SENTENZA CHAHAL C.
GRAN BRETAGNA
(estratto)
AS TO THE LAW
I. ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION (art. 3)
72. The first
applicant complained that his deportation to India would constitute a violation
of Article 3 of the Convention (art. 3), which states:
"No one shall
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading
treatment or punishment."
The Commission
upheld this complaint, which the Government contested. A. Applicability of Article 3 (art. 3) in
expulsion cases
73. As the Court has
observed in the past, Contracting States have the right, as a matter of well-established international law
and subject to their treaty obligations including the Convention, to control
the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens. Moreover, it must be noted that
the right to political asylum is not contained in
either the
Convention or its Protocols (see the Vilvarajah and Others v. the United
Kingdom judgment of 30 October 1991, Series A no. 215, p. 34, para. 102).
74. However, it is
well established in the case-law of the Court that expulsion by a Contracting
State may give rise to an issue under Article 3 (art. 3), and hence engage the
responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds
have been shown for believing that the person in question, if expelled, would
face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (art. 3)
in the receiving country. In these circumstances, Article 3 (art. 3) implies
the obligation not to expel the person in question to that country (see the
Soering v. the United Kingdom judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161, p. 35,
paras. 90-91, the Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden judgment of 20 March 1991,
Series A no. 201, p. 28, paras. 69-70, and the above-mentioned Vilvarajah and Others
judgment, p. 34, para. 103). The Government contested this principle before the
Commission but accepted it in their pleadings before the Court.
B. Expulsion cases
involving an alleged danger to national security
75. The Court
notes that the deportation order against the first applicant was made on the
ground that his continued presence in the United Kingdom was unconducive to the
public good for reasons of
national security,
including the fight against terrorism (see paragraph 25 above). The parties
differed as to whether, and if so to what extent, the fact that the applicant
might represent a danger to the security of the United Kingdom affected that
State's obligations under Article 3 (art. 3).
76.Although the
Government's primary contention was that no real risk of ill-treatment had been
established (see paragraphs 88 and 92 below), they also emphasised that the
reason for the intended deportation was national security. In this connection
they submitted, first, that the guarantees afforded by Article 3 (art. 3) were
not
absolute in cases
where a Contracting State proposed to remove an individual from its territory.
Instead, in such cases, which required an uncertain prediction of future events
in the receiving State, various factors should be taken into account, including
the danger posed by the person in question to the security of the host nation.
Thus, there was an
implied limitation to Article 3 (art. 3) entitling a Contracting State to expel
an individual to a receiving State even where a real risk of ill-treatment
existed, if such removal was required on national security grounds. The
Government based this submission in the first place on the possibility of
implied limitations as recognised in the Court's case-law, particularly
paragraphs 88 and 89 of its above-mentioned Soering judgment. In support, they
furthermore referred to the principle under international law that the right of
an alien to asylum is subject to qualifications, as is provided for, inter
alia, by Articles 32 and 33 of the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status
of Refugees (see paragraph 61 above). In the alternative, the threat posed by
an individual to the national security of the Contracting State was a factor to
be weighed in the balance when considering the issues under Article 3 (art. 3).
This approach took into account that in these cases there are varying degrees
of risk of ill-treatment. The greater the risk of ill-treatment, the less
weight should be accorded to the threat to national security. But where there
existed a substantial doubt with regard to the risk of ill-treatment, the
threat to national security could weigh heavily in the balance to be struck
between protecting the rights of the individual and the general interests of
the community. This was the case here: it was at least open to substantial
doubt whether the alleged risk of ill-treatment would materialise;
consequently, the fact that Mr Chahal constituted a serious threat to the
security of the United Kingdom justified his deportation.
77. The applicant
denied that he represented any threat to the national security of the United
Kingdom, and contended that, in any case, national security considerations
could not justify exposing an individual to the risk of ill-treatment abroad
any more than they could justify administering torture to him directly.
78. The
Commission, with whom the intervenors (see paragraph 6 above) agreed, rejected
the Government's arguments. It referred to the Court's Vilvarajah and Others
judgment (cited at paragraph 73 above, p. 36, para. 108) and expressed the
opinion that the guarantees afforded by Article 3 (art. 3) were absolute in
character, admitting of no exception. At the hearing before the Court, the
Commission's Delegate suggested that the passages in the Court's Soering
judgment upon which the Government relied (see paragraph 76 above) might be
taken as authority for the view that, in a case where there were serious doubts
as to the likelihood of a person being subjected to treatment or punishment
contrary to Article 3 (art. 3), the benefit of that doubt could be given to the
deporting State whose national interests were threatened by his continued
presence. However, the national interests of the State could not be invoked to
override the interests of the individual where substantial grounds had been
shown for believing that he would be subjected to ill-treatment if expelled.
79. Article 3
(art. 3) enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society
(see the above-mentioned Soering judgment, p. 34, para. 88). The Court is well
aware of the immense difficulties faced by States in modern times in protecting
their communities from terrorist violence. However, even in these
circumstances, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim's conduct. Unlike
most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and
of Protocols Nos.
1 and 4 (P1, P4), Article 3 (art. 3) makes no provision for exceptions and no
derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 (art. 15) even in the event
of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see the Ireland v.
the United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65, para.
163, and also the Tomasi v. France judgment of 27 August 1992, Series A no.
241-A, p. 42, para. 115).
80. The prohibition provided by Article
3 (art. 3) against ill-treatment is equally absolute in expulsion cases. Thus,
whenever substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an individual
would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3
(art. 3) if removed to another State, the responsibility of the Contracting
State to safeguard him or her against such treatment is engaged in the event of
expulsion (see the above-mentioned Vilvarajah and Others judgment, p. 34, para.
103). In these circumstances, the activities of the individual in question,
however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material consideration. The
protection afforded by Article 3 (art. 3) is thus wider than that provided by
Articles 32 and 33 of the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of
Refugees (see paragraph 61 above).
81. Paragraph 88 of the Court's
above-mentioned Soering judgment, which concerned extradition to the United
States, clearly and forcefully expresses the above view. It should not be
inferred from the Court's remarks concerning the risk of undermining the
foundations of extradition, as set out in paragraph 89 of the same judgment,
that there is any room for balancing the risk of ill-treatment against the
reasons for expulsion in determining
whether a State's responsibility under Article 3 (art. 3) is engaged.
82. It follows from the above that it is
not necessary for the Court to enter into a consideration of the Government's
untested, but no doubt bona fide, allegations about the first applicant's
terrorist activities and the threat posed by him to national security.
C. Application of Article 3 (art. 3) in
the circumstances of the case
1. The point of time for the assessment of
the risk
83. Although there were differing views on
the situation in India and in Punjab (see paragraphs 87-91 below), it was
agreed that the violence and instability in that region reached a peak in 1992
and had been abating ever since. For this reason, the date taken by the Court
for its assessment of the risk to Mr Chahal if expelled to India is of
importance.
84. The applicant argued that the Court
should consider the position in June 1992, at the time when the decision to
deport him was made final (see paragraph 35 above). The purpose of the stay on
removal requested by the Commission (see
paragraph 4 above) was to prevent irremediable damage and not to afford the
High Contracting Party with an opportunity to improve its case. Moreover, it
was not appropriate that the Strasbourg organs should be involved in a
continual fact-finding operation.
85. The Government, with whom the
Commission agreed, submitted that because the responsibility of the State under
Article 3 of the Convention (art. 3) in expulsion cases lies in the act of
exposing an individual to a real risk of ill-treatment, the material date for
the assessment of risk was the time of the proposed deportation. Since Mr
Chahal had not yet been expelled, the relevant time was that of the proceedings
before the Court.
86. It follows from the considerations in
paragraph 74 above that, as far as the applicant's complaint under Article 3
(art. 3) is concerned, the crucial question is whether it has been
substantiated that there is a real risk that Mr Chahal, if expelled, would be
subjected to treatment prohibited by that Article (art. 3). Since he
has not yet been deported, the material
point in time must be that of the Court's consideration of the case. It follows
that, although the historical position is of interest in so far as it may shed
light on the current situation and its likely evolution, it is the present
conditions which are decisive.
2. The assessment of the risk of
ill-treatment
(a) The arguments
(i) General conditions
87. It was the applicant's case that the
Government's assessment of conditions in India and Punjab had been profoundly
mistaken throughout the domestic and Strasbourg proceedings. He referred to a number
of reports by governmental bodies and by intergovernmental and non-governmental
organisations on the situation in India generally and in Punjab in particular,
with emphasis on those reports concerning 1994 and 1995 (see paragraphs 49-56
above) and argued that this material established the contention that human
rights abuse in India by the security forces, especially the police, remained
endemic. In response to the Government's offer to return him to the part of
India of his choice, he asserted that the Punjab police had abducted and killed
militant Sikhs outside their home State in the past. Although he accepted that
there had been some improvements in Punjab since the peak of unrest in 1992, he
insisted that there had been no fundamental change of regime. On the contrary,
what emerged from the above reports was the continuity of the practices of the
security agencies. In this respect he pointed to the fact that
the director general of the Punjab police,
who had been responsible for many human rights abuses during his term of office
between 1992 and 1995, had been replaced upon his retirement by his former
deputy
and intelligence chief.
88. The Government contended that there
would be no real risk of Mr Chahal being ill-treated if the deportation order
were to be implemented and emphasised that the latter was to be returned to
whichever part of India he chose, and not necessarily to Punjab. In this
context they pointed out that they regularly monitored the situation in India
through the United Kingdom High Commission in New Delhi. It appeared from this information
that positive concrete steps had been taken and continued to be taken to deal
with human rights abuses. Specific legislation had been introduced in this
regard; the National Human Rights Commission, which performed an important
function, continued to strengthen and develop; and steps had been taken by both
the executive and judicial authorities to deal with the remaining misuse of
power. The situation in India generally was therefore such as to support their
above contention. Furthermore, with reference to the matters set out in
paragraphs 45-48 above, they contended that the situation in Punjab had
improved substantially in recent years.
They stressed that there was now little or no terrorist activity in that State.
An ombudsman had been established to look into complaints of misuse of power
and the new Chief Minister had publicly declared the government's intentions to
stamp out human rights abuses. Legal proceedings had been brought against
police officers alleged to have been involved in unlawful
activity.
89. Amnesty International in its written
submissions informed the Court that prominent Sikh separatists still faced a
serious risk of "disappearance", detention without charge or trial,
torture and extrajudicial execution, frequently at the hands of the Punjab
police. It referred to its 1995 report which documented a pattern of
human rights violations committed by
officers of the Punjab police acting in under-cover operations outside their
home State (see paragraph 55 above).
90. The Government, however, urged the
Court to proceed with caution in relation to the material prepared by Amnesty
International, since it was not possible to verify the facts of the cases
referred to.
Furthermore, when studying these reports
it was tempting to lose sight of the broader picture of improvement by
concentrating too much on individual cases of alleged serious human rights
abuses. Finally,
since the situation in Punjab had changed
considerably in recent years, earlier reports prepared by Amnesty and other
organisations were now of limited use.
91. On the basis of the material before
it, the Commission accepted that there had been an improvement in the
conditions prevailing in India and, more specifically, in Punjab. However, it
was unable to find in the recent material provided by the Government any solid
evidence that the Punjab police were now under democratic control or that the
judiciary had been able fully to reassert its own independent authority in the
region.
(ii) Factors specific to Mr Chahal
92. Those appearing before the Court also
differed in their assessment of the effect which Mr Chahal's notoriety would
have on his security in India. In the Government's view, the Indian Government
were likely to be astute to ensure that no ill-treatment befell Mr Chahal,
knowing that the eyes of the world would be upon him. Furthermore, in June 1992
and December 1995 they had sought and received assurances from the Indian
Government (see paragraph 37 above).
93. The applicant asserted that his high
profile would increase the danger of persecution. By taking the decision to
deport him on national security grounds the Government had, as was noted by Mr
Justice Popplewell in the first judicial review hearing (see paragraph 34
above), in effect publicly branded him a terrorist. Articles in the Indian
press since 1990 indicated that he was regarded as such in India, and a number
of his relatives and acquaintances had been detained and ill-treated in Punjab
because of their connection to him. The assurances of the Indian Government
were of little value since that Government had shown themselves unable to
control the security forces in Punjab and elsewhere. The applicant also
referred to examples of well-known personalities who had recently
"disappeared".
94. For the Commission, Mr Chahal, as a
leading Sikh militant suspected of involvement in acts of terrorism, was likely
to be of special interest to the security forces, irrespective of the part of
India to which he was returned.
(b) The Court's approach
95. Under the Convention system, the
establishment and verification of the facts is primarily a matter for the
Commission (Articles 28 para. 1 and 31) (art. 28-1, art. 31). Accordingly, it
is only in exceptional circumstances that the Court will use its powers in this
area (see the Cruz Varas and Others judgment mentioned at paragraph 74 above,
p. 29, para. 74).
96. However, the Court is not bound by the
Commission's findings of fact and is free to make its own assessment. Indeed,
in cases such as the present the Court's examination of the existence of a real
risk of ill-treatment must necessarily be a rigorous one, in view of the
absolute character of Article 3 (art. 3) and the fact that it enshrines one of
the fundamental values of the democratic societies making up the
Council of Europe (see the Vilvarajah and
Others judgment mentioned at paragraph 73 above, p. 36, para. 108).
97. In determining whether it has been
substantiated that there is a real risk that the applicant, if expelled to
India, would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (art. 3), the
Court will assess all the material placed before it and, if necessary, material
obtained of its own motion (see the above-mentioned
Vilvarajah and Others judgment, p. 36,
para. 107). Furthermore, since the material point in time for the assessment of
risk is the date of the Court's consideration of the case (see paragraph 86
above), it will
be necessary to take account of evidence
which has come to light since the Commission's review.
98. In view of the Government's proposal
to return Mr Chahal to the airport of his choice in India, it is necessary for
the Court to evaluate the risk of his being ill-treated with reference to
conditions throughout India rather than in Punjab alone. However, it must be
borne in mind that the first applicant is a well-known
supporter of Sikh separatism. It follows
from these observations that evidence relating to the fate of Sikh militants at
the hands of the security forces outside the State of Punjab is of particular
relevance.
99. The Court has taken note of the
Government's comments relating
to the material contained in the reports
of Amnesty International (see paragraph 90 above). Nonetheless, it attaches
weight to some of the most striking allegations contained in those reports,
particularly with regard to extrajudicial killings allegedly perpetrated by the
Punjab police outside their home State and the action taken by the Indian
Supreme Court, the West Bengal State Government and the Union Home Secretary in
response (see paragraph 55 above). Moreover, similar assertions were accepted
by the United Kingdom Immigration Appeal Tribunal in Charan Singh Gill v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department (see paragraph 54 above) and were
included in the 1995 United States' State Department report on India (see
paragraph 52 above). The 1994 National Human Rights Commission's report on
Punjab substantiated the impression of a police force completely beyond the
control of lawful authority (see paragraph 49 above).
100. The Court is persuaded by this
evidence, which has been corroborated by material from a number of different
objective sources, that, until mid-1994 at least, elements in the Punjab police
were accustomed to act without regard to the human rights of suspected Sikh
militants and were fully capable of pursuing their targets into areas of India
far away from Punjab.
101. The Commission found in paragraph 111
of its report that there had in recent years been an improvement in the
protection of human rights in India, especially in Punjab, and evidence
produced subsequent to the Commission's consideration of the case indicates
that matters continue to advance.
In particular, it would appear that the
insurgent violence in Punjab has abated; the Court notes the very substantial
reduction in terrorist-related deaths in the region as indicated by the
respondent Government (see paragraph 45 above). Furthermore, other encouraging
events have reportedly taken place in Punjab in recent years, such as the
return of democratic elections, a number of court judgments against police
officers, the appointment of an ombudsman to investigate abuses of power and
the promise of the new Chief Minister to "ensure transparency and
accountability" (see paragraphs 46 and 48 above). In addition, the 1996
United States' State Department report asserts that during 1995 "there was
visible progress in correcting patterns of abuse by the [Punjab] police"
(see paragraph 53 above). 102. Nonetheless, the evidence demonstrates that
problems still persist in connection with the observance of human rights by the
security forces in Punjab. As the respondent Government themselves recounted,
the United Kingdom High Commission in India continues to receive complaints
about the Punjab police, although in recent months these have related mainly to
extortion rather than to politically motivated abuses (see paragraph 47 above).
Amnesty International alleged that "disappearances" of notable Sikhs
at the hands of the Punjab police continued sporadically throughout 1995 (see
paragraph 56 above) and the 1996 State Department report referred to the
killing of two Sikh militants that year (see paragraph 53 above).
103. Moreover, the Court finds it most
significant that no concrete evidence has been produced of any fundamental
reform or reorganisation of the Punjab police in recent years. The evidence
referred to above
(paragraphs 49-56) would indicate that
such a process was urgently required, and indeed this was the recommendation of
the NHRC (see paragraph 49 above). Although there was a change in the
leadership of the Punjab police in 1995, the director general who presided over
some of the worst abuses this decade has only been replaced by his former
deputy and intelligence chief (see paragraph 87 above). Less than two years ago
this same police force was carrying out well-documented raids into other Indian
States (see paragraph 100 above) and the Court cannot entirely discount the
applicant's claims that any recent reduction in activity stems from the fact
that key figures in the campaign for Sikh separatism have all either been
killed, forced abroad or rendered inactive by torture or the fear of torture.
Furthermore, it would appear from press reports that evidence of the full
extent of past abuses is only now coming to light (see paragraph 53 above).
104. Although the Court is of the opinion
that Mr Chahal, if returned to India, would be most at risk from the Punjab
security forces acting either within or outside State boundaries, it also
attaches significance to the fact that attested allegations of serious human
rights violations have been levelled at the police elsewhere in
India. In this respect, the Court notes
that the United Nations' Special Rapporteur on torture has described the
practice of torture upon those in police custody as "endemic" and has
complained that inadequate measures are taken to bring those responsible to
justice (see paragraph 51 above). The NHRC has also drawn attention to the
problems of widespread, often fatal, mistreatment of prisoners and has called
for a systematic reform of the police throughout India (see paragraph 50
above).
105. Although the Court does not doubt the
good faith of the Indian Government in providing the assurances mentioned above
(paragraph 92), it would appear that, despite the efforts of that Government,
the NHRCand the Indian courts to bring about reform, the violation of human
rights by certain members of the security forces in Punjab and elsewhere in
India is a recalcitrant and enduring problem
(see paragraph 104 above). Against this
background, the Court is not persuaded that the above assurances would provide
Mr Chahal with an adequate guarantee of safety.
106. The Court further considers that the
applicant's high profile would be more likely to increase the risk to him of
harm than otherwise. It is not disputed that Mr Chahal is well known in India
to support the cause of Sikh separatism and to have had close links with other
leading figures in that struggle (see paragraphs 17 and 20 above). The
respondent Government have made serious, albeit untested, allegations of his
involvement in terrorism which are undoubtedly known to the Indian authorities.
The Court is of the view that these factors would be likely to make him a
target of interest for hard-line elements in the security forces who have
relentlessly pursued suspected Sikh militants in the past (see paragraphs 49-56
above).
107. For all the reasons outlined above,
in particular the attested involvement of the Punjab police in killings and
abductions outside their State and the allegations of serious human rights
violations which continue to be levelled at members of the Indian security
forces elsewhere, the Court finds it substantiated that there is a real risk of
Mr Chahal being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (art. 3) if he is
returned to India.
Accordingly, the order for his
deportation to India would, if executed, give rise to a violation of Article 3
(art. 3).