"Trends in the
different legislation of the member states concerning asylum in the EU"
This paper addresses the human
costs of controlling the external borders of the European Union. It focuses on sea
borders, rather than land borders, because of the particular urgency of the problem at sea. First, it shows that
intensifying the EU's external borders
has not decreased the number of irregular migrants but, rather, has led
irregular migrants to use alternative, and increasingly dangerous, routes.
Second, this paper gives a very broad
overview of the response to this of EU Member States and the EU itself. This overview shows that both
Member States and the EU itself have increasingly adopted a technical,
quasi-military approach to border control. The third part of this paper presents data on the human costs of external
border control. There are strong
reasons to believe that increased controls have led to the loss of more lives,
and given this, it is foreseeable that further tightening of the external
borders, as envisaged by the Member
States and the EU, will intensify this trend. The final section of this paper examines the fundamental
policy question whether the human costs are relevant to the current
debate about the control of the EU's external borders.
1. Irregular
Maritime Migration: Recent Developments
The main
arrival areas for maritime migration are the Canary Islands, the Straights of Gibraltar, Sicily, Malta, Cyprus and the Aegean Sea.Irregular
migrants who choose to reach Europe by sea cannot afford to pay for the
forged documents that are necessary for air travel and, in many cases, for travel by land.
Although it is
difficult to find data on the number of people who arrive at the shores of Member States, the following data is presented, with the assistance of
the European Commission and NGO's and on the basis of publications.
For Italy, the
following data is available:
Table 1: Interceptions,
Italy, 1998-2002
|
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
2001
|
2002
|
2003
|
2004
|
|
Apulia
|
39.065
|
46.481*
|
18.990
|
8.546
|
3.372
|
|
|
|
Sicily
|
8.828
|
1.973
|
2.782
|
5.504
|
18.225
|
14.017
|
13.594
|
|
Calabria
|
848
|
1.545
|
5.045
|
6.093
|
2.122
|
|
|
|
total
|
48.741
|
49.999
|
26.817
|
20.143
|
23.719
|
|
|
*of whom
22,418 came from Kosovo and 7,448 came from Romania.
Source:
Interior Ministry. Immigration Service and Border Police of the Police
Department, from
Monzini, n.d.,
p. 7. For 2003-2004, Paolo Cuttitta: Delocalization of Migration Controls to
North
Africa, 2005, conference paper on file with the author.
What this data
shows is that irregular migration reflects, first of all, the causes of
migration. The enormous influxes into Apulia in 1998 and 1999
consisted mainly of migrants from the Former Yugoslavia. The shift in numbers
from Apulia to Sicily partly relates to other source areas of irregular migrants, namely the Horn of Africa, Liberia and
North Africa, as well as to increased patrols at sea between Albania and
Apulia.
The Maltese
National Statistics Office gives the following data for irregular migrants
arriving by boat:
Table 2: Interceptions, Malta,
2002-2006
|
2002
|
1.686
|
|
2003
|
502
|
|
2004
|
1.388
|
|
2005
|
1.822
|
|
2006 (until 14 June)
|
378
|
Source: Malta National Statistics
Office, News Release, 19 June 2006
The following
data is available for intercepted illegal migrants in Spain:
Table 3: Interceptions, Spam,
1993-2005
|
|
Straits of Gibraltar
|
|
Canary Islands
|
|
|
1993
|
|
4.952
|
|
|
|
1994
|
|
4.189
|
|
|
|
1995
|
|
5.287
|
|
|
|
1996
|
|
7.741
|
|
|
|
1997
|
|
7.348
|
|
|
|
1998
|
|
7.031
|
|
|
|
1999
|
|
7.178
|
|
875
|
|
2000
|
|
16.885
|
|
2.387
|
|
2001
|
|
?
|
|
4.112
|
|
2002
|
|
11.807
|
|
9.875
|
|
2003
|
|
9.794
|
|
9.382
|
|
2004
|
|
7.425
|
|
8.426
|
|
2005
|
|
7.066
|
|
4.715
|
Source:
Lahlou, 2005, pp. 6 (1993-2000), 7-8 (2002-2004). Amnesty International, 2005,
p. 50, for the Canary Islands 2001-2002. For 2005, Spanish Ministry of Labour and Welfare: Balance
de la Secretaria de Estado de
Inmigracion y Emigration de las Embarcaciones Interceptadas en 2005, Madrid, 2006.
According to the Spanish
authorities, the number of attempted crossings into the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla has decreased significantly,
from 55.000 in 2004 to 12.000 in 2005.
In May 2006, the international
press reported large influxes of illegal migrants arriving in the Canary Islands. The International Herald Tribune
(IHT), quoting Spanish government figures, noted that 8.500 migrants
were detained while trying to reach the Canary Islands in 2004 and that this number was 4.700 in 2005 (IHT
16-5-2006, p. 3). In the week of 15 May 2006 alone, however, more than
1.500 migrants were reported to have reached the Canary Islands (IHT 25-5-2006, p. 8). At the end of May 2006, the
total number of illegal migrants who had reached the Canary Islands was
8.000 (IHT 31-5-2006, p. 2). In late-July 2006, the Dutch newspaper NRC-Handelsblad reported that, according
to Spanish officials, 11.000 illegal migrants had already crossed the
Atlantic to the Canary Islands that year, twice as many as in all of 2005
(NRC-Handelsblad 24-7-2006, p. 5).
Developments in the Mahreb and African countries
According to
Moroccan government sources, some 26.000 illegal migrants attempted to enter Europe but were prevented from doing so by Moroccan authorities in 2004,
almost 5.000 migrants of which were headed
towards the Canary Islands. According to the same source, this number was considerably less than in 2003.
In October 2005, after the Melilla
enclave had been stormed by thousands of black Africans, Morocco rounded up the migrants at issue and
dumped them in the desert, without food or water, several hundred
kilometres south of Melilla (Financial Times 1-2-2006, p. 8; Human Rights
Watch, 13 October 2005). There have been other reported human rights violations
by the Moroccan authorities as a result of
European migration policy.
The Moroccan crackdown led migrants to move their departure points
further and further south, first to Mauritania and now to Senegal. Spanish officials attribute the increased use of this
long sea route to improved monitoring of other routes used by illegal
migrants in the past, such as those across the
Straights of Gibraltar or, more recently, across the land borders of the
Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the northern coast of Morocco
(IHT 16-5-2006, p. 3).
Against a
backdrop of increased border controls elsewhere, such as at the Straights of Gibraltar and at European airports, two points should be noted. First,
illegal migrants who travel long distances in small boats are
not only people from the Mahreb countries or from sub-Saharan Africa but are increasingly migrants from Asia, particularly
Pakistan, Bangladesh and India.
Second, increasingly strict
Moroccan border controls have forced migrants to use points of departure much further removed from the European
mainland, such as Libya, Tunisia, Guinee Bissau and Ivory Coast,
as well as, more recently, Mauritania and Senegal.
European countries, particularly
Spain, are now trying to convince the authorities at points of departure to prevent migration, as well as to
take back irregular migrants who have succeeded in reaching Europe. The
Senegalese government is reported to intercept migrants who want to sail
to the Canary Islands. In May 2006, Senegalese authorities announced their
intention to arrest over 15.000 irregular
migrants who were preparing to reach the Canary Islands by small wooden boats
(Liberation 13-6-2006). At the end of that month, 642 Senegalese citizens were waiting
in Mauritania to be returned home, while another 105 were being held by the
police; 116 were given two-year prison
sentences. In May 2006, the Senegalese government was reported to have
stepped up sea surveillance to stem the outflow of illegal migrants. Several hundred of them were intercepted and returned.
According to this report, this has failed to deter other migrants from leaving for Europe. It should also be noted
that the local economy in northern
Senegal partly relies on revenue generated by illegal migration (IHT 31-5-2006,
p. 2).
An agreement
reached between Senegal and Spain on 30 May 2006 was suspended by Senegal
on June 1 after Senegalese officials alleged that a group of migrants who had
been deported on 30 May had been handcuffed and misled into believing that they
were being transferred to mainland Spain (IHT 2-6-2006, p. 3).
Conclusion
The available data does not suggest
that the intensified border controls of the past few years have led to decreased numbers of irregular
migrants. Rather than abandoning their plans to travel to Europe, these migrants have simply chosen more dangerous
migration routes, routes that expose them to even greater risks.
2. The
European Union's Response
Member States have intensified
their border controls over the past decade.
Spanish
authorities have tightened their sea borders by both symbolic means and quasi-military
means. Two policy measures that Spain has implemented are particularly
revealing. First, the Integrated System for External Patrols (SIVE), which
started in 2002 and is to be completed in
2008, involves 25 detection stations, 71 patrol boats and 13 mobile radars
along the coasts of Southern Spain and Fuerteventura. This should make
these coasts impenetrable for irregular
migrants. A marked decrease in the number of people who reach Ceuta, from 47.005 in 2000 to 6.790 in the first nine months
of 2004, is attributed to SIVE by the Spanish authorities. A second
point worth noting is that there have been joint Spanish/Moroccan patrols in the Straights of Gibraltar and between
Morocco and the Canary Islands since 2004.
In May 2005, the Spanish government
adopted its Africa Plan 2006-2008. This outlines a multi-faceted policy that focuses on cooperation with African countries
to address the root causes of
migration. Although this approach is obviously promising, its developmental potential will only materialise in the long run, if
at all. The concrete and short term plans include strengthening border controls.
Italy
refouled more than 1.500 irregular migrants from Lampedusa to Libya between
October 2004 and March 2005 without examining the migrants' asylum applications.
According to
press reports, the EU decided on 23 May 2006 to deploy planes, boats and rapid reaction aid teams from eight Member States to deal with new influxes of
illegal migrants into the Canary Islands (IHT 25-5-2006, p. 8).
Frontex, the
European agency in charge of cooperation in the field of external border
control, has a very technical understanding of its role. In its action plan for
2005-2006, for example, it aims to facilitate
practical assistance between Member States by providing technical equipment to make risk analyses in cooperation with
police authorities.
Following the events at Ceuta and
Melilla in September 2005, the Hampton Court summit of Heads of State and Government expressed a need for more action on the
issue of migration. The Commission
then issued a Communication concerning Priority actions for responding to the challenges of migration. The European Council on 16
December 2005 adopted the Global Approach to
Migration Although the introduction to such policy proposals does refer
to the human costs of border control, the concrete proposals fail to clearly
follow-up on this point. The European
Council proposes projects that reinforce surveillance and monitoring. This is said to have "the aim of
saving lives at sea and tackling illegal immigration",
but the evidence suggests that measures aimed at tackling illegal immigration greatly increase the risks to migrants, including
loss of life. The policy outlines do not address how they will protect migrants from the risks that they face. The
proposals also contain an approach
that combines development and migration, but the short term aim of the
proposals is to combat migration, while development is clearly relegated
to the distant future. Thus, while a development-focused approach may in the
long term change migration patterns such that human costs decrease, in the
short and medium term, the European Council's proposals will probably increase human costs because of the intensified security and
surveillance orientation.
Based on a proposal by the
Commission of 3 May 2005,
the EU is now close to a Decision establishing the External Borders Fund. Its
most recent version is that of 11 July 2006.
It creates a framework for burden sharing and intensified cooperation between
Member States when it comes to external border control. Its objectives, as
detailed in Article 3 of the draft Decision, consist of an intensification of
border control functions:
- the
efficient organisation of control and surveillance tasks relating to external
borders;
- ensuring,
on the one hand, a high level of protection at external borders and, on the
other,
facilities for the efficient crossing of external borders by regular migrants;
- the
uniform application of the Schengen Borders Code; and
- improvement
of consular services.
More
specifically, Article 4 contains a range of more concrete objectives, which
include:
- the
improvement of surveillance systems between border crossing points (Article
4(1)(b));
- the methodical gathering of information on the evolving situation on the
ground
before, at and behind external borders (Article 4(l)(c));
- developing
new working methods, logistical measures and state of the art technology
for
systematic controls at border crossing points (Article 4(2)(a));
- the
increased use of technology (Article 4(2)(b)); and
- building
and upgrading detention centres (Article 4(3)(e)).
As concrete
actions that would be fundable, Article 5 lists, inter alia:
- borders
crossing infrastructure at border crossing points (Article 5(l)(a));
- infrastructure, buildings and
systems required for surveillance
between border
crossing points and for the protection against illegal crossings at
external borders
(Article 5(l)(b));
- operating
equipment, such as sensors, video surveillance and other detection tools
(Article 5(l)(c));
- means
of transport for the control of external borders, such as vehicles, vessels,
helicopters and light aircraft that are specially
equipped with electronic equipment for
the surveillance of the border and the detection of migrants (Article
5(l)(d)); and
- investment
in the development, testing and installation of state of the art technology
(Article
5(1)(j)).
Article 15,
which concerns the distribution of resources among Member States, makes clear that a significant amount of funds will be spent on
external borders, both land borders and sea borders.
On 19 July 2006, the Commission
issued two documents that reflect a similar focus on short term, surveillance orientated policies.
The July 2006 Rabat Conference on Development and Migration equally combined securitisation and
development when dealing with the migration issue. What is truly remarkable is that policies that control migration
in the short term are much more
operational than policies that aim at development.
To summarise, a development focused
approach to migration, although to be welcomed, will only be effective in the long term. A surveillance approach to migration
is much more operational and in place,
and the past year has seen a considerable increase in the EU's cooperation efforts in this field. It is to be
expected that increased controls, which in the future may include African military and security agencies, will force
migrants to move to other departure
points. This, in turn, will increase the risk to the migrants involved.
3. The
Human Costs of Border Control
The following
focuses on the number of migrants who accidentally die while trying to enter the EU,
not on deaths caused to migrants by acts of border guards that clearly violate
human rights, such as the ones documented by
Amnesty International
and MŽdecins Sans FrontiŹres.
By their very
nature, statistics on the number of people who do not survive their attempt to reach Europe are incomplete and, in part, speculative.
Stories of migrant deaths appear almost daily as fails
divers in European newspapers (for example, IHT 7-6-2006, p.
1).
During the
1990s, when sea patrols between Albania and Apulia were increased, the number of
migrant deaths increased. To make interception at sea by the authorities more
difficult, departures were arranged for when weather conditions would be
particularly bad, especially during the
winter. The practice of unloading passengers into the sea without lifejackets
near the coast began as an attempt to evade apprehension on the Apulian
coast. This led to a large increase in the number of accidents, for example,
people being mangled by propellers and drownings.
Cuttitta (2005) reports 411 casualties in the Sicily Channel in 2003 and 280 in
2004 on the basis of a press review that he undertook.
A Spanish
human rights organisation estimated that some 4.000 people drowned in the Straights of Gibraltar between 1990 and 2003.
In 2005, Amnesty International reported that the Spanish
authorities used boats to patrol the Atlantic that were physically equipped for
intercepting migrants but not for rescuing
them. Thus, migrants drowned after being intercepted by the Spanish
Coast Guard. Although the authorities now use different boats, surveillance is expressly stated as being the main
mission, saving lives being of only secondary
concern.
Spanish
authorities report the following data:
Table 4:
Deaths at the Spanish border
|
|
2003
|
2004
|
2005
|
|
Drowned migrants on the coast
|
13
|
14
|
2
|
|
Cadavers at sea
|
100
|
81
|
24
|
Data 2003: Lahlou, 2005, p. 7; 2004/2005: Spanish Ministry of Labour
and Welfare: Balance de la Secretaria
de Estado de Immigration y Emigration de las Embarcaciones Interceptadas en
2005, Madrid, 2006.
On the basis of
data from the same source, Cuttitta (2005) reports 210 casualties in Spain during
2003 and 141 for 2004. Medecins Sans Frontieres, however, reports that the
official number of fatalities in relation to
border patrols was 284 in 2004 and gives an unofficial estimate of around 500.
On the basis of press reports, United (see below) counted 641 deaths at
the Spanish border in 2003, 280 during 2004 and 444 for 2005.
It seems clear
that the death toll is increasing, particularly given statistics from the only register of people who have died at the border known to the author, a
register kept by the NGO United.
This register is based on press clippings and is fairly detailed as to the
number of deaths, identities and sources. It should be noted that it also
includes people who commit suicide pending deportation, who are not relevant to
this research study. The overwhelming majority
of people on the list died while trying to cross Europe's borders. Because this
list is based on press reports, the larger incidents, such as the 58
people who were found dead in a truck in Dover in June 2000 and the 283 people
who drowned near Malta on Christmas day 1996, are reported in the list while
smaller incidents may not be reported in the press at all. Thus, one can reasonably assume that the actual
number of fatalities is higher than indicated in Table 5. This assumption is confirmed by the fact that, based on press
reports, Cuttitta counted 411 and 280 casualties in, respectively, 2003
and 2004 in the Sicily Channel alone.
Table 5: Documented deaths at the European
Borders, 1993-2006
|
1993
|
57
|
|
1994
|
123
|
|
1995
|
179
|
|
1996
|
457
|
|
1997
|
361
|
|
1998
|
390
|
|
1999
|
516
|
|
2000
|
652
|
|
2001
|
444
|
|
2002
|
820
|
|
2003
|
1309
|
|
2004
|
898
|
|
2005
|
769
|
|
2006*
|
207
|
|
total
|
7182
|
*until 3 May 2006
Source: United, Amsterdam, 2006
Although these statistics must be
dealt with carefully, one can reasonably conclude that the number of people who died at the European borders
has increased significantly since controls were extended to the external
borders in 1995.
4. Should the Human
Costs of Border Control be Taken into Account?
This section
begins by examining legal aspects related to the fact that the way in which the
EU's external borders are controlled leads to an increasing number of
fatalities. In the strictly legal sense, there does not seem to be State
responsibility for these fatalities.
Under the
International Law Commission's Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
States cannot be held responsible for fatalities that result indirectly from controlling their borders because border control, in
itself, is not a wrongful act. Under some circumstances, a State may
be held responsible for damage that arises out of acts not prohibited by international law, as when it undertakes a
hazardous activity, defined by the International Law Commission as
"an activity which involves a risk of causing significant harm".
The question remains, however, whether increased border controls themselves
cause the fatalities. One may argue that they are a
contributing factor but that, in themselves, increased border controls do not
cause the fatalities. Other factors may be more important, such as the
willingness of migrants to take considerable risks, as well as factors beyond anyone's control, such as the weather during
migration. Hence, States are not responsible
in the legal sense for fatalities that occur indirectly as a consequence of controlling their borders.
A parallel
that is often drawn is that of the Iron Curtain. Between 1961 and 1989, many people
lost their lives when attempting to cross the border between East and West
Germany because of anti-personnel mines or
automatic fire systems or after being shot by East German border guards. While
the official death toll according to the Federal Republic of Germany was 264, other sources quote a number as high as 938.
On account of this, East German leaders were convicted as indirect principals to intentional homicide.
Analogising this to the fatalities
at the EU's borders, however, is flawed. Anti-personnel mines and automatic
fire systems, as well as orders to shoot at fugitives (Schiessbefehl)
were conscious, affirmative measures
that directly led to the deaths of people who tried to cross the border between
the two Germanys. There is a distinction to be made between measures that
directly result in fatalities and tightening border controls, the effect of the
latter being that migrants will use travel routes that are riskier.
The above
parallel does suggest, however, that States can be held responsible for
fatalities that occur as a direct consequence of particular
border control measures, such as shooting at migrants
who attempt to cross the border or placing landmines at the border.
Because of this, the authority to
shoot at irregular migrants should be cancelled, and the minefields between
Greece and Turkey should be dismantled.
The fact that States generally
cannot be held legally responsible, however, does not end the story. Consider the European Court of Human
Rights' decision in Osman, which
involved Article 2(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
According to Article 2(1):
Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No
one shall be deprived of his life intentionally
save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a
crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
Osman involved a stalker who had harassed a family for a number of years and
ended up killing a father and wounding a son. The Court held:
The Court notes that the first sentence of Article 2 ¤ 1 enjoins the
State not only to refrain from the intentional
and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see the
L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III, p. 1403, ¤ 36). It is common ground that the State's obligation in this respect extends beyond its
primary duty to secure the right to life by putting in place effective
criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person
backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such provisions. It is thus
accepted by those appearing before the Court that
Article 2 of the Convention may also imply in certain well-defined
circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive
operational measures to protect an
individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual. The scope of this obligation is a matter
of dispute between the parties.
As in the
border control cases, Osman did not
involve a causal relationship between failing to take
preventive measures to protect individuals' lives and those individuals'
deaths. The obligation of a State to take
appropriate steps to safeguard lives is not conditioned on a causal relationship between the State's actions and someone's death. Rather,
the obligation is triggered by the State's
knowledge that a particular life is at risk and that same State's ability to do
something about it.
Increases in
the number of fatalities of irregular migrants are related to the tightening of
border controls. Thus, these fatalities are a foreseeable consequence of
this policy. Although this does not lead to
State responsibility, it does trigger a State's positive obligation to take preventive measures to safeguard the lives of
those who are put at risk. In the context of border control measures, because States' policies increase the loss of
lives of irregular migrants, they are
obliged to exercise their border controls in such a way that loss of lives is minimised.
In other
policy fields, measures aimed at increasing safety, such as measures related to
traffic, health care and labour relations,
are taken not because otherwise the State would be responsible for fatalities but, rather, because human lives deserve
protection by the State. The same reasoning should
be applied to migration policy.
When it is clear that a particular
set of State policies will lead to increased fatalities, it seems reasonable to take account of this in policy
debates. Until now, however, this has not happened in the debate about
border control. Increased human costs from intensifying border controls should factor into the debate about the
future of European border control. What weight the human costs should have can only be determined when more
information becomes available.
Information
on the number of fatalities at the EU's external borders is scarce and
inconsistent. In order to support a debate on border control in
which human costs play a role, three things are
necessary:
1.
Research should be carried out to
get as much information as possible about the
number of fatalities at the EU's external borders
since the Schengen system became
operational in 1995. This should be done by
collecting data from governments,
human rights organisations, local police authorities, churches and
similar bodies.
2.
On the basis of (1.), a network
should be created to permanently collect data on
fatalities. This should involve a fact finding
report submitted by the Commission to
the Parliament every three months.
3.
When discussing new policies or
evaluating existing ones on external border controls,
a standard topic for discussion should be the human costs of such
measures.
The
Parliament should ask the Commission to undertake research as mentioned under
(1.) and to establish the network discussed under (2.).
Building on this, the Parliament should ask the Commission to address the human costs of border control measures in
every document that deals with the
issue. In the short term, collecting information about the human costs of
border controls could be one of the concrete actions that are listed in Article
5 of the Decision on the External Borders Fund.
The research and the network could
be activities of a new or existing EU agency or could be undertaken by an NGO
funded by the EU.
Furthermore, authority to shoot at
irregular migrants should be withdrawn, and minefields between Greece and
Turkey should be dismantled.
5. Summary
The number of
migrants reaching Europe has been consistently increasing. Although there are yearly differences, the general trend is clear. Member States have
responded to this by intensifying their
border controls over the past few years, especially at sea. This has displaced the flow of migrants from one place to another, involving longer
journeys under more dangerous circumstances.
Increased fatalities have occurred. Although data on this is scarce and contested, the number of people who do not survive
their trips has increased. The number of fatalities reported by United,
which has the most comprehensive data available, has varied between 800 and 1.300 over the past few years. It
is safe to assume that the actual numbers are considerably higher than
this. This means that every day people die trying to cross the external borders of the EU. There is a plausible
link between increased fatalities and intensified
border control.
The effect of
intensifying border controls should play a role in the public policy debate.
Some measures will have less fatal consequences than others. In order to be
able to discuss this thoroughly, it is necessary to learn much more about the
number of fatalities at the external borders
of the EU.
In order to
trigger a sensible debate on border controls in which human costs play a role,
three
things must
be done:
1. The
Commission should undertake research to get as much information as possible
about the number of fatalities that have occurred at the external borders of
the EU since the Schengen system became operational in 1995. This should be
done by collecting data from governments, human rights
organisations, local police authorities,
churches and similar bodies.
2.
On the basis of the network used
to acquire this data, a network should be created to
permanently collect data on fatalities. This
should involve a fact finding report
submitted by the Commission to the Parliament every three months.
3.
When discussing new policies or
evaluating existing ones on external border controls,
a standard topic for discussion should be the human costs of such
measures.
Furthermore,
authority to shoot at irregular migrants should be withdrawn, and minefields between
Greece and Turkey should be dismantled.
Directorate-General
Internal Policies