity to review
the situation, draw a few lessons and elicit some hope for the future.
The first lesson of the meeting was to emphasise the
unknown scale of such initiatives. A great number of regions have included them
in their public policies and, more important still, they do not suffer from
changes in the party in power. The principal merit of such initiatives is that
one partner learns about the rule of law and the other about democratic
scrutiny. In order to be authorised, every project must be long-term and
executed at every stage in
co-operation with the partners concerned. The ongoing exchange of international
information between the partners, the development of co-operation networks and
monitoring by local civil society of the projects they have helped to draw up
are the essential criteria for equitable exchange and true partnership and are
even more important than the cost of the project. As Paul Allies, professor of
politics at Montpelier University, points out, "A new type of
governance might be invented in this way. [Ö] a form of democratic governance
promoting the idea of local government mobilising the human and social
resources scattered over nameless territories. This would be the manifestation
of good globalisation practice ". Three areas are favoured: local development, training and
health, along with improving public management.
The twofold advantage of this type of co-operation is,
firstly, that it is more flexible and easier to adapt to the situation on the
ground than governmental or international aid and, secondly, its greater
reliability than some voluntary sector and humanitarian commitments. For
example, funding by French local authorities has been supplemented by funds
from the European Union and the French government[173].
But this co-operation is intended to be more than a mere (technical or
material) contribution by the North to the South. It is distinguished from
traditional aid by the ambition to initiate a relationship of exchange based on
a true partnership profitable to both parties. Its promoters call this reciprocity. Some of the operations undertaken with
young second-generation immigrants have proved particularly fruitful in this
respect and municipalities derive two benefits from them. The first has been
greater mobilisation of the whole population around the theme of the
integration of migrants. The second, a corollary of the first, has been
increased respect for and self-esteem among the young second-generation
immigrants, who have acquired a "feeling of social usefulness".
Co-operation with the South can thus help to inculcate citizenship in the
North.
[Similarly, but on a different level, it is worth
citing the twofold outcome of the action that has been taken for over 20 years
by a group of some 15 villages in Normandy on the Boos Plateau (east of Rouen)
for the benefit of the dÈpartement of GuibarÈ in Bam province, Senegal, with
financial support from local firms and the Council of the dÈpartement of Seine-Maritime. The first result,
remarkable in itself, is the transfer of about 300,000 francs every year that
doubles GuibarÈ's budget. The second, less foreseeable, is that, in return,
this has fostered co-operation among the Normandy municipalities on water
distribution and the management of lower secondary schools, for example. It has
been a genuine success in the eyes of the instigator of the twofold
co-operation, Mr Max Martinez, mayor of one of the municipalities involved:
"The climate has changed. Now when a village organises a day to support
Africa, three-quarters of the population attend".] (Bilan pratique,
CitÈs-Unies France, December 1996).
The private sector also provides thought-provoking
examples of schemes to develop
co-operation based on mutual respect. Here again, the initiatives fill in the
gaps in, and sometimes even make up for the failures of, international aid. The
industrial ìworker and mateî system linking enterprises in the North and the
South is one of the most interesting in this respect. The objective is to help
wealth-generating small enterprises in the South to overcome their lack of
commercial competitiveness (lack of trained managers and executives and lack of
appropriate financing), and understand market mechanisms better and the rules
of competition they impose.
The experiment was started by the Centre for the
Development of Enterprise (CDE), a joint institution of the European Union and
the ACP (Africa-Caribbean-Pacific) countries set up 25 years ago to encourage
the development of small and medium-sized industrial enterprises in the 77 ACP
countries. The CDE has worked in France, Spain and Austria and is concerned
only with the private sector. In France, there has been collaboration with the
association Enterprises et DÈveloppement[174] and, since 1996, 130 ìworker and mateî
schemes have been established between French and African SMEs, generating a
turnover of about Ä6 million with public funds amounting to Ä600,000. The
President of the Entreprises et DÈveloppement network, Jean-Claude Sitbon, comments on the
initiative in the following terms: "We want to replace the usual
customer-supplier or Southern project-Northern investor relationship by
bringing together firms in the same line of business. [Ö] The quality of the
links forged between the people concerned has enabled us to combine the search
for profit and the transfer of knowledge". A new programme in the commercial, technical
and financial fields concerning the countries of north-west and French-speaking
Africa was announced on 19 May 2002.
The dream of favouring the return to their countries
of some emigrants and, better still, avoiding the "forced emigration"
of those who are still there has no chance of being realised if both the former
and the latter are not given the possibility of seeing their individual
initiative and choice embodied in a collective strategy that gives them back
hope by ensuring that there is a meaningful objective - that of a future for
their countries. In other words, the reverse of the outcome of fifty years of
development policy. The conclusion reached in recent years, namely that it has
failed utterly, is beyond question.
This was, for example the conclusion of the second
European Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE) held in Paris
in June 2000[175] on the
theme Development Thinking at the Millennium. The figures are damning: more than one billion
people on the planet live on less than $1 a day; the GDP of sub-Saharan Africa
(with a population of 750 million) is barely more than that of Belgium
(population 10 million) and its road network inferior to that of Poland, while
only slightly more than half the population (58%) has access to drinking water.
These figures illustrate the utter failure of the international community.
The World Bank clearly expresses this failure in its
latest annual report, World Development Report 2000-2001: Attacking Poverty[176].
The average income of the 20 richest countries is now 37 times that of the 20
poorest. This gap has doubled since 1960. A total of 2.8 billion people live on
less than $2 a day and 1.2 billion on less than one dollar.
A quarter of the world's children suffer from
malnutrition. In Africa, the average per capita income has fallen since the
1960s. In 1960, 20% of the world's richest people had incomes 30 times that of
the 20% poorest - in 1995, they were 82 times higher. According to the UNDP[177],
in 1980 the 1.3 billion people living in the poorest countries were on average
22 times poorer than Americans. Twenty years later, they are 86 times poorer!
Thus, contrary to the prevailing argument among
ultra-liberal Americans, "macro-economic growth" is not automatically
accompanied by a general improvement in the standard of living. While
globalisation in its present form has undeniably increased trade, it is equally
clear that it has made inequalities still greater[178].
The action of the international financial institutions
which have given themselves the mission of liberalising the markets of the
whole planet is now being compounded by the more direct actions of the large
multinational companies with their repeated relocation operations. Right from
the start, when companies are moved to a new location they upset local balances
completely. They destabilise economies, wreak havoc with existing productive
co-operation, change the status of workers, and accentuate the dependence of
the countries concerned and their populations on the outside world. When the
second phase comes along - abandonment for lack of sufficient profitability -
the consequences are still more brutal. The economic organisation is destroyed
even more quickly than it was set up and this exposes, if indeed there was any
doubt about it, its essential instability.
The "maquiladoras" of Northern Mexico are a perfect example of
this. The objective was to take maximum advantage of extremely low wage costs,
customs exemptions and the proximity of the United States for the export of
their products. Millions of immigrants from the interior were
"attracted" there to serve as cheap labour. This led to massive
migration within the country and through Mexico from neighbouring countries.
Now that the system considers them less "profitable", the "maquiladoras" are closing in their hundreds or
even thousands, without any particular concern for the people employed. Since
profitability is greater elsewhere, a new relocation process is under way with
no regard for the social consequences either in the country that is being left
or the country to which they are going - temporarily.
This is also a factor in international migration,
which is not entirely caused by overpopulation. The unemployment and
impoverishment which result from these strictly financial relocations are the
ideal stimulus for further internal, transnational and international migration.
But here again there is rigorous selection: not everyone leaves, far from it;
and not everyone goes where they want to go. Contrary to appearances, there is
always more logic than incoherence and anarchy in international migration, even
if the logic is not the same today as it was in the middle of the last century.
Added to this are the effects of military and civil
conflicts arising from the geopolitical reorganisation accompanying
"globalisation". From the fall of the Soviet empire to the Great
Lakes conflicts, such geopolitical reorganisation also contributes to the
acceleration, sometimes in more violent forms, of population movements, with
more coherence than might appear in the exactions perpetrated. Selection is
still more rigorous here. Not everyone is able to go everywhere with impunity.
And, globally, poverty remains poverty.
On the eve of the Monterrey summit, the 260 NGOs at
the Global Forum on Financing the Right to Sustainable and Equitable
Development called for thorough-going reform of aid. "The rules have to
be changed to stop the haemorrhage from the poor countries," said Alejandro Villamar, one of the
Mexican organisers.
One cannot avoid underlining the irony of history that
has made Mexico the theatre of a dream, followed 20 years later by
disillusionment. From Cancun (1981) to Monterrey (2002), the Utopia of a "new
world economic order"
has been replaced by the imperative of "attacking poverty", with as background the unavoidable
observation that inequalities have steadily worsened over the intervening 20
years and the fear that they are the most fertile breeding-ground for blind
terrorism against the "wealth" of the West.
It is no less remarkable that we had to wait until the
beginning of the third millennium for the World Bank, whose mission it is, to
try at last, as its President James D. Wolfensohn put it, ìto expand the
understanding of poverty and its causesî and study what needs to be done to meet the
challenges of reducing poverty. One figure is sufficient to illustrate this
challenge: in 20 years the number of poor people - those living on less than $2
a day - has increased by 50%. There are now more than 2.4 billion, ie almost
40% of the world's population[179].
It should also be stressed that the preparation of the
report[180], which
took more than two years, was based on a study entitled Voices of the Poor, which took evidence from more than 60,000
deprived men and women in 60 countries. While we must welcome this initiative,
it may seem surprising that we have had to wait so long to understand at last
that those most concerned have something to say about their situation and
needs. We "discover" from the document that the following must be
included in the definition of poverty: powerlessness, inability to make one's
voice heard, vulnerability and fear - in a word, human rights.
This remark is taken from the World Bank report and
represents a turning-point in what was previously a very dogmatic approach to
development. The Senior Vice President of the World Bank, Nicholas Stern, was
particularly clear on this point when he said it was clear that economic growth
was crucial to sustained poverty reduction, but that institutional and social
change was of fundamental importance in strengthening development processes and
integrating poor people.
Like the UNDP [United Nations Development Programme],
the World Bank agrees that development should no longer be subordinated to the
primacy of economics and believes,
on the contrary, that it is useful to improve public and social institutions
and health and education infrastructure. The aim is to attack inequalities in
this way and, above all, involve the poorest people in the benefits of growth[181],
a requisite if they are to be able to contribute to it in return. The more
inegalitarian a society is, the more urgent the need to make it fairer if
poverty is to be reduced quickly.
Accelerating globalisation and the financial crises of
1997-1998 have highlighted the perverse effects of previous policies. "They
led to a reduction in public spending on health and education in the name of
reducing budget deficits, and consequently to an increase in poverty and
inequality. Globalisation is not simply about the opening of borders: it also
means the growing influence of the market, the retreat of the Nation-State, the
difficulty of setting up forms of supranational power able to direct it and a growth
of the grey areas that it produces and on which it feeds," points out Jacques Valier, a
lecturer at the University of Paris-X-Nanterre and a member of the CAE. "Globalisation
is increasingly exclusive,"
he adds.
It was the recession in Asia in 1997-1998 which first
revealed the serious weakness in the prevailing wisdom and led to severe
internal criticism of the infallibility of liberal policies[182].
The criticism was all the more pertinent for having been voiced by Joseph
Stiglitz, at that time Chief Economist at the World Bank, who took issue with
the "Washington consensus"[183]
on which economic policies based on the triptych of liberalisation,
privatisation and deregulation had been founded since the 1980s, with almost
complete power over the conduct of budgetary policies in the indebted countries[184].
In fact, the challenge is to rethink the very concept
of development, first of all accepting that it cannot be reduced to per capita
GDP but includes as preconditions democracy, respect for human rights and
access to knowledge, and then accepting that previous policies have failed;
that the traditional financial aid policy[185],
like the so-called "structural adjustment"[186]
policies, the social cost of which proved counterproductive, has failed. And,
lastly, accepting that public financial aid alone is incapable of combating
poverty[187].
Rethinking development also means denouncing the
attitude of the rich countries that call for the development of trade but close
their doors to exports from poor countries either by imposing prohibitive
customs duties or by engaging in unfair competition through their
"subsidy" policies[188].
The debate on the CAP in the EU is a good illustration of this. It is estimated
that the subsidies in the OECD countries are costing the poor countries $20
billion, the equivalent of 40% of foreign aid in 1998. As Nicholas Stern, Chief
Economist at the World Bank, says, there is a need for new policies.
The simplistic strategies of economism should be
replaced by a new approach that gives redistribution, social protection,
education and health their rightful place, an approach that admits that there
can be no true development without the rule of law, as a guarantor of equality
of opportunity and equitable treatment for the whole population[189].
This means that public action and democratic guarantees have to be strengthened
by enhancing the role of the state but, because the state is not free of the
risk of "corruption" and experience shows that it often attaches
little importance to the rule of law, civil society must be fully involved in
implementing development projects in order to force the state to be more
"transparent". The programme is huge: fostering access to information,
promoting equality between the sexes, working towards real progress in
education and health.
This is what the President of the World Bank seemed to
be saying at the opening of the ABCDE conference: "development is
multi-faceted Ö the experience and determinants of poverty are
multi-dimensional. A better quality of life for the poor calls for not only
higher incomes; it also requires individual security and empowerment; improved
and more equitable opportunities for education and jobs; better health and
nutrition; a cleaner and more sustainable natural environment; a
well-functioning judicial and legal system; greater civil and political
liberties and freedom".
This statement is echoed in the letter addressed to
their "Excellencies, the members and officials of Europe" by Yaguine Koita and FodÈ Tounkara,
the two Guinean boys found dead on Monday, 2 August 1999 at Brussels airport in
the undercarriage of a Sabena aircraft. They were 14 and 15 years old; they
were also "illegals".
"We ask you to come to the aid of
Africa. Help us, we are suffering enormously in Africa. Help us, we have
problems and the rights of the child are not always respected. The sorts of
problems we have are war, disease, malnutrition, etc.
"As for the rights of the child, in
Africa, especially in Guinea, we have schools, but a great lack of education,
except in the private schools, where you can get a good education and good
tuition, but you need a lot of money and our parents are poor [Ö]
"So, if you see that we are
sacrificing ourselves and putting our lives at risk, it's because there's too
much suffering in Africa and we need you to fight against poverty and put an
end to war in Africa."
Immigration is unquestionably one of the major future
challenges for Europe, which must manage the contradiction between its
(economic and social) needs and the state of public opinion, ever more inclined
to link "foreigners" and "insecurity". Faced with these
challenges, the history of the last two decades teaches us that a policing
response alone is inadequate, not to say ineffective.
This is all the more true now that Europe is receiving
twice the number of asylum-seekers it did ten years ago[190]
and is looking at how it can recruit new immigrant workers to make up for the
shortage of labour in certain sectors as well as how to deal with a demographic
deficit in the not too far distant future.
Furthermore, the risk of relying exclusively on a
clamp-down has not escaped the interior ministers themselves. After the Rome meeting
preparing for the Seville Summit, the French minister advised against "going
from being too soft to becoming a fortress Europe, which, in any case, wouldn't
work" and rejected
the idea of "zero immigration". His Italian counterpart, Claudio Scajola, added,
"We don't want Europe to become a fortress, but to promote a model of
integration that will guarantee the security of our citizens in our common
area."
In addition, experience shows that a policy and
rhetoric that give priority to "security" have the twofold
disadvantage of exacerbating the atmosphere of mistrust towards foreigners and
people who are presumed to be foreigners[191]
and lending credence to the unrealistic, if not fallacious, idea that
"zero immigration" is possible. The serious consequence of this idea
is that it lends substance to the idea of "total closure" whereas, in
reality, Europe has constantly admitted thousands of foreigners to its
territory legally, whether for work, for the purposes of family reunification
or by granting them asylum. In recent years, there has been an average of some
700,000 such entries per year, to which of course must be added those who are
non-documented and wrongly referred to as "clandestine".
While the right of countries to control access to their territory cannot be questioned, the European Union can no longer delay the development of a proper common policy clearly setting out the conditions of entry, reception, residence and employment of the people it attracts and whom its labour market is demanding. The OECD report of March 2001 confirms this by showing the concomitance between the return to economic growth since 1997 and the acceleration in the influx of foreign workers.
In a communication of 22 November 2000 on a Community
immigration policy, the European Commission emphasised the importance of the
issue and the urgent need for decisions. It pleaded for a harmonisation plan
that would respond to the Union's economic, demographic and social imperatives,
which are all the more pressing in view of the impending enlargement of the EU
and in particular its ageing population.
Transparency on this point is absolutely essential.
This means, firstly, removing the confusion and stopping people from lumping
different situations together. Public opinion should be clearly informed about
the diversity of immigration-related situations and the subject should no
longer be dealt with as though asylum applications, family reunification,
labour immigration (legal or illegal), the movement of persons, the social
problems of young people with foreign antecedents, etc were one and the same
thing. Each of these issues corresponds to a particular rationale and needs to
be dealt with by means of specific measures.
Transparency therefore involves explaining that high
unemployment in Europe does not prevent there being sectoral and regional
recruitment problems. It means demonstrating that the refusal to introduce
positive regulation of labour immigration reinforces shortages, fosters
trafficking, impedes growth and the generation of wealth and at the end of the
day penalises job creation and increases the risks of unemployment for
nationals.
Transparency means confronting and informing public
opinion, opening up a broad debate on the subject and confronting taboos. It
also means not allowing people to believe that the illegal landing of would-be
immigrants on the southern coasts of Europe has any connection with offences
committed by young people on housing estates. Combating illegal immigration will
not magically solve so-called "integration" problems. Both require
determined government action, but it is illusory and a political error to
establish a causal link between them.
Transparency is put forward here as a major
political initiative, and probably the only one that might, by regarding
people as responsible, sustainably curb the rise of extremism, the potential
scale and influence of which has been demonstrated in France, the Netherlands,
Denmark, Austria, Italy and elsewhere.
All too often, the effectiveness of measures announced
seems to be less important than announcing them and the media coverage they
receive. The primary concern is that public opinion should be convinced that
governments are intransigent when it comes to making national borders ìsecureî
and protecting them from every "threat". The risk itself is
dramatised in an effort to justify the fact that fundamental rights and
individual freedoms are sometimes infringed. The ideological construct of
immigration as "both an internal and an external threat" may
be considered one of the major phenomena of recent decades. While
"9/11" has buttressed this perception, the logic behind it was
already very much at work before the attack on the World Trade Centre.
There is an unquestionable need to combat illegal
immigration and, above all, the people who profit from it by their trafficking
activities. But allowing it to be believed, as too often happens, that Europe
is being invaded is equally unquestionably to take the risk of playing into the
hands of the populists and xenophobes.
No, Europe is not "taking in all the poverty of
the world"! The poorest are not knocking at its door: they have neither
the means nor the strength to do so: they are confined in the
"South". But if it does nothing about them, it may one day have cause
to regret it. Is this not a good reason to increase, rather than reduce, the
aid allocated for the establishment of new political and social institutions in
the bankrupt or near-bankrupt states?
MILLIONS OF REFUGEES, A BURDEN FOR THE SOUTH
Sources: United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR); World Refuge Survey 2000, US Committee for Refugees (USCR); World Development Report 2000-2001, Washington DC.
Source:
Philipe Rekacewicz, January 2000. Courrier international
One of the main lessons of the analysis of the
policies implemented in recent years is that the wish to appear firm has been
counterproductive. One of the most unfortunate effects has been to push
would-be emigrants into the hands of illegal networks, playing into the hands
of the traffickers who take advantage of the lack of transparency in
regulations and control practices.
A new immigration policy should have the objective of
breaking with the dominant security model in favour of a comprehensive approach
to the question, clearly reflecting the choice of positive regulation of labour
migration, a harmonised asylum policy and greater transparency in their
management.
Greater transparency in the legal framework. In addition to a clear definition of the
rights of each category of migrant, a precise description of the prohibitions
it is intended to impose, coherent measures and a more clear-cut division of
powers among the institutions responsible, it is necessary to take steps to
ensure that the letter and the spirit of the legislation and regulations
introduced are strictly complied with. In this area more than in many others,
arbitrary administrative decisions are without doubt the last thing that is
needed.
Positive regulation of labour migration. The objective here should be to attend
both to the needs of the host society and to the interests of migrants. This
should make it possible to renew "migratory rotation" and boost
investment in countries of origin[192].
It is not simply a matter of returning to the movements current in the middle
of the last century (1960-1970) but much more of assisting the new movements at
work in recent years, opening up a legal path for the strategies of the workers
concerned and giving them security by removing their fear of being refused
admission if they periodically return to their countries.
Avoiding "global apartheid". The injunction by Nigel Harris[193]
expresses the real challenge. Europe, North America and Australia are in fierce
competition to attract skilled workers from the South, at the same time as
unskilled workers are being exposed to increasing hostility. They have little
freedom of settlement, while skilled Èlites can go where they like.
Harmonising asylum and immigration policies. This is obviously one of the major
requirements of the duty to ensure a transparent legal framework. There has to
be an end to the differences, and indeed contradictions, in the regulations,
procedures and mechanisms in force in the various member states. Legislation
and practices differ from one country to another, the bilateral co-operation
put in place is hampered by mutual ignorance, and the departments concerned are
scarcely, if at all, familiar with their counterparts, responsible for the same
tasks and with the same powers of prevention, punishment or investigation. As
we have seen, not only is all this to the great advantage of the traffickers,
but in the eyes of the migrants it undermines the authority of the rule of law.
Remedying this situation means adopting a common framework setting out rules on
reception, processing procedures and definitions of the status of migrants, as
called for at the Tampere Summit.
More guarantees for people needing asylum and
protection. Giving these
men and women greater assurance that their rights will be safeguarded should be
the corollary of improved control of EU borders. This recommendation, made by
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, is essential. As he says, it
means constantly monitoring the professionalism, competence and fairness of the
officials responsible for control. They should be trained to perform this role
in order to guarantee that people are not turned away when they should be
admitted or, worse, sent back to countries where they risk persecution,
imprisonment, torture or death.
Firm commitment to the battle to win round public
opinion. Public opinion is
as yet far from sharing the idea, accepted by experts and even politicians, of
the need for immigration and the corollary of Europe's dependence on it. It
even tends to be open to the opposite message and is strengthened in its view
by the rhetoric of populist and extremist parties, but often also by the
ambiguity of the statements made by certain other politicians and the fact that
they lump different situations together. Bringing round public opinion in order
to gain its support is therefore a major challenge, and one that it is by no
means easy to meet.
[1] The debates in Germany on the reform of Article 16 of the Basic Act in the early 1990s are examples of this, as are the more recent debates on nationality and immigration legislation, officially recognising Germany as a country of immigration.
2 Le Monde diplomatique, No. 478, January 1994, page 21.
[2] Mobility within the EU is declining steadily. Of 375 million Europeans, only 6 million, ie 1.5%, live in a country other than their country of birth. In 2000, only 225,000 people, ie 0.1% of the total population of the EU, changed their official residence to another country. The situation is very different from the United States, where 6% of the population changes county every year.
[3] Eurostat data for 2000.
[4] More than 70% of the 7.3 million foreigners live in the L”nder of North Rhine Westphalia (27%), Baden- Wurtemburg (17%), Bavaria (15%) and Hesse (11%).
[5] See on this point Claude-Valentin Marie,
"Entre Èconomie et politique: le 'clandestin' une figure sociale ý
gÈomÈtrie variable" in Pouvoirs, no. 47, Paris, 1988.
[6] In contrast to the previous situation, when many countries prohibited the departure of their citizens.
[7] Recognised by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and by the United Nations Charter.
[8] Behind drugs, white-collar crime, crimes against property and crime connected with nightlife, but ahead of violence, forgery and arms dealing. Report on organised crime by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
[9] The two protocols to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime.
[10] Draft general resolutions to combat illegal migration/illegal entry / trafficking in human beings.
[11] According to German police investigations, most of the people responsible are foreigners, only 16% being German.
[12] At the end of 2000 the number of visas issued had reached 60,000, as against 30,000 the previous year, total applications being 85,000.
[13] In August 2001, four people, the senior French civil servant, his Bulgarian partner, and a couple running a business in Sofia were under investigation for "assisting illegal residence" and "aiding and abetting procuring". Their misconduct apparently resulted in the issue of tens of thousands of visas.
[14] It is suspected that some of them are directly controlled by traffickers.
[15] The journey to Germany takes between two weeks and three months.
[16] Most of whom belong to the Kurdish minority and come from the North.
[17] Their identity papers are then confiscated for use in other operations. It should be noted that Indians sometimes spend quite a long time in countries of transit.
[18] The most numerous are from China, Albania, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Somalia, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, India, Romania and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.
[19]Most go by air, but some stow away in cargo ships.
[20] The Federal border police, the police forces of the federal L”nder responsible for policing frontiers and the customs authorities all along the German border.
[21] Via Belgium.
[22] Via France.
[23] Along the coastline extending from the mouth of the Saquia al-Hamra to the Moroccan town of Tan-Tan.
[24] Mauritania does not have the resources to police its 3600-kilometre desert border.
[25] Trafficking in migrants is only one part of intensive smuggling. According to a report by the government of the Canaries, Royal Moroccan Armed Forces officers aid and abet these activities.
[26] According to the Moroccan Human Rights Association these departures are an expression of "the despair of Moroccans, more of whom venture abroad every day because of increasing unemployment and poverty.
[27] This is the journey made by Ecuadorians, Venezuelans and Colombians.
[28] African countries with Portuguese as official language.
[29] Recruitment advertisements are published in the leading Kiev, Moscow and Kishinev newspapers by bogus travel agencies. The situation is confirmed by the head of mission of the IOM in Lisbon, who states that they have completely valid Schengen visas issued by the consulates of countries like France, Germany and Spain. Local travel agencies run by the local mafia do all the necessary work. So there is no way they can be turned back. Quoted in Le Point, 21 June 2002.
[30] Who are in Portugal legally and have been for a long time.
[31] The ship, which was carrying hundreds of Kurds was scuttled off the Var coast of France in February 2001.
[32] Going by land over the Greek border costs half as much but is far more dangerous. It is necessary to cross the border at night, avoiding minefields. Once in Greece, migrants must get out of the border area as quickly as possible so as not to be sent straight back to Turkey. The recent readmission agreement between Greece and Turkey has made prospects even more uncertain.
[33] Hence the interest of large organised gangs in this profitable, risk-free form of trafficking.
[34] "Since the Helsinki Summit Turkey has been a candidate country for EU membership and the rules of the game have become harsher. Under the membership partnership, [it has] obligations with respect to asylum and immigration," stresses Luigi Narbonne, adviser to the EU delegation in Ankara.
[35] In the Beyoglu neighbourhood of Istanbul.
[36] The network had been set up in Turkey but its ramifications extended from Italy to countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
[37] Fifteen people were arrested and charged, including five Turks and three Kurds.
[38] 1200 Kurds from Turkey have entered Europe via Italy since January.
[39] Turkey refuses to finance the repatriation of illegal immigrants from countries that are too distant, in particular nationals of African countries. When they are arrested, they are taken to Istanbul and released.
[40] The Turkish authorities regard this as an excellent opportunity to make safe very sensitive areas which for many years were the sanctuaries of Kurdish guerrillas.
[41] Such as in May 2001, when forty bodies were found in a lorry, Le Monde, 20 May 2001.
[42] Ali Bensaad, lecturer at the Institute of Geography of the
University of Aix-Marseille I, researcher at the Institut de recherche et
díetude du monde arabe et musulman (Institute of
Research and Study of the Arab and Moslem World). Le monde diplomatique, September 2001.
[43] In his study, Ali Bensaad observes that there are more and more well-educated migrants (one-fifth of those interviewed).
[44] Departures for Algeria are considered more dangerous and take place in Toyota pick-ups carrying 25 to 30 passengers, which make it possible to escape controls.
[45] The Toubou traders, an ethnic group with more freedom of movement in Libya and many of whom have Libyan nationality, are among the most active.
[46] In 1999, 9500 foreigners who had entered illegally were arrested by the border police, the highest number ever. Half of them were from Afghanistan.
[47] The pressure is felt mainly in the region of the frontier posts of Kapitan Andreevo, Kulata, Ruse, Sofia and Varna.
[48] They are now more numerous than people from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, who formed the majority during the conflicts concerning them.
[49] Except for a few Iranians trying to avoid military service in their country of origin.
[50] If their application is refused, they have to leave the country. Between 1994 and 2000, 6410 people whose applications for asylum had been refused were ordered to leave Lithuania, most of them Russians, Belarussians and Ukrainians.
[51] In some cases court decisions were required for this to be the case, eg that of the Conseil d'Etat in France in 1976.
[52] A resolution on the harmonisation of legislation was adopted in Copenhagen on 1 and 2 June 1993.
[53] In force since 1 January 1998.
[54] Previously, the Home Office was supposed to be informed of suspicious cases by an informal procedure, which was not always complied with.
[55] In Portugal, in the 1992 Act and the Decree of March 1993, in France in the Pasqua Act of August 1993, as amended by the ChevËnement Act of 1998, in Belgium in the Act on access to the territory, residence, settlement and removal of foreigners. In Spain the principle is set out in the Implementing Act of 1985, which gives foreigners the same fundamental rights as nationals. Consequently, the implementing regulations lay down that "the members of the families of foreigners legally resident in Spain shall be able to reside with them". In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the right to family reunification does not appear anywhere in legislation.
[56] In the Netherlands, the law contains no provision on family reunification, which is governed by a circular on foreigners and by case-law. In Spain and France, it has been mentioned in texts establishing legalisation: the ChevËnement Circular of June 1997 and the regulation of February 1993.
[57] The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990).
[58] The conditions are more strict than those for married couples, however. The relationship must be serious and enduring, the partners must live together and both must produce certification of their single status. A foreigner who has settled in the Netherlands must sign a declaration guaranteeing to bear the costs of his or her partner's stay.
[59] Although it is to be feared that its spirit remains and that the habits acquired will not be quickly forgotten.
[60] For example, the compulsory recording of asylum-seekers' fingerprints and photographs when they submit their applications.
[61] The war in Former Yugoslavia did not affect this convergence. After an initial reaction of sympathy and openness "on humanitarian grounds", the imperatives of restriction and selectivity regained the upper hand, the aim being to avoid any breach in the control system that would provoke further population movements.
[62] Countries whose situation seemed to guarantee the absence of political persecution and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
[63] Passed by the Chamber of Deputies on 4 June 2002 and approved by the Senate on Thursday 11 July 2002.
[64] Ten new centres are to be opened. The authorities anticipate a flow of 36,000 people a year.
[65] The previous legislation passed in January 2001 instituted a sort of permanent legalisation, with the offer of a temporary visa on arrival on Portuguese soil.
[66] It includes Christian Democrats of the CDA, liberals of the VVD and populists from the Pim Fortuyn List.
[67] Associated Press, Amsterdam, 16 August 2002.
[68] A third of Dutch people earn less than this.
[69] The clause enables states to decide that the nationals of some countries will no longer enjoy protection as a result of what is considered an improvement in the political situation in those countries. The amendment will therefore consist in increasing the number of countries whose political situation has changed in such a way as to make it unnecessary to grant refuge and protection to their nationals.
[70] Up to now, only refusals by OFPRA have been subject to appeal.
[71] According to a recent poll, 64% of Austrians approve of the requirement to speak German as a sine qua non of the right to live in their country.
[72] The German Minister of the Interior welcomed the change in the French position, which, according to him, had previously been to regard police and immigration issues as being part of "the hard core of national sovereignty".
[73] This course of action had been suggested in the White paper of Ö 1985, but the priorities then were to harmonise visa policy and co-ordinate regulations on the entry, residence and employment of nationals of third countries. Times and concerns have certainly changed!
[74] All the provisions should benefit from the Galileo satellite system due to come into operation in 2006.
[75] Such as the co-operation organised between France and Belgium, and Germany, Italy and Austria at the Brenner Pass.
[76] This body is at present working on legislative harmonisation and does not have any operational role.
[77] The Treaty also advocated improved co-ordination of immigration policy.
[78] As early as the European Council meeting in Tampere (Finland) late in 1999, Italy expressed serious concern about illegal landings of foreigners transported by criminal organisations and stressed that it was unable to halt them single-handed.
[79] Beginning with Greece and its borders with Macedonia, Turkey, Albania and Bulgaria. The Commission will make proposals on distributing the financial burden. The European Commissioner for Home Affairs said that the principle of solidarity had to be strengthened and the burden shared more fairly..
[80] Italy, which has a 7600-kilometre coastline, counted 20,000 illegal landings in 2001.
[81] He believed, however, that member states had first to harmonise their legislation, devise arrangements for genuine co-operation with respect to training and equipment, undertake a joint analysis of the threats and, above all, settle the question of the sharing of costs.
[82] The Laeken Summit entrusted Italy with the task of organising it.
[83] Europol coordinated the operation and centralised the information gathered.
[84] A similar, more limited, initiative had been conducted by Italy and Spain in April.
[85] Many qualified observers believe, however, that, to be successful, combating arrivals by sea requires the co-operation of the countries of transit and embarkation, in particular those which have agreements with the European Union (such as Turkey and Egypt).
[86] It went much further than what is provided for in the Cotonou accords with the countries of the ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) area.
[87] Not to mention the political and legal problems it would create.
[88] In the view of the French minister Nicolas Sarkozy, the EU "cannot simply send out the message that the rich are threatening to punish the poor"; on the contrary, what is needed was "an aggressive development strategy". He publicly supported the statement of the Swedish minister, Jan Karlsson, to the effect that our timetable should not be set by xenophobes. (AFP, Seville, 31 May 2002)
[89] A number of other important measures had already been agreed, such as the establishment of a central database of asylum-seekers' fingerprints (EURODAC), which will be in operation in 2003, the joint visa management policy, common rules on the repatriation of illegals, the principle of fining traffickers and mutual recognition of deportation orders.
[90] Romania and Bulgaria will have to wait until 2007.
[91] Quoted in Le Monde, 3 August 2002.
[92] 217 traffickers were arrested in 2001.
[93] It is in particular a matter of combating the transit of pseudo-businessmen and pseudo-students who have taken advantage of the administrative loopholes in Romania to gain access to the European Union via its territory.
[94] ENFOPOL 118, a training programme for security forces in Central and Eastern Europe, has been set up for the purposes of training, experience sharing and the development of contacts between the police forces of EU member states and candidate countries.
[95] Particularly between Cracow and Lvov, Helsinki and St Petersburg, Iasi in Romania and Chisinau in Moldova.
[97] There are an estimated 400 to 500 new arrivals every week.
[98] The agreement came into force on 24 May of the same year. Five days later the patrols were suspended: the Belgian police refused to lay down their arms in order to patrol in France. "Working groups" have been trying to iron out the problems and in the meantime the officers concerned are to be issued with temporary firearms permits.
[99] The two European ports of Zeebrugge and Calais account for the great majority of European maritime traffic to Great Britain.
[100] Messrs Sarkozy and Blunkett had met several times over the previous months.
[101] This is the case in the Netherlands. If the couple stop living together within the three years following reunification (through separation or divorce), the residence permit is withdrawn. An independent permit will only be issued if the marriage has lasted at least three years with at least one year's residence in the Netherlands within the marriage. This first permit is valid for one year, a "period for seeking employment", and its renewal is subject to the finding of a job. The same rules apply to unmarried partners.
[102] The period may be reduced to three years where failure to issue an independent residence permit would be seriously prejudicial to the individual concerned.
[103] For example, since the Act of 28 June 1984, repeat reunification ("family reunification in stages") has been prohibited in Belgium once two years has elapsed since the time when the right to reunification was exercised.
[104] The right to family reunification is restricted to men in some countries.
[105] In France, for example, the system for family reunification for EU nationals was introduced by a decree of 11 March 1994, while the one for nationals of third countries remains the one established by the Pasqua Act of 24 August 1993. The ChevËnement Act of 11 May 1998 did not introduce any significant change.
[106] For example, the period of marriage required for reunification to be allowed varies (two years in the Netherlands, one in Belgium and France). Only foreigners who are legally resident in Spain and whose residence permit has already been renewed once may apply for their families to join them. If they have permission to work, the work permit must have been renewed at least once. In the Netherlands, a distinction is made between "family reunification" and "founding a family", according to whether the marriage takes place before or after the foreigner has settled in the Netherlands. In the latter case, the foreigner must have at least three years' residence in the country in order to be allowed to form a household there. This condition is not required for "family reunification" properly so-called. Assessment of housing and income criteria is often left to the fluctuating judgment of the authorities. The existence or lack of bilateral agreements with the countries of origin may accentuate discriminatory practices, or make women even more dependent on their husbands (being subject to their husbandsí personal status).
[107] For example, in October 1995 the European Co-ordination for foreigners' right to family life proposed an amendment to the Maastricht Treaty which would have taken the family dimension of immigration into account.
[108] Source, UNITED for Intercultural Action, an international network of more than 500 associations.
[109] The first countries to take this decision were the Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark in 1973, followed the next year by France (circular of 5 July 1974) and Belgium (government decision of 1 August 1974). But the measure concerns only permanent labour immigration and not seasonal immigration, which is still permitted.
[110] In the EU, the notion of "foreigner" applies to nationals of states which are not members of the European Economic Area (EEA).
[111] The authorities have to check that the lists of those registered as unemployed do not include a person capable of occupying the post for which the application for a work permit has been made. This requirement is sometimes accompanied by further restrictions, such as compulsory advertising of the vacancy, the requirement that an employee who is already available be trained or promoted or inspection of the general employment conditions in the company.
[112] They main consequence being the illegal employment of foreigners who have permanent residence permits but who do not have permission to work.
[113] In all cases they have the right at least to a lump sum equal to one month's salary in the event of termination of their contract.
[114] Act of 26 July 1994.
[115] Germany set up the central department for combating the illegal entry of foreigners in the early 1990s in the Directorate of the Federal Border Protection Corps in Koblenz. It gathers and analyses information on, in particular, the nature and scale of illegal entries, the illegal activities of smugglers and the illegal entry and employment of foreigners. Under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, and in co-operation with all the other departments responsible for studying these issues, it devises strategies and measures for the border authorities and other services concerned.
[116] In Germany, since 1 January 1993 (27 June 1993 for the customs service), the inspection services have been able to enter companies without any presumption that an offence has been committed.
[117] Declaration prior to recruitment in France; certified individual form in Belgium.
[118] Parliament rejected the proposal, which would have made departure compulsory after two years, in return for a "return bonus" paid by the state.
[119] Quota systems, recruitment programmes specific to certain sectors, secondment, sub-contracting, and the limited use of foreign workers as part of a rotating migration scheme might also be mentioned here.
[120] The presence of seasonal workers in this sector was a characteristic of Germany for many years as is shown by the number of workers recruited in this way in the 1990s and the relative flexibility of the legislation governing this form of employment. The practice involved foreigners who had already settled and nationals, as well as new migrants brought in for the purpose.
[121] In Germany, for any recruitment of a seasonal worker for more than three months the law requires a work permit issued subject to the state of the labour market.
[122] The Economist, London.
[123] In particular with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.
[124] First with Poland, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic and later with Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia.
[125] In a different context and perhaps less ambitiously, the same desire for renewed co-operation was behind the agreement between Spain and Morocco following the "pateras" affair in 1992.
[126] The countries concerned are Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Israel, the Palestinian Autonomous Territories, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta.
[127] Bill 28/1993.
[128] This was the approach taken at the time by the SPD, which deplored the consequences of the agreements signed with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Werkvertragsabkommen).
[129] In 1993 they visited 29,822 enterprises employing foreigners.
[130] In the early 1990s, in order to avoid this risk, Germany introduced the requirement that foreign workers should receive equal pay for equal work as compared with German workers, otherwise the work permit would be refused. In most EU countries, compliance with the social legislation of the country in which the service is provided is not a matter of course. This is because of uncertainty as to the law applicable to the employment contract and the difficulties of monitoring the situation. A Community directive has been adopted on the subject. The problems of monitoring remain: their resolution would require genuine co-operation between the countries concerned.
[131] Delays in court proceedings (several years) guaranteed them a long period of impunity.
[132] The directors of Kralowetz were given prison sentences.
[133] After performing their assignments, they returned to their country by coach.
[134] "The French industry, which was one of the largest in Europe, is experiencing a dramatic fall in market share. Between 1999 and 2000 it lost 25% of its market share. We are generally losing our competitiveness. What happens in France should be the model. It is not healthy to drive for 60 hours a week, but the model is being destroyed."
[135] Provided appropriate checks are carried out to ensure that the rule is applied.
[136] "We do G–teborg - Albacete (Spain). Why should our employer work with a Swedish driver who has to be paid Ä1500 more a month for the same trip?" They buy their provisions in Portugal and sleep in the driverís cab. They do not go to hotels or restaurants, except sometimes "in Portugal and Spain".
[137] Suffice it to recall the European Court of Justice rulings in the cases of Rush Portuguesa (27 March 1990, Case C-113/89) and Van der Elst (9 August 1994, Case C-43/93) concerning the links between freedom to provide services and permitting nationals of third countries to work.
[138] Eurostat. Compared with 5.9% in the United States and 5.4% in Japan in the same month. The best figures are those for Luxembourg (2.3%), Austria (4.1%), Ireland and Portugal (both with 4.4%). Germany was above the average with 8.3% but the situation was deteriorating sharply (7.7% a year previously). France had the second highest rate at 9.2% (as against 8.6% in June 2001). Spain's was the most worrying figure (11.5%). According to Eurostat, this classification should be treated with some caution since no data for Italy, Greece, Ireland or the Netherlands were available for June.
[139] The programme, known as "Green Card", got under way in August 2000. It has concerned some 10,000 foreign computer experts, most of them recruited in India, followed by Eastern Europe, but also including almost 300 Algerians.
[140] They had 75,000 vacancies and there were 6000 new university graduates a year.
[141] The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, stressed the contribution immigration had made to high rates of growth.
[142] In Le Monde on 1 October 1999, the former Prime Minister Alain JuppÈ confirmed that Europe was going to "need supplies of foreign labour".
[143] Commissariat GÈnÈral du Plan, Le
Travail dans vingt ans,
La Documentation franÁaise, Paris, 1995.
[144] Order of 11 July 2000 on work permits and Order of 25 July 2000 on residence permits for highly skilled information and communication technology specialists. Despite unemployment and the prohibition on recruiting foreigners, the objective was to attract 20,000 such people with five-year permits by means of a fast-track procedure. Measures were taken to train nationals.
[145] The committee was to submit its recommendations in mid-2001.
[146] It will not enter into force before 2010, "when Germany's demographic problems will be worsening," Minister of the Interior Otto Schily has said. Germany recognises that, in addition to the needs of the economy, immigration will be useful in offsetting its demographic deficit. The plan is to try out the mechanism with a quota of 10,000 people a year and gradually increase it according to need.
[147] "The quality of technical training is particularly poor."
[148] According to the CIP, competitive sectors, such as textiles, plastic tools and shoes, are only too keen to expand and are demanding new skills. The shortage of skills is putting a brake on the gains in productivity needed to increase their market share.
[149] Michele Faggioli, responsible for immigration issues in the Belluno
Association of Industrialists and the National Movement of Young Entrepreneurs.
Le Monde, 22 June 2002.
[150] The Managing Director of the family business SEST, the European leader in the production of components for supermarket shelf refrigeration, which has recorded record growth for years.
[151] To enable foreigners to remain in Portugal with a status other than the one which enabled them to enter the country.
[152] Those with an employment contract or an offer of an employment contract approved by the General Labour Inspectorate may have their situation made legal. This does not apply to foreigners who have been sentenced to a prison term exceeding six months or deported, who are subject to an order prohibiting entry or who are on file in the Integrated Information System of the SEF (Foreigners and Border Policing Department).
[153] Sub-contracting by foreign enterprises has also increased a great deal.
[154] National Employment Service annual report, 1999.
[155] Lessons drawn from the experience of the National Employment Service (for job seekers), the Statistics Office database on employed persons and surveys of employersí needs are being used.
[156] Which may be registered in their country or the country where the service is provided.
[157] The very strict terms of the commercial sub-contracting contracts protect IBM from any plundering of its technology or customers.
[158] The programme was presented to the central joint consultative committee of IBM France over a year ago.
[159] In 2000-2001 the United States admitted 195,000 workers. By March 2000 American computer companies had already reached the annual quota of 115,000 H1B work permits.
[160] For the first time in many years, an INSEE study in France in 1991 dealt with the contribution of immigration to the national economy. In Germany in 1997 the Westphalia Institute for Economic Research (RWI) published a report showing that the 7 million foreigners in the country brought in between 20 and 35 billion marks, in particular through their contributions to retirement funds, which exceeded spending on them in the form of unemployment benefit and social assistance. In October 1998, a parliamentary commission of enquiry emphasised that Germany benefited from being a "country of immigration".
[161] Births minus deaths.
[162] Spain has the lowest fertility rate in the world.
[163] Federal Statistics Office (OFS) figures published on 8 August 2002.
[164] Deaths still exceed births and recently the difference has even increased.
[165] Annual report on Trends in International Migration, OECD, Paris.
[166] The OECD is planning to study the impact of the "brain drain" on Russia.
[167] Almost 7 million immigrants with temporary permits have been recruited in the United States.
[168] In Migration and Development - New partnerships for co-operation, OECD, 1994.
[169] International Mobility of the Highly Skilled, OECD, Paris, 2002.
[170] There is a programme in China to transform 100 universities into world class research centres.
[171] The association agreements between Europe and the countries of North Africa, for example.
[172] The concept of "decentralised co-operation" includes any civil society player or organisation. Local authorities are increasingly asking to be included in this definition. It is broader than the one officially accepted in France, where the term simply covers partnership between authorities of an equivalent level.
[173] In 2000 the French government budget for this area was 62% higher than in 1994, ie 69.7 million francs for 319 projects. The total funds allocated by local and regional authorities to international aid that year was almost 1.5 billion francs. At that time, all the regions, half the dÈpartements and the great majority of large and medium-sized cities were supporting almost 6000 international programmes in 114 countries.
[174] The project is also supported by the French Foreign Ministry's Priority Solidarity Fund and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).
[175] The conference was held under the auspices of the World Bank and the Economic Analysis Council (CAE), a body attached to the French Prime Minister's office. In the same week, the United Nations Social Summit was held in Geneva (preceded by demonstrations by anti-globalisation organisations), the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) annual report on human development, focussing on human rights, was presented, and the EU development ministers seminar on European Identity and Development was held in Paris.
[176] Attacking Poverty, report published on Tuesday, 12 September 2002. The Bank expresses serious doubts about the results of the action taken to combat poverty and seems to distance itself from the accepted wisdom as to the benefits of globalisation.
[177] United Nations Development Programme.
[178] In 1997 the world's 225 largest fortunes were equal to the annual income of the 47% poorest individuals, ie 2.5 billion people.
[179] This impoverishment is not only affecting Africa. In the countries in transition of Eastern Europe and Central Asia the number of people living in poverty has increased by a factor of over 20. The similarities in the procedures is, moreover, edifying: J. Stiglitz stresses that the International Monetary Fund is partly responsible for this appalling situation: it was the Fund that imposed the famous 'shock therapy' on the former Eastern bloc which has led to the enrichment of the few and the deprivation of the great majority. Interview in Le Nouvel Observateur, July 2002.
[180] The most detailed the World Bank has ever produced on world poverty.
[181] According to one World Bank expert, ten years ago there was a belief in miracle solutions; the approach was, ìAll you need do is Öî. Today, it is acknowledged that there is no longer any magic formula. If poverty cannot be reduced without economic growth, inequalities have to be reduced so there can be growth; a strong social policy and more democracy are needed. Nicholas Stern adds that promoting growth that is directly beneficial for the poor is fundamental.
[182] In Asia in 1997 and 1998 the restrictions the IMF imposed on Thailand, Indonesia and Korea resulted in millions of people losing their jobs and being thrown into poverty. The exception was Malaysia, which was the only country to refuse the demands imposed on the others.
[183] The rule valid for all is as follows: liberalising markets, reducing budget deficits, reducing the number of civil servants, selling off public enterprises, stabilising the banking sector, etc, without bothering particularly about the social effects (unemployment and impoverishment) of such measures.
[184] Economic and financial crisis, serial bankruptcies, a doubling of the unemployed in ten years, an explosion of poverty (44% of the population of Latin America today): the situation of the three countries of south-eastern Latin America (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) can only strengthen the criticisms levelled against the macro-economic models the IMF systematically imposes on developing countries.
[185] The policies that have been used in Africa to fund white elephants (grandiose, useless projects) and to enrich a few unscrupulous leaders.
[186] The policy of macro-economic balances advocated by the IMF, often synonymous with economic austerity. It was of liberal inspiration and was introduced in the 1980s under the name of "the Washington consensus".
[187] Even if the imperative that the countries of the North should allocate 0.7% of GDP to it - which they never have - is reaffirmed.
[188] Under pressure from the developed countries, the South is opening
its borders and abolishing subsidies, while the North, which should be able to
adapt far more quickly, continues to prohibit the entry of products from the
South and is maintaining subsidies in order to defend its own products. J. Stiglitz, La Grande DÈsillusion, Fayard, Paris, 2002.
[189] "We are arguing for the role of the state upstream in social policies and downstream to ensure the necessary redistribution, and this is new," says one of the institution's economists.
[190] Last year there were 384,000, accounting for only 0.1% of the population.
[191] The British Prime Minister has criticised the laxness of the EU which, he said, worries people in Spain, Britain, France and indeed all the countries of Europe. He went on to say that people want to be sure of coherence, order and appropriate regulations. Monday, 20 May 2002, London (AFP).
[192] The UN has evaluated the possible amount of this type of transfer at $200 billion, ie four times total official aid.
[193] Professor at University College, London, and author of Thinking the Unthinkable.