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THE EUROPEAN UNION |
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REV 1 |
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JAI 773 ECOFIN 695 TRANS 436 RELEX 999 ECO 128 PESC 1460 COTER 123 ENFOPOL 278 COSDP 1040 PROCIV 168 ENER 364 ATO 132 DATAPROTECT 68 TELECOM 231 |
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EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator |
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to : |
Council/European Council |
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Subject : |
Since my
appointment as Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, I have been reporting regularly
to the European Council on developments in the fight against terrorism, and
also producing discussion papers highlighting the key issues for policy makers
to concentrate on.
This paper comes
at a particularly crucial moment, as the Council is currently considering major
changes in the way in which the EU's Institutions work, following agreement to
the Lisbon Treaty. The EU will also soon set out a new five year plan for
Justice and Home Affairs, the “Stockholm Programme”, to which I have made a
separate detailed contribution. One of the priorities of the incoming
Presidency will be agreement to an Internal Security Strategy, in which
terrorism is likely to feature prominently. Rather than repeat the detail of all this, and the revision
of the Counter-Terrorism Action Plan, I have taken the opportunity to produce a
discussion paper which is shorter and more strategic. This seeks to describe
the changing nature of the threat from terrorism, reconfirm the validity of the
EU's Counter-Terrorism strategy, and set out some key challenges which need to
be addressed in the future.
The Threat
It is now over
eight years since the catastrophic attacks of 9/11; five years since the Atocha
station bombings in Madrid and four years since the "7/7" attacks in
London. In this climate it is natural to ask whether terrorism is still
something we need to worry about. Amid a string of other global crises with
more immediate impact on peoples' lives, there seems to be a growing sense of
"CT fatigue".
However, the
fact that an incident on the scale of 7/7 has not happened again in Europe does
not mean that Al Qaeda or other militant groups have not been trying. It is
rather a tribute to the success of the measures we are already taking to
counter the threat. Police forces in Europe and the US have foiled a number of
plots including some aimed at mass transit systems. Within the last month there
has been the attack on an army barracks in Milan, fortunately with
significantly less damage than might have been the case. Arrests have been made
of staff working in sensitive institutions. Outside Europe, EU nationals have
been the target of AQ related groups in the mass attack in Mumbai in November
2008, and within the last few months EU nationals have been taken hostage and
killed in North Africa and in Pakistan. Arrests have also been made in the US
in connection with a plot to attack the Danish newspaper famous for the
publication of cartoons of the prophet Mohammed.
The core
organisation of Al Qaeda, probably based somewhere on the borders of Pakistan
and Afghanistan, has been under enormous pressure from US and Pakistani
military action. It has also been destabilised by the election of President
Obama, who has mounted a visible challenge to its propaganda narrative.
However, it remains the most significant source of threat to Europe and
whatever organisational dislocation it has suffered, it is clear that AQ
propaganda still has the power to inspire and motivate individuals around the
world, including in Europe, to get involved in terrorism as a solution to the
problems they see around them. AQ is actively seeking out new sanctuaries in
which to regroup and continue its campaign, most significantly at the moment in
Sahel and Yemen, but this risk exists wherever weak States and poor government
combine. Young Europeans continue to travel to conflict zones, such as the
Afghanistan/Pakistan border or increasingly Somalia, in order to train as
terrorists and to join AQ. Others are only in touch with the organisation
through the internet. This kind of "home grown" terrorism requires
few resources and is harder to detect because it may not have any physical
links back to what one might call "Al Qaeda central".
While militant
Islamist terrorism today still constitutes the biggest threat facing Europe as
a whole, a number of Member States continue to face their own indigenous
terrorist problems, and we should not lose sight of the longer term possibility
that other fringe groups could resort to political violence on a European scale
as has happened in the past.
The threat from
terrorism thus remains significant, but more importantly it is constantly
evolving both in response to our attempts at combating it, and to new
opportunities that present themselves. The emergence of self-starting “lone
wolves” (or small groups) that have no organisational connections, but work
entirely from material they find for themselves on the internet is a particular
example. Terrorist groups have shown interest in developing CBRNE capabilities.
To keep Europe protected against a further mass casualty attack, our
counter-terrorism measures need to evolve as fast and as effectively as do the
terrorists. Terrorist attacks happen when intent meets capability. We need to
work on both sides of this equation.
The EU CT Strategy
It has been the
long-standing policy of the EU to treat Terrorism as crime, to be tackled
within the framework of criminal law. This approach has many obvious
advantages, not least the fact that it helps de-glamorise the terrorists. The
"prisoners of war" in Guantanamo are a staple of Al Qaeda propaganda,
convicted prisoners in European jails do not get a mention.
Terrorism is
different to other forms of crime in that it is conducted in the hope of
political gain, rather than financial gain. This explains the high political
importance attached to the fight against terrorism, and consequent need for a
political response. The fight against terrorism is one of the key areas in
which, according to Eurobarometer surveys, European citizens see the need for a
common European response.
However,
concentrating on terrorism simply as a criminal phenomenon does have
disadvantages. It tends to downplay the factors that motivate terrorism, and
encourage a straightforward repressive approach. In the past, CT measures have
often been considered only in great haste in reaction to major attacks. In
these circumstances there is again an imperative to take visible repressive
action. The EU CT strategy was deliberately designed to remedy this defect by
setting out a comprehensive approach, to be implemented steadily, and so
providing a more solid and durable basis for long term success against
terrorism. Indeed, the best way to overcome "CT fatigue" is to
maintain a steady pace rather than try to sprint ahead too quickly and end up
falling behind.
The analysis we
have made of what has been done so far under the strategy, on which a draft is
being circulated separately, shows how much has been done, but also what still
remains to do. Much has already been achieved in Europe, especially in terms of
PROTECT and PURSUE. To balance this more work needs to be done in the PREVENT
and RESPOND strands.
The 10 Key Challenges:
1. Victims
: we need to do more to support the victims of terrorism. This is important for
its own sake, to show that our policy is centred on helping our citizens who
are the targets of terrorism. The victims of terrorism are victims of an attack
that is directed at society as a whole, and thus society must show its
solidarity, recognition and support; not just for their healing process, but to
de-legitimize and de-glamorise the appeal of terrorism. In order to justify
their murders, terrorists de-humanize their victims. We must bring the human
element back into the centre-ground.
2. Human
Rights. We need to maintain broad support for the fight against terrorism
both within the EU, and internationally. Crucial to this is making the case
that effective counter terrorism measures and the promotion of human rights
really are mutually reinforcing goals. Most importantly, the transatlantic
relationship will remain crucial to Europe’s security and the approach of the
new US Administration, strongly motivated by human rights concerns, is a
significant opportunity to deepen the EU – US partnership. We need to lay
the basis for this by concluding an agreement on data protection and data
sharing, as well as a robust long term agreement to support the Terrorist
Finance Tracking Program. A set of common principles in the fight against
terrorism, as proposed in the EU-US Statement on Guantanamo could reinforce the
legal foundation for our joint efforts. These efforts should focus not only on
creating our own common space of justice and security, but we should also work
together more in third countries and international institutions to expand that
space of justice and security more widely. We need to maintain the consensus in
the UN behind the global CT strategy, and develop it further, for example
through the CCIT.
3. We need to
intensify and broaden our Prevent work. Extensive studies have looked into
why people become terrorists. They have shown that the drivers of this kind of
radicalisation are not confined to one faith or political persuasion. A
particular challenge is thus to prevent terrorism without stigmatising any
community. We need to proceed with an open mind and great sensitivity in order
to get the balance right. In doing so, we have to challenge our own thinking as
a fair part of what can be done to prevent violent radicalisation falls outside
core CT-focus, yet they remain 'CT-relevant' policies. Cross-cultural dialogue,
community cohesion and participation have an obvious CT dividend, but this is
devalued if CT is seen as the main driver.
I am
increasingly convince that we need both to prevent radicalisation but also to promote
good relations and practices in terms of community engagement. Again, this
implies looking beyond looking beyond core CT tasks, but instead at CT-relevant
policies and practices. That is why we are very engaged in improving
cross-cultural relations through initiatives, like the Alliance of
Civilisations. We need more genuine cross-cultural dialogue. To break the
vicious circle and find ways to understand the differences. Also from the
perspective of preventing extremism is dialogue of great value as it
constitutes a clear rebuttal of the propaganda of extremists.
This is a field
where we rely heavily on Member States to take the lead. A number have already
done so as "lead countries" for particular strands of work as set out
in my previous reports. In going forward, I would like to highlight the
Netherlands, who with a concrete and practical focus on the role of local
actors have created a de-facto experience-sharing network of the local actors
from some ten Member States. It is through this kind of sharing of best practices
and concrete operational tools that we need to proceed. Only by building upon
the first-hand experience of local professionals - be they teachers, youth
workers, police officers or community liaison officers - will we deal with the
reality on the ground. Indeed, we need more of a multi-disciplinary approach to
fully grasp the challenges and to identify real responses.
4. Development
and Security (including ESDP) We need to respond to the problem of failed
& failing states, which provide potential havens not only for terrorists
but for all forms of crime. Without security, development is impossible, for
example we cannot achieve targets for female education if terrorists burn down
all the schools which admit women. This is increasingly recognised by the
development community, but there is still a reluctance to use aid money to
tackle the security challenges facing these countries. We need to work to make
sure the causes of insecurity and conflict are taken more into account in
developing programmes to support sustainable development. We should also
continue to improve the coordination between internal security instruments and
CFSP/ESDP tools, not only in sharing information, but also in sharing expertise
to make sure that the extensive contribution the EU makes to creating security
and expanding the rule of law across the world has a visible dividend in terms
of internal security. This is needed to justify the continued contribution
particularly of domestic law enforcement personnel to these missions.
5. The Legal
Framework The 2008 Framework Decision on incitement, recruitment and
training was a major step forward. We now need to follow its implementation.
More generally we need to continue with the approximation of Member States
criminal law to ensure that differing definitions do not give rise to loopholes
in which behaviour illegal in one Member State can simply shift to another.
This is particularly important where new offences are being created.
A new legal
instrument based on mutual recognition allowing for the collection of evidence
in cross border investigations, and covering all forms of investigative
measures, is needed to allow genuinely integrated cross border investigations;
and in terrorism investigations a cross border element is much more frequent
than in ordinary crime. We should also examine the need to adopt common
legislation on new investigation techniques (e.g. on line computer search).
Other challenges include the need to think about the correct legal framework to
tackle "participation" in terrorist groups when such groups are loose
or even have at best a virtual existence (as with the "lone wolf");
and whether going to a terrorist training camp abroad should be made an offence
as it has in some Member States.
6.
Information Management and Data Protection The Zazi case in the US shows
how data collection can be an effective tool in CT investigations. However,
fragmented requests for new data collection measures without any explanation of
underlying strategy have allowed a myth to grow that there is a secret
"Big Brother" plan. The real problem has been that we have had no
plan. We need to develop a strategy for collecting all the data we need,
but for privacy protection this must be only the data which are
necessary. The proposed Council Conclusions are a major step forward in
achieving this by setting out a methodology to ensure that the decisions on
management and exchange of data are taken in a coherent, professional,
efficient, cost-effective, accountable and comprehensible way.
In most lessons
learned exercises after major terrorist incidents there are indications that an
attack could have been stopped had all the relevant information been available
to the right people at the right time. We need to improve the way in which
Member States are feeding information to Europol and Eurojust. All Member
States should also have a national fusion centre and we should set up a network
connecting them. Depending on the findings of the EU Information Management
Strategy and the lessons learned from national experience with PNR systems, we
should examine in this context the need for an EU PNR, and the possibility of
an EU Terrorist Tracking Financial Programme (TFTP). An added benefit of
developing our own European PNR (or even TFTP) models would be the development
of a more equal partnership with the US.
7. Soft
targets : among the favourite targets of terrorist groups have been
transport systems, and prestige hotels. We need to intensify the current work
on aviation and maritime security, in close cooperation with transport
operators in order to mitigate the impact on the travelling public (eg to find
ways in which we can resume allowing liquids to be taken on planes). We also
need to start working potential targets which have received less attention such
as urban mass transit and high speed rail.
Major events
(most recently the Oktoberfest in Germany) have
been subject to specific terrorist threats. In a number of countries terrorist
organizations specifically target the tourism industry in order to inflict
financial damage. A lesson from the Mumbai attacks is that we need to develop
and exercise emergency plans to respond to multiple attacks in large cities.
There are a number of events in the coming years, such as the 2012 Olympics and
Euro 2012, where a successful terrorist attack would have obvious
trans-national consequences. The EU needs to continue to reinforce the civil
protection mechanisms available to it (eg MIC, and Respond "modules")
and also have an ambitious programme of exercises to test these systems and
generate ideas for developing them further not least in the context of
post-Lisbon arrangements (see below).
8. Critical
Infrastructure & Cyberspace We need to think about what in today's
world constitutes “critical infrastructure” and extend the Directive on the
protection of critical infrastructures accordingly. More widely there is a need
to ensure overall coordination of the various aspects of the fight against
terrorism in cyberspace. This needs to be seen not only as critical
infrastructure, but also as an arena for the propaganda war and for recruitment
to terrorism), a space in which terrorists need to be tracked and monitored,
the venue for cybercrime and potentially also for targeted attacks
(cyber-warfare). We need to balance citizens legitimate expectations of privacy
in the virtual world with the ability to track those who mean serious harm (eg
in the regulation of encryption).
9. Public
Private Partnerships We need to do more to actively engage the private
sector and develop Public Private Partnerships in CT. We should start by
setting up proactive and sustained dialogue with the private sector. This could
be initiated by a Summit meeting of representatives of the European security
industry with the new EU institutions and representatives of the Member States.
One of the results of such dialogue should be the configuration of informal
networks between policy, CT practitioners, the private sector and civil
society. In addition to the
transport sector (as mentioned above), more work needs to be done with the
private operators of hotels and other large venues (including hospitals etc.).
Another priority should be to collect best practices on the relations between
the financial institutions and the law enforcement and intelligence
communities. In CT in particular, there are fewer of the suspicious patterns
visible in money laundering and financial institutions need more help in
spotting suspicious transactions.
10. Security-related
research : unlike the military, law enforcement does not have a tradition
of forward planning for its future requirements from technology. The market for
internal security products in Europe remains highly fragmented. It would help
law enforcement, and also help create a stronger European security industry if
we could develop and expand a genuine dialogue on future technology needs in
the field of internal security.
The ESRIF report provides a good basis for this. We should also
reinforce the European Network of Internal Security Technology Departments, and
seek to increase the synergies in the field of research between Defence and
Internal Security.
Next Steps
The
disappearance of the Pillars will allow for more integrated policies in a
number of areas. In counter-terrorism, as outlined in the key challenges above,
internal and external aspects are inextricably entwined, and a multi
disciplinary cross Ministerial approach is essential. The collapse of the
barriers between pillars will facilitate such an approach within the EU's
institutions and greatly increase efficiency in policy making. Just as
particular examples, it will facilitate links between law enforcement agencies
and CFSP Missions, and it will allow closer cooperation between Europol and
Frontex.
In terms of
future operational cooperation, COSI should set the framework within which
Member States and EU Agencies operate in the field of CT. In particular, more
needs to be done to promote the setting up of JIT's in the field of CT with the
participation of Europol and Eurojust (with EC financial support). We will need
to develop and adopt rapidly the decision-making procedure for the use of the
solidarity clause. The CCA offers a good and well tested model for this.
Otherwise, the
future organisation of the EU institutions following entry into force of the
Lisbon Treaty remains to be finally determined, and this is not the right
moment to get into organisational detail. However, it would greatly help in
taking work forward at an EU level if there were a network of senior national
officials each of whom had an overall view at a policy level of their country’s
work on CT. Many Member States have designated a national Counter-Terrorism
Coordinator (CTC). As
administrative systems vary greatly, there is no simple model which can be
transferred everywhere, and each Member State would need to find its own
solution. But given the particular political sensitivity of CT work, I would
value the "reality check" which such a network of senior officials
would provide.
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